Censorship by Proxy: The First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link by Kreimer, Seth F.
University of Pennsylvania Law School
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository
Faculty Scholarship
11-21-2006
Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment,
Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the
Weakest Link
Seth F. Kreimer
University of Pennsylvania, skreimer@law.upenn.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship
Part of the Communications Law Commons, Communication Technology and New Media
Commons, Computer Law Commons, Constitutional Law Commons, First Amendment Commons,
Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, and the Science and Technology Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty
Scholarship by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu.
Recommended Citation
Kreimer, Seth F., "Censorship by Proxy: the First Amendment, Internet Intermediaries, and the Problem of the Weakest Link" (2006).
Faculty Scholarship. Paper 127.
http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/127
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
 
 
(11) 
 
ARTICLES 
CENSORSHIP BY PROXY:  THE FIRST AMENDMENT, INTERNET 
INTERMEDIARIES, AND THE PROBLEM OF THE WEAKEST LINK 
SETH F. KREIMER†
The rise of the Internet has changed the First Amendment drama, for gov-
ernments confront technical and political obstacles to sanctioning either speak-
ers or listeners in cyberspace.  Faced with these challenges, regulators have fallen 
back on alternatives, predicated on the fact that, in contrast to the usual free 
expression scenario, the Internet is not dyadic.  The Internet’s resistance to di-
rect regulation of speakers and listeners rests on a complex chain of connec-
tions, and emerging regulatory mechanisms have begun to focus on the weak 
links in that chain.  Rather than attacking speakers or listeners directly, gov-
ernments have sought to enlist private actors within the chain as proxy censors 
to control the flow of information. 
Some commentators have celebrated such indirect methods of governmental 
control as salutary responses to threatening cyberanarchy.  This Article takes a 
more jaundiced view of these developments:  I begin by mapping the ubiquity of 
efforts to enlist Internet intermediaries as proxy censors.  I emphasize the dan-
gers to free expression that are likely to arise from attempts to target weak links 
in the chain of Internet communications and cast doubt on the claim that mar-
ket mechanisms can be relied upon to dispel them.  I then proceed to explore the 
doctrinal resources that can meet those dangers. 
The gambit of enlisting the private sector to establish a system to control ex-
pression is not new in the United States.  I argue that the First Amendment doc-
trines developed in response to the last such focused effort, during the McCarthy 
era, provide a series of useful starting points for a First Amendment doctrine to 
protect the weak links of the Internet. 
 
 † Kenneth W. Gemmill Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania Law School.  
This Article has benefitted from the generous insight of Ed Baker, Greg Lastowka, and 
Polk Wagner, as well as the extraordinary research assistance of Mihir Kshirsagar.  
They are entitled to my great thanks for their efforts, but are without responsibility for 
any errors or omissions that remain. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The archetypal actors in the First Amendment drama appear on 
stage in dyads:  in free speech narratives, a speaker exhorts a listener; 
in free press accounts, a publisher distributes literature to readers.1  In 
the usual plot, the government seeks to disrupt this dyad (for legiti-
mate or illegitimate reasons) by focusing sanctions on the source of 
the speech.  The government attempts to license her, to tax her en-
terprise, or to threaten her with civil or criminal penalties; courts re-
spond by evaluating the legality of those attempts.  On occasion, the 
government turns its efforts to the listener, seeking to punish receipt 
of illicit messages or possession of illicit materials preparatory to read-
ing them, and the courts proceed to evaluate the constitutionality of 
those proposed sanctions. 
The Internet, as a network of networks, alters the drama. When 
communication utilizes the Internet, government finds it more diffi-
cult to sanction either speaker or listener.  Speakers can hide their 
identities, impeding direct coercion; they can extend the reach of 
their communications into foreign jurisdictions that may face legal or 
practical impediments to exerting control.  Even where speakers are 
theoretically subject to sanctions, the exponential increase in the 
number of speakers with potential access to broad audiences multi-
plies the challenge for censors seeking to suppress a message.2  On 
1 First Amendment analysis thus usually involves a speaker, who “expresses” be-
liefs, information, or insights, and a listener who “considers” and chooses whether to 
adopt them.  Justice Kennedy’s formulation captures the tone of this archetype:  “At 
the heart of the First Amendment lies the principle that each person should decide for 
him or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, consideration, and adher-
ence.”  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994), quoted with approval in 
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003). 
2 With a constant marginal cost of prosecution, an increase in the number of 
speakers who must be sanctioned raises the cost of suppression, at least proportionally; 
given a constant enforcement budget, this increase in speakers decreases the probabil-
ity of successful suppression.  When the U.S. Department of Justice sought to suppress 
publication of the Pentagon Papers, it was able to direct its attention (albeit ultimately 
unsuccessfully) at a finite series of major newspapers.  See N.Y. Times Co. v. United 
States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (rebuffing efforts “to enjoin the New York Times and 
the Washington Post from publishing the contents of a classified study entitled ‘History 
of U.S. Decision-Making Process on Viet Nam Policy’”); see also H. Bruce Franklin, Pen-
tagon Papers Chase, THE NATION, July 9, 2001, at 31, 34 (reporting that after the initial, 
temporary injunction against the New York Times’ publication of the Pentagon Papers, 
Daniel Ellsberg “began to deploy the multiple copies he had stashed in secret loca-
tions,” and that “[a]s soon as one paper was enjoined, another would start publishing 
until seventeen newspapers got into the action”). 
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the listeners’ side, an expanding universe of seekers of forbidden con-
tent can obtain access to material in private without leaving their 
homes, bypassing both formal and informal obstacles, and can pursue 
alternative pathways when a particular route is blocked.  The mantra is 
that “the Internet interprets censorship as damage, and routes around 
it.”3
Faced with these challenges, state actors who seek to control 
Internet communications have begun to explore strategies that target 
neither speakers nor listeners.  Regulators have fallen back on alterna-
tives predicated on the fact that, in contrast to the usual free expres-
sion drama, the Internet is not dyadic.  The Internet’s resistance to di-
rect regulation of speakers and listeners rests on a complex chain of 
connections, and emerging regulatory mechanisms have begun to fo-
cus on the weak links in that chain.  Rather than attacking speakers or 
listeners directly, governments have sought to enlist private actors 
within the chain as proxy censors to control the flow of information. 
Some commentators have celebrated such indirect methods as 
salutary responses to threatening cyberanarchy.  Jack Goldsmith 
opines that local control of service providers could allow governments 
appropriate leverage over foreign content,4 while Neal Katyal argues 
 By contrast, when Universal Studios sought to suppress copies of the DeCSS pro-
gram, which allowed users to circumvent DVD encryption, it found itself confronted 
with an unending series of copies that sprang up hydra-like over Internet mirror sites 
around the world.  See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 441 (2d Cir. 
2001) (describing “electronic civil disobedience” (quotation marks omitted)); Kristin 
R. Eschenfelder & Anuj C. Desai, Software as Protest:  The Unexpected Resiliency of U.S.-
Based DeCSS Posting and Linking, 20 INFO. SOC’Y 101 (2004) (demonstrating the prolif-
eration of U.S.-based websites either posting or linking to the DeCSS program over the 
course of the Universal Studios lawsuit); Kristin R. Eschenfelder et al., The Limits of 
DeCSS Posting:  A Comparison of Internet Posting of DVD Circumvention Devices in the Euro-
pean Union and China, 31 J. INFO. SCI. 317, 318 (2005) (surveying such posting and link-
ing on a range of non-U.S.-based websites, especially on sites in the Netherlands, Ger-
many, and Great Britain); cf. Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 
1195, 1204-05 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (describing efforts by a voting machine manufacturer 
to end the publication of its internal email records on a series of websites); Why War?, 
Targeting Diebold with Electronic Civil Disobedience, http://why-war.com/features/2003/ 
10/diebold.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (describing an activist group’s tactic of set-
ting up mirror sites to avoid the voting machine manufacturer’s efforts to suppress 
documents); Why War?, Diebold Campaign Analyzed, http://www.why-war.com/features/ 
2003/11/diebold_analyzed.html (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (same). 
3 Philip Elmer-Dewitt, First Nation in Cyberspace, TIME, Dec. 6, 1993, at 62, 64 (quot-
ing “Internet pioneer John Gilmore”). 
4 Jack L. Goldsmith, Against Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1217-22 (1998) 
(arguing that “a nation can regulate people and equipment in its territory to control 
the local effects of the extraterritorial activity,” in part by imposing obligations regard-
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that Internet service providers (ISPs) “will often be essential in pre-
venting cybercrime.”5  Jonathan Zittrain has taken the position that 
judicious pressure on Internet “points of control” offers an admirable 
“chance of approximating the legal and practical frameworks by which 
sovereigns currently sanction illegal content apart from the Internet,”6 
while Joel Reidenberg commends the enlistment of Internet interme-
diaries as a means of reestablishing the primacy of “democratically 
chosen law” and the ability of states to protect their citizens.7  Ronald 
Mann and Seth Belzley laud the promise of exerting control over 
payment intermediaries,8 while Doug Lichtman and Eric Posner have 
argued strenuously that “ISPs should be called into the service of the 
law” by imposing vicarious liability.9
This Article takes a more jaundiced view of these developments.  I 
begin by mapping the ubiquity of efforts to enlist Internet intermedi-
aries as proxy censors.  I emphasize the dangers to free expression 
that are likely to arise from attempts to target weak links in the chain 
of Internet communications and cast doubt on the claim that market 
mechanisms can be relied upon to dispel them.  I then proceed to ex-
ing “the local means through which foreign content is transferred”); see also Jack L. 
Goldsmith, The Internet and the Abiding Significance of Territorial Boundaries, 5 IND. J. 
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 475, 481 (1998) (“In cyberspace, as in real space, offshore regu-
lation evasion does not prevent a nation from indirectly regulating extraterritorial ac-
tivity that has local effects.”). 
5 Neal Kumar Katyal, Criminal Law in Cyberspace, 149 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 1100 
(2001). 
6 Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 688 (2003).  Zit-
train has had second thoughts about this strategy, though.  See Jonathan Zittrain, The 
Generative Internet, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1974, 2028, 2037 (2006) (arguing that the “most 
important opportunities for . . . creativity ought to be retained as the Internet evolves” 
and exploring ways to “reduce pressure on institutional and technological gatekeep-
ers”). 
7 Joel R. Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1951, 
1952-53 (2005); see also Joel R. Reidenberg, States and Internet Enforcement, 1 U. OTTAWA 
L. & TECH. J. 213, 216 (2003) (“For states to meet their responsibilities in the online 
world, states must find ways to transpose the powers of enforcement to the internet.”). 
8 Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary Liability, 47 
WM. & MARY L. REV. 288-90 (2005); see also Ronald J. Mann, Regulating Internet Payment 
Intermediaries, 82 TEX. L. REV. 681 (2004) (advocating regulation of payment interme-
diaries to control new modes of communication and interaction made possible by the 
Internet). 
9 Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers Accountable 5 
(Univ. of Chi. Law Sch., John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 217 (2d Se-
ries), 2004), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=573502; cf. Tim Wu, When Code 
Isn’t Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 679, 711-17 (2003) (arguing that copyright enforcement has 
always been focused on intermediaries (publishers) rather than end users). 
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plore the doctrinal resources by which a system of free expression can 
meet those dangers.   
The gambit of enlisting the private sector to establish a system to 
control expression is not new in the United States.  I argue that the 
First Amendment doctrines developed in response to the last such fo-
cused effort, during the McCarthy era, provide a series of useful start-
ing points for a First Amendment doctrine to protect the weak links of 
the Internet. 
I.  THE PHENOMENON:  PROXY CENSORSHIP 
AND INTERNET INTERMEDIARIES 
The very plurality of private actors who cooperate to achieve 
Internet communications provides governments seeking to recruit 
proxy censors with a target-rich environment in three dimensions.10  
First, the networks of the Internet involve a series of electronic links; 
at each link, from user to originating computer to server to ISP to 
Internet backbone and back down the chain to the end user, the state 
may find a potential proxy censor.  Each intermediary may interdict 
communications, or identify speakers, listeners, or other intermediar-
ies against whom sanctions may be directed.11
Second, as Herbert Simon pointed out a generation ago, “a wealth 
of information creates a poverty of attention,”12 and the wealth of in-
formation on the Internet multiplies at an exponential rate.  The 
10 See Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake:  The Re-
emergence of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6 (2003) (describing 
the prospect of recruiting ISPs, search engines, content producers, and online service 
providers to serve as regulatory proxies, and focusing on surveillance facilitated by data 
retention, disclosure, and access requirements); Katyal, supra note 6, at 1095-1106 (dis-
cussing law enforcement strategies to recruit ISPs, credit card companies, and equip-
ment manufacturers as gatekeepers); Zittrain, The Generative Internet, supra note 6, at 
2001 (explaining that a primary focus of Internet regulation has been the imposition 
of gatekeeping obligations on private intermediaries, such as routers, ISPs, and tech-
nology providers); Jonathan Zittrain, A History of Online Gatekeeping, 19 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 253 (2006) (same). 
11 See Steven Cherry, The Net Effect, IEEE SPECTRUM, June 2005, at 38, 44, available 
at http://www.spectrum.ieee.org/jun05/1219 (quoting Seth Finkelstein, a Cambridge, 
Massachusetts programmer, as remarking:  “There’s a famous saying, ‘The Internet 
considers censorship to be damage, and routes around it.’  I say, what if censorship is 
in the router?”). 
12 Herbert Simon, Speech at the Johns Hopkins University and Brookings Institu-
tion Symposium:  Designing Organizations for an Information-Rich World, in COM-
PUTERS, COMMUNICATIONS, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 37, 40 (Martin Greenberger ed., 
1971). 
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
2006] CENSORSHIP BY PROXY 17 
 
emerging organization of Internet communications relies on search 
engines, blogrolls, RSS feeds, links, and other directories to allow us-
ers to sort through the vast amounts of available information and allo-
cate their limited stock of attention.  These actors constitute a second 
set of potential weak links between speaker and listener.  Even where a 
prospective speaker retains the technical capacity to reach prospective 
listeners, she must still catch their attention in a communicative uni-
verse populated with upwards of 600 billion webpages and 50 million 
blogs.13  A government intervention that interferes effectively with the 
ability of intermediaries (whether search engines or well-attended 
websites)14 to direct attention to particular speakers renders those 
speakers as unable to communicate with mass audiences as if they 
were silent and invisible. 
The technically demanding structure of the Internet offers a third 
set of potential weak links, in the form of the providers of specialized 
equipment and services upon which effective Internet access depends.  
To the extent that potential regulators can induce these providers to 
disrupt communications, whether by blocking payment to targeted 
websites, or by embedding obstacles to communication and mecha-
nisms of surveillance in the hardware or software that facilitates com-
munication, they can spawn effective proxy censors. 
Government actors have been far from insensitive to these oppor-
tunities to develop systems of censorship by proxy.  Unable to reach 
those who originate or receive communications, official actors have 
sought to exert pressure on intermediaries with authority over what 
Professor Zittrain characterizes as “points of control,”15 in order to 
prevent Internet communications from reaching their intended audi-
ence. 
13 Kevin Kelly, We Are the Web, WIRED, Aug. 2005, at 92, 96, 99, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/13.08/tech.html. 
14 Blogs seem to have developed a “power law distribution” that focuses a large 
proportion of blog traffic through a small number of websites.  Clay Shirky, Power 
Laws, Weblogs and Inequality (Feb. 2003), http://www.shirky.com/writings/ 
powerlaw_weblog.html; see also David Post, Temple Univ. Law Sch., Liberty! Equality! 
Diversity!  Internet “Intermediaries” and the Nature of the Net, Presentation at  
Michigan State University (April 2005), http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/dpost/ 
scaling.pdf (observing that the most-visited websites, such as Google, Yahoo!, and eBay, 
often serve intermediary functions). 
15 See Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, supra note 6, at 656 fig.1 (mapping different 
points of control). 
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A.  Proxy Censorship Abroad 
Internationally, China has led the way in targeting ISPs, routers, 
and search engines as a means of controlling access to Internet con-
tent.16  Famously, Google has recently agreed to mimic the censorship 
of the Chinese government in its Chinese search engine,17 and other 
intermediaries have followed suit.18  Elsewhere in the world, authori-
tarian countries are not far behind in seeking to enlist intermediaries, 
often deploying technology supplied by western firms.19  In Pakistan, 
16 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., Online Briefing Book:  Internet Freedom of 
Expression in China and Other Anti-Democratic Countries, http://www.cdt.org/ 
international/censorship (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (listing documents that chronicle 
China’s record of Internet censorship); OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN 
CHINA IN 2004-2005: A COUNTRY STUDY (2005), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/ 
studies/china/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf (detailing China’s “Internet filtering” 
practices); see also, e.g., Cherry, supra note 11, at 40 (quoting critics of China’s Internet 
censorship); Bridget Johnson, Bloggers Get No Leeway in China, L.A. DAILY NEWS, Apr. 
25, 2006, available at http://www.dailynews.com/bridgetjohnson/ci_3750849 (report-
ing on the censorship of bloggers in China); Alexa Olesen, Rights Group  
Says Yahoo Helped China Jail Journalist, USA TODAY, Sept. 6, 2005, available  
at http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/2005-09-06-yahoo-china-journalist_x.htm (“A 
French media watchdog said . . . that information provided by . . . Yahoo Inc. helped 
Chinese authorities convict and jail a writer who had penned an e-mail about press re-
strictions.”); Associated Press, Microsoft Censors Chinese Blogs, WIRED NEWS, June 13, 
2005, http://www.wired.com/news/culture/0,1284,67842,00.html (“Microsoft is co-
operating with China’s government to censor the company’s newly launched  
Chinese-language web portal . . . .”); Will Knight, Google Omits Controversial News  
Stories in China, NEWSCIENTIST.COM, Sept. 21, 2004, http://www.newscientist.com/ 
article.ns?id=dn6426 (“Google has been accused of supporting Chinese internet con-
trols by omitting contentious news stories from search results in China.”); OpenNet 
Initiative, Bulletin 006:  Google Search & Cache Filtering Behind China’s Great Fire-
wall (Aug. 30, 2004), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/bulletins/006 (observing that 
Google yields truncated results when accessed through Chinese websites,); Jonathan 
Zittrain & Benjamin Edelman, Empirical Analysis of Internet Filtering in China, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/filtering/china (last updated Mar. 20, 2003) (identify-
ing at least four methods of Internet filtering in China). 
17 See Clive Thompson, Google’s China Problem (And China’s Google Problem), N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 23, 2006, § 6, at 64 (“To obey China’s censorship laws [Google] had 
agreed to purge its search results of any websites disapproved of by the Chinese gov-
ernment . . . .”); Andrew Keen, Google in the Garden of Good and Evil:  How the Search-
Engine Giant Moved Beyond Mere Morality, DAILY STANDARD, May 3, 2006,  
http://www.weeklystandard.com/Content/Public/Articles/000/000/012/176wtlbv.asp 
(“Everything that the Chinese government blocks, Google also blocks.”). 
18 See, e.g., John Leyden,  Skype Uses Peer Pressure Defense To Explain China Text Cen-
sorship, THE REGISTER, Apr. 20, 2006, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/20/ 
skype_china_censorship_row (“VoIP firm Skype has admitted that its Chinese partner 
filters instant messages sent using its software to comply with local censorship laws.”). 
19 The OpenNet Initiative has recently published studies of the efforts of Yemen, 
Saudi Arabia, Burma, Singapore, the United Arab Emirates, Iran, and Bahrain to do 
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
2006] CENSORSHIP BY PROXY 19 
 
the Supreme Court has ordered that a criminal case be filed against a 
variety of telecommunications officials and Internet intermediaries for 
failing to block the showing of Danish newspaper cartoons caricatur-
ing the Prophet Muhammad.20  In response, several American legisla-
tors have introduced the “Global Online Freedom Act,” purporting to 
bar American Internet intermediaries—including search engines and 
blog hosts—from complying with demands by “Internet-restricting 
countries.”21
The gambit of recruiting proxy censors has been attractive as well 
to countries with somewhat better-rooted rights of free expression.  
Western European efforts to control Internet access to particular con-
tent have begun to target intermediaries.  France has sought to im-
pose liability on Yahoo! for making overseas Nazi messages and images 
available to French citizens and extraterritorially presenting Nazi 
memorabilia for purchase, while Swiss police have induced ISPs to 
so.  OpenNet Initiative, Case Studies, http://www.opennetinitiative.net/index.php 
(follow “Case Studies” hyperlink) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).  Other sources have 
tracked the same types of efforts.  See, e.g., Iran Tightens Web Filters, RED HERRING, Oct. 
24, 2005 (available with subscription at http://www.redherring.com and on file with  
the author) (describing how Iran used a California company’s filtering software to fur-
ther its Internet censorship efforts); OPENNET INITIATIVE, INTERNET FILTERING IN  
IRAN IN 2004-2005:  A COUNTRY STUDY 16-17 (2005), http://www.opennetinitiative.net/ 
studies/iran/ONI_Country_Study_Iran.pdf (reporting that Internet content targeted 
for filtering in Iran included opposition websites, some lesbian and gay sites, and many 
blogs, especially those written in Farsi); REPORTERS WITHOUT BORDERS, THE INTERNET 
“BLACK HOLES”:  2006 ANNUAL REPORT:  INTERNET (2006), http://www.rsf.org/ 
IMG/pdf/internet_report.pdf (identifying various countries’ censorship of the Inter-
net and reporting that western firms have facilitated such censorship); Mahmood Sa-
beri & Mariam Al Serkal, Isn’t It Time To Stop Kidding?, GULFNEWS.COM,  Feb. 12, 2005, 
http://www.gulfnews.com/articles/05/02/12/151585 (detailing filtering of nude 
paintings and dating sites by a government-run ISP monopoly in the United Arab 
Emirates); Kelley Beaucar Vlahos, U.S. Tech Firms Help Governments Censor the Internet, 
FOXNEWS.COM, July 19, 2005, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,162781,00.html 
(“Free speech advocates are frustrated with a host of American companies they say 
have been collaborating with oppressive regimes in countries like China, Iran, and 
Saudi Arabia, to help them filter and monitor the Internet activity of their citizens.”). 
20 See Pakistan Registers Blasphemy Case Over Prophet’s Cartoons, KHALEEJ TIMES, Apr. 26, 
2006, http://www.khalejtimes.com/DisplayArticleNew.asp?section=subcontinent&xfile=data/ 
subcontinent/2006/april/subcontinent_april1001.xml (describing a criminal action 
lodged against Hotmail, Yahoo!, and Google); Action Ordered Against Pakistan Telecom 
Chief, SOUTHASIANEWS.COM, Apr. 18, 2006, http://www.southasianews.com/64489/ 
Action-ordered-against-Pakistan-telecom-chief.htm (describing an action against tele-
communications officials for failing to block cartoons). 
21 Global Online Freedom Act of 2006, H.R. 4780, 109th Cong. § 301 (2006). 
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“voluntarily” block neo-Nazi sites.22  German courts have imposed 
strict liability on ISPs for hosting copyright infringement, one German 
jurisdiction has sought to require ISPs to block access to extraterrito-
rial neo-Nazi websites, and another has barred news sites from carry-
ing links to the home page of a company that may provide circumven-
tion technology.23  At least one major search engine has responded to 
these initiatives by blocking access by French, German, and Swiss users 
to websites that carry messages that could be regarded by those coun-
tries as illegal hate speech.24  So too, British Telecom has developed a 
filtering system that blocks access to sites placed on a child pornogra-
phy blacklist by the Internet Watch Foundation.25  Increasingly the 
22 See Yahoo!, Inc. v. La Ligue Contre le Racisme et l’Antisémitisme, 379 F.3d 1120, 
1121-22 (9th Cir. 2004) (declining to enjoin the enforcement of a French order be-
cause a voluntary change in Yahoo!’s policy cast doubt on the ripeness of the case and 
because of doubts as to personal jurisdiction), aff’d en banc, 433 F.3d 1199 (9th Cir. 
2006), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 2332 (2006); Benoît Frydman & Isabelle Rorive, Regulating 
Internet Content Through Intermediaries in Europe and the USA, 23 ZEITSCHRIFT FUR 
RECHTSSOZIOLOGIE 41, 45-49, available at http://www.isys.ucl.ac.be/etudes/cours/ 
linf2202/Frydman_&_Rorive_2002.pdf (discussing French and Swiss initiatives, and 
the unsuccessful German prosecution of a CompuServe executive for not blocking ac-
cess to child pornography); see also Eur. Digital Rights Initiative, French Court Issues 
Blocking Order to 10 ISPs, EDRI-GRAM, June 15, 2005, http://www.edri.org/ 
edrigram/number3.12/blocking (reporting a Paris court’s order to ten French ISPs to 
block access to a Holocaust-denial website hosted in the United States); Benoît 
Frydman & Isabelle Rorive, Racism, Xenophobia and Incitement Online:  European 
Law and Policy, http://www.selfregulation.info/iapcoda/rxio-background-020923.htm 
(last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (listing and briefly analyzing various examples of European 
efforts to enlist intermediaries in suppressing online hate speech). 
23 See Hit Bit Software GmbH v. AOL Bertelsmann Online GmbH, Munich Ober-
landesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Mar. 8, 2001, 2 European Copyright Design 
Report [ECDR] 375 (393-94) (F.R.G.), available at http://www.juriscom.net/ 
en/txt/jurisde/da/olgmunich20010308.pdf (imposing strict liability on an ISP for 
copyright violations); Eric T. Eberwine, Sound and Fury Signifying Nothing?  Jürgen Büs-
sow’s Battle Against Hate-Speech on the Internet, 49 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 353, 355-56 (2004) 
(discussing an order to all ISPs in the German State of Nordrhein-Westfalen  
(North Rhine-Westphalia) to block user access to U.S.-based neo-Nazi  websites); Jan  
Libbenga, Heise Ordered to Remove Link to Slysoft.com, THE REGISTER, Apr. 11,  
2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/04/11/heise_not_allowed_to_mention_slysoft 
(reporting that a German news site was enjoined from linking to an illegal music copy-
ing site). 
24 See Josh McHugh, Google v. Evil, WIRED, Jan. 2003, at 130, 133, available at 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/11.01/google_pr.html (discussing Google’s 
“moral compromise”). 
25 See Richard Clayton, Failures in a Hybrid Content Blocking System, 
http://www.cl.cam.ac.uk/~rnc1/cleanfeed.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (discussing 
the British Telecom filter); cf. John Tilak, TDC Activates Child Porn  
Filter, DIGITAL MEDIA NEWS FOR EUR., Oct. 24, 2005, http://www.dmeurope.com/ 
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European Union has advanced “co-regulation” initiatives, seeking to 
enlist intermediaries in the effort to suppress particular types of con-
tent,26 as well as “data retention” initiatives seeking to require inter-
mediaries to keep records that will be available to law enforcement.27  
In antipodal counterpoint, the Australian government has established 
a regime entitling censors and “co-regulatory” bodies to direct ISPs to 
take down “objectionable” content from their servers, and opposition 
parties continue to advocate for mandatory filtering by ISPs.28
default.asp?ArticleID=10886 (reporting on Danish ISP filtering “in cooperation with 
the national police”). 
26 See, e.g., Michael D. Birnhack & Jacob H. Rowbottom, Shielding Children:  The 
European Way, 79 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 175, 177 (2004) (describing a combination of co-
regulation and “hotlines”); Matthew Schruers, Note, The History and Economics of ISP 
Liability for Third Party Content, 88 VA. L. REV. 205, 226-30 (2002) (discussing European 
approaches); Christopher T. Marsden, Co- and Self-Regulation in European Media and 
Internet Sectors:  The Results of Oxford University’s Study, in ORG. FOR SEC. & CO-OPERATION 
IN EUR., THE MEDIA FREEDOM INTERNET COOKBOOK 76, 80 (Christian Möller & Ar-
naud Amouroux eds., 2004), available at http://www.osce.org/publications/rfm/ 
2004/12/12239_89_en.pdf  (noting the study’s recommendation of co-regulation); 
Council of Eur., 7th European Ministerial Conference on Mass Media Policy, 
http://www.coe.int/T/E/Com/Files/Ministerial-Conferences/2005-kiev (last visited 
Oct. 22, 2006) (recording the conference at which these co-regulation measures were 
discussed and adopted); PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW & POLICY, OXFORD 
UNIV. CTR. FOR SOCIO-LEGAL STUDIES, SELF-REGULATION OF DIGITAL MEDIA CONVERG-
ING ON THE INTERNET:  INDUSTRY CODES OF CONDUCT IN SECTORAL ANALYSIS 4 (2004), 
http://pcmlp.socleg.ox.ac.uk/text/IAPCODEfinal.pdf (“This report examines the 
regulation of harmful or otherwise inappropriate content . . . and the regulation of 
content by self-regulatory means by the media industry.”); see also Francoise Massit-
Follea, Internet Regulation and Governance, in VOX INTERNET SCIENTIFIC REPORT (2005), 
http://www.voxinternet.org/article.php3?id_article=24 (discussing international ap-
proaches to Internet governance). 
27 See Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr., Data Retention Page, http://www.epic.org/privacy/ 
intl/data_retention.html (discussing various European data-retention efforts). 
28 See DEP’T OF COMMC’NS, INFO. TECH. & THE ARTS, AUSTRALIAN GOVERNMENT 
REVIEW OF THE OPERATION OF SCHEDULE 5 TO THE BROADCASTING SERVICES  
ACT OF 1992 (2004), http://www.dcita.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/10920/ 
Online_Content_Review_Report.pdf (assessing the current state of Australia’s co-
regulatory scheme for Internet censorship); Elec. Frontiers Austl., Internet Censorship 
Laws in Australia, http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/cens1.html (last visited Oct. 
22, 2006) (providing “information about on-line censorship legislation in Australia”); 
Elec. Frontiers Austl., Labor’s Mandatory ISP Internet Blocking Plan, 
http://www.efa.org.au/Issues/Censor/mandatoryblocking.html (last visited Oct. 22, 
2006) (concluding that “mandatory ISP filtering would not be effective in protecting 
children, whether or not it is, or becomes, both technically feasible and technically 
practical”). 
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B.  Proxy Censorship in the United States 
Domestic efforts to suppress disfavored content on the Internet 
have begun to follow a similar course.  Congress has successfully re-
quired schools and libraries to install filtering software on their com-
puters to bar users’ access to material that is obscene as to minors, 
though constitutionally protected as to adults.29  Pending legislation 
proposes expanding this bar to “commercial social networking web-
sites.”30  States have sought to require ISPs to block content suspected 
of being child pornography or “harmful to minors,”31 and actions 
have been filed seeking to hold search engines and Internet hosting 
services liable for providing access to child pornography.32
29 See United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 214 (2003) (upholding the 
Children’s Internet Protection Act); cf. Miller v. Nw. Region Library Bd., 348 F. Supp. 
2d 563, 570-71 (M.D.N.C. 2004) (recounting a library’s decision to bar the plaintiff 
from using any computer with Internet access after a librarian observed nude images 
on the screen, even though the plaintiff claimed the images came from an unwanted 
pop-up). 
30 Deleting Online Predators Act of 2006, H.R. 5319, 109th Cong. (2006) (propos-
ing an amendment to the Communications Act of 1934). 
31 See, e.g., Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 610-11 
(E.D. Pa. 2004) (enjoining the enforcement of a Pennsylvania statute allowing the is-
suance of ex parte orders requiring ISPs to remove or disable access to websites con-
taining child pornography); Complaint at 2-6, The King’s English, Inc. v. Shurtleff,  
No. 2:05CV00485 DB (D. Utah June 9, 2005), available at http://www.cdt.org/ 
speech/utahwebblock/20050609hb260complaint.pdf (challenging a Utah statute im-
posing an obligation on ISPs to block material that is “harmful to minors”); Stipulated 
Order, The King’s English, No. 2:05CV00485 DB (D. Utah Aug. 25, 2006),  available at 
http://cdt.org/speech/20060829utah.pdf (entering a stipulated preliminary injunc-
tion against the enforcement of the contested Utah statute); cf. Voicenet Commc’ns, 
Inc. v. Pappert, 126 Fed. Appx. 55, 60 (3d Cir. 2005) (upholding the seizure of ISP 
equipment used to access child pornography on USENET). 
 In the interests of full disclosure, the reader should be aware that I was part of the 
counsel team for the plaintiffs in Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, and cur-
rently serve as a member of the ACLU counsel team in Pilchesky v. Miller, No. 3:05-CV-
2074 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 21, 2005).  The Pilchesky amended complaint is available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/PilcheskyComplaint.pdf, and is discussed infra 
notes 48 and 53. 
32 See, e.g., Report and Recommendation of the United States Magistrate Judge at 
1-2, Doe v. Bates, No. 5:05CV91 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 18, 2006) (on file with author) (reject-
ing liability for Yahoo! for hosting the “Candyman” e-group, alleged to be “a forum for 
sharing, posting, emailing, and transmitting hard-core illegal child pornography”); 
Complaint at 13-15, Toback v. Google, Inc., No. 06-007246 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 4, 2006) 
(on file with author) (seeking damages and an injunction against Google for allowing 
access to child pornography); see also Free Speech Coal. v. Gonzales, 406 F. Supp. 2d 
1196, 1212-13 (D. Colo. 2005) (enjoining the application of burdensome federal re-
cord-keeping rules to “secondary producers,” including websites that allow uploading 
of sexually explicit content). 
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In the area of intellectual property, an array of initiatives has tar-
geted intermediaries in the effort to suppress particular varieties of 
content distributed over the Internet.33  Congress has provided strong 
incentives under the DMCA for ISPs, search engines, and other in-
termediaries to take down or block access to websites that are alleged 
to contain content that infringes intellectual property rights;34 these 
incentives have been deployed to induce intermediaries to block ac-
cess to other, noninfringing content objectionable to copyright hold-
ers.35  Content owners have sought to push their legal entitlements 
33 See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement 
Without Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1346, 1352 (2004) (citing suits 
against makers of software, search engines, ISPs, credit card companies, venture capital 
firms, and websites that link to potentially infringing or cracking software); see also 
LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE 190-91 (2004) (describing lawsuits filed by copyright 
holders against intermediaries, such as lawyers and venture capital firms); Wu, supra 
note 9, at 684 (describing the Digital Millennium Copyright Act as an effort to reestab-
lish regulation through intermediaries). 
34 17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000). 
35 See, e.g., Rossi v. Motion Picture Ass’n of Am., 391 F.3d 1000, 1002 (9th Cir. 
2004) (describing the use of the DMCA’s notice and takedown provisions to induce an 
ISP to take down a website from which illegal content could not be downloaded); 
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204-05 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(detailing the use of DMCA notices to induce ISPs to take down websites containing 
internal memoranda that embarrassed a voting machine manufacturer, even though 
the websites were, in fact, protected fair use). 
 In Ellison v. Robertson, the court effectively required AOL to block its users’ access 
to USENET groups containing copyright-infringing material, on the basis of the 
DMCA obligation to block “repeated infringers.”  357 F.3d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 2004).  
The settlement in another aspect of the case required one of the defendants to de-
velop software to allow the plaintiff to delete offensive postings. See Press  
Release, Harlan Ellison, Copyright Infringement Action (Jan. 19, 2002), available at  
http://harlanellison.com/kick/crit_rls.htm. 
 The sexually explicit website Perfect 10 has been particularly aggressive in seeking 
to enlist intermediaries to enforce its alleged copyright entitlements regarding reveal-
ing pictures that appear on other sites.  See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 
2d 828, 832 (C.D. Cal. 2006) (seeking to impose liability on a search engine for failing 
to block links to allegedly infringing websites); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Visa Int’l Serv. Ass’n, 
No. C 04-0371 JW, 2004 WL 1773349, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 5, 2004) (bringing an ac-
tion to impose liability for the failure of a payment site to block payment to repeat-
infringing sites); Perfect 10 v. CCBill, L.L.C., 340 F. Supp. 2d 1077, 1082 (C.D. Cal. 
2004) (same); Perfect 10, Inc. v. Cybernet Ventures, Inc., 167 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1118 
(C.D. Cal. 2001) (bringing an action against an adult verification service for facilitating 
access to websites alleged to post some of Perfect 10’s copyrighted images). 
 For initiatives against other intermediaries under the DMCA, see, for example, 
Daniel W. Kopko, Looking for a Crack To Break the Internet’s Back:  The Listen4ever Case and 
Backbone Provider Liability Under the Copyright Act and the DMCA, 8 COMP. L. REV. & TECH. 
J. 83, 85 (2003) (discussing the lawsuit brought by thirteen record companies against 
the Internet’s four major “backbone” providers for failing to block access to a  
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further, asserting a right to unilaterally require ISPs to reveal the iden-
tity of subscribers who are alleged to violate intellectual property 
rights.36  They have sought the imposition of secondary liability to ef-
fectively oblige software and network providers to monitor their net-
works for infringing content,37 as well as regulatory initiatives to re-
quire manufacturers of digital devices to hardwire their products to 
respect copyright claims.38  Content providers have successfully in-
voked the DMCA to obtain orders preventing websites from linking to 
other websites that make available programs that could be used to cir-
cumvent copy protection.39
The “War on Terror” and other law enforcement initiatives have 
similarly sought leverage by pressing intermediaries to monitor or in-
terdict otherwise unreachable internet communications.  Thus, ap-
parently in 1999, antiterrorism units of the FBI adopted a “good cor-
porate citizenship program,” which empowered them to seek to 
website that offered free downloads of copyrighted music); Michael Davis-Wilson, 
Google DMCA Takedowns:  A Three-Month View, CHILLING EFFECTS, June 2, 2005, 
http://www.chillingeffects.org/weather.cgi?WeatherID=498 (detailing Google’s grow-
ing receipt of takedown demands); Seth Finkelstein, Google Censorship:  How It 
Works, Mar. 10, 2003, http://www.sethf.com/anticensorware/general/google-censorship.php 
(describing how Google censors its search results due to governmental pressure). 
36 See In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 393 F.3d 771, 773 (8th Cir. 2005) (quashing a 
subpoena to a conduit ISP); Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Verizon Internet Servs., 
Inc., 351 F.3d 1229, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (same).  Compare Atl. Recording Corp. v. 
Doe, 371 F. Supp. 2d 377, 377-78 (W.D.N.Y. 2005) (issuing an ex parte subpoena 
against a university to obtain ISP records of students alleged to have downloaded in-
fringing material), with Recording Indus. Ass’n of Am. v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 
367 F. Supp. 2d 945, 958 (M.D.N.C. 2005) (granting universities’ motions to quash 
similar subpoenas). 
37 See MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764, 2766 (2005) (seeking to 
impose liability for failure to prevent copyright violation by users of peer-to-peer net-
works); cf. In re Napster, Inc. Copyright Litig., No. C MDL-00-1369 MHP, 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 30338, at *8 (N.D. Cal. May 17, 2006) (seeking to impose liability on inves-
tors in enterprises that facilitated infringement by third parties); UMG Recordings, 
Inc. v. Hummer Winblad Venture Partners (In re Napster, Inc.), 377 F. Supp. 2d 796, 
799-800 (N.D. Cal. 2005) (same). 
 At least one amicus brief argued that secondary copyright liability should be im-
posed to encourage providers to configure systems that could be used to suppress 
other sorts of content judged illegal.  Brief for Kids First Coalition et al. as Amici Cu-
riae in Support of Petitioner, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-480). 
38 See Am. Library Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 692 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (reversing the 
FCC’s broadcast-flag-technology order). 
39 See Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 458 (2d Cir. 2001) (ap-
proving the invocation of the DMCA by motion picture studios).  But cf. Newborn v. 
Yahoo!, Inc., 391 F. Supp. 2d 181, 184 (D.D.C. 2005) (dismissing as poorly pleaded a 
complaint seeking to hold a search engine liable in a secondary copyright infringe-
ment suit). 
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induce ISPs to censor websites that were constitutionally protected but 
were not viewed by the FBI as consonant with the public interest.40  
The USA PATRIOT Act has provided federal officers with unilateral 
authority to demand that private intermediaries secretly turn over the 
records of those whose communications pass through their equip-
ment,41 an authority that the government has not been reluctant to 
exercise.42  Pre-9/11 legislation has been invoked to authorize re-
40 See Zieper v. Metzinger, 392 F. Supp. 2d 516, 522-23, 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (re-
viewing the FBI’s effort, under its “‘good corporate citizenship program,’” to require a 
website owner and ISPs to take down a video detailing an imaginary New Year’s Eve 
attack on Times Square). 
41 See, e.g., Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe I ) , 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 475 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (strik-
ing down the USA PATRIOT Act’s use for that purpose as unconstitutional, but staying 
the enforcement of the court’s judgment); Doe v. Gonzales (Doe II ) , 386 F. Supp. 2d 
66, 81 (D. Conn. 2005) (same).  Both cases were recently either remanded for recon-
sideration or dismissed as moot in light of amendments to the underlying statutory au-
thorization.  Doe v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, 421 (2d Cir. 2006) (vacating and remand-
ing Doe I, and dismissing Doe II as moot). 
42 See, e.g., Barton Gellman, The FBI’s Secret Scrutiny:  In Hunt for Terrorists, Bureau 
Examines Records of Ordinary Americans, WASH. POST, Nov. 6, 2005, at A1 (reporting the 
issuance of more than thirty thousand national security letters per year to holders of 
transaction records). 
 Official compulsion has not always been necessary.  For example, eBay enlisted in 
the “War on Terror” by volunteering to provide law enforcement with its enormous 
proprietary stock of data.  See Posting of Ernest Miller & Nimrod Kozlovski to Law-
Meme, eBay to Law Enforcement—We’re Here to Help, http://research.yale.edu/lawmeme/ 
modules.php?name=News&file=article&sid=925 (Feb. 17, 2003, 9:09 EST) (quoting 
eBay’s Director of Compliance and Law Enforcement Relations regarding this com-
pany policy).  Similarly, AT&T apparently acquiesced to federal requests to install 
monitoring devices in strategically placed Internet junctions, permitting monitoring of 
billions of Internet messages.  See Complaint at 1-2, Hepting v. AT&T Corp., 2006 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 41160 (N.D. Cal. June 6, 2006) (No. C-06-672 VRW), available at 
http://www.eff.org/legal/cases/att/att-complaint.pdf; see also Ryan Singel, Court Filing 
Confirms Spy Docs, WIRED NEWS, May 26, 2006, http://www.wired.com/news/ 
technology/0,71008-0.html (reporting on a former AT&T employee’s revelation of the 
company’s disputed practice); Ryan Singel, Whistle-Blower Outs NSA Spy Room, WIRED 
NEWS, Apr. 7, 2006, http://www.wired.com/news/technology/0,70619-0.html (same).  
A number of telephone companies have voluntarily provided federal authorities with 
local and long-distance phone records on tens of millions of Americans.  See, e.g., Leslie 
Cauley, NSA Has Massive Database of Americans’ Phone Calls, USA TODAY, May 11, 2006, 
at 1, available at http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2006-05-10-nsa_x.htm 
(“The National Security Agency has been secretly collecting the phone call records of 
tens of millions of Americans, using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and Bell-
South . . . .”); Matt Richtel & Ken Belson, U.S. Focused on Obtaining Long-Distance Phone 
Data, Company Officials Indicate, N.Y. TIMES, May 18, 2006, at A22 (concluding that the 
government’s efforts to obtain information from the nation’s phone companies to 
identify terrorists focused on long-distance carriers).  But cf. Elec. Frontier Found., Best 
Data Practices for Online Service Providers from the Electronic Frontier Foundation 
(Aug. 19, 2004), http://www.eff.org/osp/20040819_OSPBestPractices.pdf (outlining 
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quirements that intermediary networks structure their operations to 
facilitate wiretapping,43 while the USA PATRIOT Act and subsequent 
legislation have authorized ISPs to voluntarily disclose electronic 
transaction information to law enforcement authorities in order to 
avoid the “‘danger of death or serious physical injury.’”44  In pursuit of 
the “War on Terror,” the federal government has sought to impose 
criminal liability under material support statutes45 for assisting in the 
construction of a website that acts as an intermediary for Islamic de-
bate and discussion.46
This effort has not been limited to the “War on Terror.”  In more 
mundane pursuits, the New York Attorney General has successfully 
enlisted the aid of credit card companies in his effort to interdict off-
shore Internet gambling.47  Pennsylvania state police persuaded a Ca-
strategies for intermediaries to avoid retaining information that may be subject to sub-
poena). 
43 See Am. Council on Educ. v. FCC, 451 F.3d 226, 227 (D.C. Cir. 2006) (upholding 
a rule requiring networks to adopt technology that allows wiretapping). 
44 Birnhack & Elkin-Koren, supra note 10, ¶ 104 (quoting 18 U.S.C.A. § 2702(b) 
(2002)); cf., e.g., A.B. 1327, 212th Leg., 2006 Sess. (N.J. 2006), available at http:// 
www.njleg.state.nj.us/2006/bills/a1500/1327_i2.pdf (proposing to obligate ISPs and “in-
teractive computer services” to obtain and retain identifying information for posters 
and to disclose the information to the targets of “false or defamatory” postings). 
45 See 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B (2005) (prohibiting the provision of “material support 
or resources to designated foreign terrorist organizations”). 
46 Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, a computer science student in Idaho, was prosecuted 
for designing and maintaining a website for an Islamic charity that posted edicts from 
radical clerics along with pleas for peaceful dialogue and could be used to access links 
to sites operated by a designated terrorist group.  The government claimed the website 
functioned illegally to fund and recruit terrorists.  See Bob Fick, Trial Pits Free Speech vs. 
Terror, AKRON BEACON J., May 29, 2004, at A5 (quoting a prosecutor alleging that “Al-
Hussayen provided the linkage to create the platform and then the content to advo-
cate extreme jihad”); Richard B. Schmitt, Free Speech Crux of Terrorism Case:  Sami Omar 
Al-Hussayen’s Lawyers Say He Was Trying to Foster Dialogue on His Fatwa-Filled Websites, L.A. 
TIMES, May 23, 2004, at A25 (detailing the arrest of Al-Hussayen and the charges 
against him).  After a seven-week trial, Al-Hussayen was acquitted on the material sup-
port charges, but agreed to be deported in exchange for the immigration charges 
against him being dropped.  See Bob Fick, Feds Drop Charges in Deal that Sends Al-
Hussayen Home, SPOKESMAN REVIEW (Spokane, Wash.), July 1 2004, at A1.  For discus-
sion, see infra note 268 and accompanying text. 
47 See Press Release, Office of New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, 
Agreement Reached with Paypal To Bar New Yorkers from Online Gambling (Aug. 21, 
2002), available at http://www.oag.state.ny.us/press/2002/aug/aug21a_02.html (“At-
torney General Eliot Spitzer today announced that PayPal, the nation’s leading ‘e-cash’ 
company, has agreed to stop online gambling merchants from using its facilities to 
take money from New York gamblers.”); see also Ryan Naraine, PayPal to Fine Gambling, 
Porn Sites, INTERNETNEWS.COM, Sept. 13, 2004, http://www.internetnews.com/ec-news/ 
article.php/3407211 (“PayPal, the eBay-owned online payment provider, plans to levy 
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nadian ISP to suppress a political message board harshly critical of lo-
cal officials.48  An enterprising plaintiffs’ law firm in California has 
brought a private action seeking to hold search sites liable for carrying 
links to gambling sites.49  Recent federal legislation empowers federal 
regulators to issue rules to require that payment systems block Inter-
net gaming transactions, and allows federal and state law enforcement 
officials to obtain judicial orders against Internet intermediaries to 
withdraw communications facilities used to facilitate internet gam-
bling.50
Proxy censorship of the Internet is no passing fad; it is a growth 
industry of Internet regulation. 
II.  FREE EXPRESSION AND THE PROBLEM  
OF THE WEAKEST LINK 
A.  The Dangers of Proxy Censorship 
The strategy of recruiting proxy censors by targeting the weakest 
link in the chain of communication has obvious advantages for regula-
tors.  It provides a mechanism for the exercise of authority over oth-
erwise ungovernable conduct.  Moreover, it does so at a discount:  the 
cost of monitoring and sanctioning disfavored communications is 
largely externalized onto the intermediaries who are the subjects of 
direct regulation.  But these advantages come with substantial costs to 
the system of free expression. 
First, even if the ultimate target is an entirely legitimate one, and 
the proxy censor attempts to block only speech unprotected by consti-
tutional immunity, there is always danger of error.  An ISP or search 
engine may mistake a family photo album for child pornography, an 
AIDS prevention site for obscenity, a political commentary for a “true 
threat,” or a parody for a copyright violation.  A system of informal 
private monitors encouraged by the government provides none of the 
fines of up to $500 for users who violate its acceptable use policy regarding adult con-
tent and services, prescription drugs and gambling.”). 
48 See Amended Complaint at 3-12, Pilchesky v. Miller, No. 3:05-CV-2074 (M.D. Pa. 
Dec. 21, 2005), available at http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/PilcheskyComplaint.pdf. 
49 See Complaint, Cisneros v. Yahoo!, Inc., No. CGC-04-433518 (Cal. Super. Ct. 
Aug. 3, 2004), available at http://www.techfirm.com/yahoocomplaint.pdf (illustrating 
the California firm acting as a “private attorney general,” suing Yahoo!, Google, and 
other search engines for sponsoring gambling links). 
50 Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-347,  
§ 802 (2006) (to be codified at 31 U.S.C. §§ 5361-5367). 
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due process guarantees that preserve accuracy in the public sector, 
and the dominant incentive of intermediaries is to protect themselves 
from sanctions, rather than to protect the target from censorship.  
Nor is there any warrant of proportionality.  Unlike an official deter-
mination, which assesses damages or penalties tailored to the prospect 
of public harm, censorship by proxy is an unavoidably blunt instru-
ment.  Private censorship takes place at low levels of visibility.  It is nei-
ther coordinated nor reviewed.51  Often, neither speakers nor listeners 
will know that the message has not been conveyed, and there is no way 
to determine how dialogue has been deformed. 
Second, if it is costly to distinguish protected from unprotected 
speech, the proxy censor is likely to abandon the effort to avoid errors 
and adopt a conscious policy of prophylactic self-censorship that 
blocks any content that could precipitate the threat of sanctions.52  To 
be sure, every prospect of liability or other sanction can chill speech, 
but intermediaries have a peculiarly fragile commitment to the speech 
that they facilitate.  In networked environments, revenue from the 
marginal customer brings only a small payoff, a benefit that can easily 
be dwarfed by threatened penalties—or even by the threat of official 
displeasure.53  It is almost always cheaper to drop a marginal website 
than to employ counsel.  Indeed, even if imposition of the penalty is 
unlikely and absolute expected value of the perceived loss is no 
greater than the expected gain from retaining the customer, the risk-
averse intermediary is likely to buy “insurance” by dropping the risky 
51 My colleague Polk Wagner has expressed similar concerns about the substitu-
tion of software for publicly enforced legal rules as a means of control on the Internet.  
R. Polk Wagner, On Software Regulation, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 457, 478-81 (2005). 
52 See Sonia K. Katyal, The New Surveillance, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 297, 368 (2003) 
(“Napster placed the responsibility to detect infringement with intellectual property 
owners, and the DMCA’s standard for a notice-and-takedown request is surprisingly 
subject to manipulative assertions of copyright infringement.  Consequently, overde-
terrence of speech is a relatively straightforward, and realistic, risk.”); Lemley & Reese, 
supra note 33, at 1380 (discussing efforts to impose secondary liability that “lack the 
granularity of suits against direct infringers,” in addition to explaining that no indi-
vidualized defenses are available); PROGRAMME IN COMPARATIVE MEDIA LAW & POLICY, 
supra note 26, at 70 (“There is a dangerous trend towards a private form of censorship 
in [notice-and-takedown] approaches, and a ‘shoot first, ask questions later’ approach 
to removing questioned content.”). 
53 See Zieper v. Metzinger, 392 F. Supp. 2d 516, 518-19 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (describing 
an ISP’s ready acquiescence to an FBI request to take down a constitutionally pro-
tected website); Amended Complaint at 3-12, Pilchesky, No. 3:05-CV-2074, available at 
http://www.aclupa.org/downloads/pilcheskycomplaint.pdf (describing similar acqui-
escence). 
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customer where the ultimate risk of sanctions is unclear.54  As a num-
ber of commentators have noted, in many situations an intermedi-
ary—particularly an upstream intermediary whose contact with the 
speaker is mediated by other entities—cannot capture the full value of 
speech, but can easily avoid potential liability by simply declining to 
carry speech that could raise problems.55
An intermediary’s policy, in turn, can trigger a cascade of censor-
ship.  Even where they propound their own views, speakers who use 
the facilities of an upstream intermediary with a policy of proxy cen-
sorship will themselves engage in self-censorship as a means of assur-
ing uninterrupted access if doing so is less costly than seeking out a 
new and permissive intermediary.  Where they are conduits for the 
content of others, as is increasingly the case with the blogosphere, 
speakers will be still more likely to steer clear of links to content that 
could induce their own ISPs to cut off their access to the Internet. 
Intermediaries are peculiarly susceptible to chill, for they often 
face cost and revenue structures quite different from those of first-
party speakers.  Where the intermediary’s success depends on sales to 
a broad customer base, public association with controversial speech—
much less active efforts to defend it—may be untenable.  Likewise, 
where an intermediary is partially dependent on other revenue 
streams, whether from advertisers or other corporate affiliates, it may 
54 See LESSIG, supra note 33, at 98, 187-88, 192-93 (arguing that, although the U.S. 
legal system protects fair use in theory, in practice the constant threat of a lawsuit dis-
courages people and companies from distributing copyrighted material even when do-
ing so would be fair use). 
55 See, e.g., Assaf Hamdani, Who’s Liable for Cyberwrongs?, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 901, 
916 (2002) (arguing that strict liability for ISPs results in overdeterrence and excessive 
censorship); Matt Jackson, The Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998: A Proposed 
Amendment to Accommodate Free Speech, 5 COMM. L. & POL’Y 61, 63 (2000) (arguing that 
by imposing liability on online service providers Congress has provided them with in-
centives to censor their users); Lemley & Reese, supra note 33, at 1385-86 (“ISPs, auc-
tion sites, search engines, wireline providers, and other intermediaries capture only a 
tiny part of the value of a third-party posting.”); Malla Pollack, The Right to Know?  De-
limiting Database Protection at the Juncture of the Commerce Clause, the Intellectual Property 
Clause, and the First Amendment, 17 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 47, 109 (1999) (“To ne-
gate their own possible liability, OSPs [online service providers] and ISPs are required 
to take down content when notified by the allegedly aggrieved right holder.  No court 
is involved.  No process is provided to the censored speaker before this restraint on his 
or her speech.”); Alfred C. Yen, Internet Service Provider Liability for Subscriber Copyright 
Infringement, Enterprise Liability, and the First Amendment, 88 GEO. L.J. 1833, 1836, 1886-87 
(2000) (discussing the various theories for holding an ISP liable for copyright in-
fringement by a subscriber); Schruers, supra note 26, at 244-45 (discussing intermedi-
ary liability’s potential “reductive effect on public discourse”). 
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be vulnerable to pressures to which the primary speaker is immune.56  
Putting the censorship decision in the hands of the intermediary al-
lows commercially powerful blocs of customers a potential veto on the 
speech of others. 
Third, even if the intermediary decides to expend the resources to 
identify and target only speech that is legally unprotected, the inter-
mediary’s response will often be far from precisely tailored; collateral 
damage to protected expression will be an appealing exchange for 
avoiding liability.  A speaker who is threatened with prosecution can 
avoid collateral damage by editing her website to comply with the law, 
but, for many intermediaries, it is easier to block or take down a web-
site than to edit it.57  In a hierarchically networked environment, exci-
sion of a higher-level connection is often more easily achieved than 
denial of access to a single node; it is easier for a recipient ISP to iden-
tify and block transmissions from the domain name “terra.es” than to 
identify and block a particular page, http://www.terra.es/example/ 
example.  In a multiparty network, isolating a single node from the 
network as a whole is easier than isolating it from a particular destina-
tion; when a host ISP is asked to prevent transmission to Utah, for ex-
ample, pulling the website entirely is easier than seeking to determine 
the ultimate source of each query and to prevent communication only 
with recipients in Utah.  Where technology makes it easier to block a 
series of affiliated (or unaffiliated) websites than to target only a single 
56 For example, Yahoo! recently shut down chat rooms in response to pressure 
from advertisers.  See John Oates, Yahoo! Shuts Door on Dodgy Chatrooms, THE REGISTER, 
June 22, 2005, http://www.theregister.co.uk/2005/06/22/yahoo_shuts_chatrooms 
(“Yahoo! has pulled the plug on user-created chat rooms in the US with apparent child 
sex content after major advertisers withdrew their ads.”); Zachary Rodgers, Chat Rooms 
Closed, Advertisers Bolt at Yahoo!, CLICKZ NEWS, June 24, 2005, http://www.clickz.com/ 
news/article.php/3515226 (“In addition to shutting down all user-created chat rooms, 
Yahoo has made unavailable the ability to create new chat rooms.”).  For a discussion 
of the similar phenomenon of Google’s censoring of links available to Chinese users as 
a way of obtaining access to Chinese markets, see supra note 17 and accompanying 
text. 
57 To identify a speaker as “risky” or not is a bimodal choice, especially where 
there is an official black list.  By contrast, to identify and edit out problematic aspects 
of speech and potential substitutions is far more difficult for an intermediary.  Often, 
the intermediary will be technically unable to control content precisely.  See, e.g., 
Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1198 n.2 (N.D. Cal. 2004) 
(discussing how in co-location configuration, an ISP “could not comply by merely dis-
abling or removing the hyperlink and related information demanded by Diebold” and 
“OPG’s only option to comply with the demand was to cut off IndyMedia’s Internet 
connectivity entirely” (quotation marks omitted)). Even search engines that link to 
particular URLs have no capacity to edit content. 
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offending URL, the profit-maximizing intermediary likely will choose 
the mechanism that is least costly, rather than the one that preserves 
the most speech.  And where the number of potential liability-
producing nodes is great, the scaled-up filtering process yields well-
recognized problems of inaccuracy.  Thus, for example, in Center for 
Democracy & Technology v. Pappert, the court found that ISPs blocked 
access to around 1.2 million “innocent” websites in response to de-
mands by law enforcement to disable four hundred targeted URLs.58  
In contrast to first-party sanctions, intermediaries have limited incen-
tives to preserve access to protected speech.59
Finally, efforts to generate proxy censorship by targeting interme-
diaries are less likely to be challenged in court than censorship efforts 
directed at speakers or listeners, and are therefore more likely to be 
consciously manipulated to suppress protected speech.  Given the di-
vergence between their interest and those of the speakers, intermedi-
aries are unlikely to expend much time or energy contesting dubious 
demands that can be satisfied by sacrificing a marginal user of their 
services.  Unlike a speaker, who has an interest in all of the profits to 
be earned from a determination that speech is protected, the inter-
mediary’s interest is limited to the profits from speech conveyed over 
its own network, and a regulator intent on suppressing a particular 
type of communication can take advantage of that fact.  Thus, in all 
but one of the four hundred instances in which Pennsylvania sought 
to require ISPs to block access by their subscribers to websites alleged 
to contain child pornography, ISPs acceded to the requests without 
awaiting judicial determination of the claim.60  This pliancy was moti-
vated in part by the Pennsylvania Attorney General’s issuance of a 
58 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 642, 650, 655 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
59 There are, of course, limits to this proposition.  An occlusion of content might 
attain sufficient breadth that it would substantially undercut customers’ willingness to 
purchase the intermediary’s services.  But particularly where occlusion occurs without 
disclosure, this result is unlikely.  An ISP that successfully blocked all access to all por-
nography might lose substantial market share.  An ISP that surreptitiously failed to 
connect with only a third of those sites might not.  A Google image search for “sex” on 
June 24, 2005 yielded 1.7 million sites without filtering, and 1.12 million sites at the 
default “moderate” filtering.  Cf. Benjamin Edelman, An Empirical Analysis of Google  
SafeSearch (2003), http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/people/edelman/google-safesearch 
(describing and analyzing Google’s “SafeSearch” filtering mechanism, and concluding 
that “SafeSearch blocks at least tens of thousands of web pages without any sexually 
explicit content”). 
60 See Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 660 (noting that only one ISP 
did not comply with the informal notice process). 
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
32 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 11 
 
press release effectively accusing the one ISP that demanded a judicial 
order of aiding and abetting pedophilia.61
Especially where the available levers can be wielded by private par-
ties, the power of the proxy censor can be hijacked by those with pri-
orities distinctly at odds with the public interest.62  Thus, for example, 
when the Diebold Corporation invoked the DMCA “cease and desist” 
authority to block embarrassing disclosures of the flaws in its elec-
tronic voting machines, most ISPs acceded to the demand that the 
sites be blocked, notwithstanding the patent impropriety of the copy-
right claims.63  Google is reported to respond to “cease and desist” no-
tices in most cases by simply removing search results, a reaction that 
can be used to suppress access to websites of critics.64  A recent article 
61 See id. at 625, 660 (quoting the Attorney General’s press release). 
62 The award of legal sanctions at the instance of a private party is, of course, state 
action subject to First Amendment review.  See, e.g., Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 
U.S. 663, 668 (1991) (“These legal obligations would be enforced through the official 
power of the Minnesota courts.  Under our cases, that is enough to constitute ‘state 
action’ for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment.”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.51 (1982) (“Although this is a civil lawsuit between private par-
ties, the application of state rules of law by the Mississippi state courts in a manner al-
leged to restrict First Amendment freedoms constitutes ‘state action’ under the Four-
teenth Amendment.”); N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 265 (1964) (“Although 
this is a civil lawsuit between private parties, the Alabama courts have applied a state 
rule of law which petitioners claim to impose invalid restrictions on their constitutional 
freedoms of speech and press.  It matters not that that law has been applied in a civil 
action and that it is common law only, though supplemented by statute.”). 
63 See Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1203 (N.D. Cal. 
2004) (describing Diebold’s bad-faith effort to suppress embarrassing corporate 
documents); Press Release, Elec. Frontier Found., ISP Rejects Diebold Copyright 
Claims Against News Website:  EFF Defends Right to Publish Links to Electronic Vot-
ing Memos (Oct. 16, 2003), available at  http://www.eff.org/legal/ISP_liability/ 
20031016_eff_pr.php (indicating that the Online Policy Group was the only  
one of “dozens” of ISPs to resist Diebold’s takedown letters); cf. Christian Ahlert  
et al., How “Liberty” Disappeared from Cyberspace:  The Mystery Shopper Tests  
Internet Content Self-Regulation, http://www.rootsecure.net/content/downloads/pdf/ 
liberty_disappeared_from_cyberspace.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2006) (describing the 
ready acquiescence of European ISPs in responding to a request to take down an ex-
cerpt from John Stuart Mill’s On Liberty, which was clearly in the public domain);  
Sjoera Nas, The Multatuli Project:  ISP Notice and Take Down (Oct. 27, 2004), 
http://www.bof.nl/docs/researchpaperSANE.pdf (describing the rapid acquiescence 
of seven of ten Dutch ISPs to a similarly baseless demand); Jennifer Urban & Laura 
Quilter, Summary Report:  Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? Takedown Notices 
Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 12 (2005), 
http://mylaw.usc.edu/documents/512rep-execsum_out.pdf (reporting that a census 
of section 512 “takedown notices” that resulted in blocking by ISPs or search engines 
found that thirty percent of the notices involved weak or baseless claims). 
64 See Davis-Wilson, supra note 35 (“Google receives more than 30 copyright-based 
takedown demands each month invoking the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  A re-
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in Forbes was explicit in expressing the common corporate wisdom for 
dealing with Internet critics: 
ATTACK THE HOST.  Find some copyrighted text that a blogger has 
lifted from your Web site and threaten to sue his Internet service pro-
vider under the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.  That may prompt the 
ISP to shut him down.  Or threaten to drag the host into a defamation 
suit against the blogger.  The host isn’t liable but may skip the hassle and 
cut off the blogger’s access anyway.
65
In a concentrated intermediary market, there is a still higher pay-
off to abuse:  if threats of legal action designed to suppress criticism 
can incentivize intermediaries that have substantial market position, 
intimidation can proceed wholesale rather than retail. 
B.  The Coasian Counter and Its Limits 
Advocates of proxy censorship often acknowledge the possibility 
that overzealous intermediaries will suppress protected speech.66  To 
the extent that they do not simply assume the problem away,67 their 
view of three months of notices shows they cluster in a few big categories:  C&Ds 
[cease-and-desist notices]  from companies and individuals demanding removal of 
competitors’ sites; C&Ds  demanding removal of ‘cracks’ or material copied wholesale; 
and C&Ds demanding removal of criticism.”); cf. Reuters, Google Restores Church Links, 
WIRED NEWS, Mar. 22, 2002, http://www.wired.com/news/ebiz/0,1272,51257,00.html 
(discussing Google’s initial removal of pages of a website criticizing the Church of Sci-
entology after receiving a takedown notice from the Church). 
65 Daniel Lyons, Attack of the Blogs!, FORBES, Nov. 14, 2005, at 128, 132 (noting that 
another option is to “[s]ubpoena the host company, demanding the blogger’s name or 
Internet address”). 
66 See, e.g., Katyal, supra note 5, at 1100 (“Placing burdens on ISPs risks balkanizing 
the net and inducing ISPs to purge risky users.”); Reidenberg, Technology and Internet 
Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 1966 (“Civil libertarians may also be concerned about the 
abuse of intermediaries by the state when intermediaries are pressed into law en-
forcement functions.”); Lichtman & Posner, supra note 9, at 12-13 (“[I]t is unlikely that 
telephone company liability [for failure to prevent crank phone calls] would be attrac-
tive, both because of obvious privacy concerns and because of worries that, in its at-
tempts to address the problem of crank calls, the telephone company would inadver-
tently interfere with a sizeable percentage of legitimate telephone activity.”), quoted and 
paraphrased without citation in Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth Arrow et al. in Support of 
Petitioners at 6, MGM Studios Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005) (No. 04-
480). 
67 See, e.g., Reidenberg, Technology and Internet Jurisdiction, supra note 7, at 1966 
(“These objections, however, are not insurmountable obstacles.  The response lies in 
legislation that protects against overreaching and that protects against abuse of inter-
mediaries.”); Lichtman & Posner supra note 9, at 19 (“Legal rules, however, could ease 
these concerns.”); id. at 23 (“Our first response is that this concern, while plausible, 
seems overdrawn.”). 
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response is rooted in a faith that market forces will assure that sanc-
tions targeted at intermediaries will be no more dangerous than simi-
lar sanctions would be if the state simply sought to enforce its norms 
directly against speakers or listeners. 
The argument comes in two forms.  One version holds that 
“Internet subscribers can discipline service providers that disable con-
tent needlessly . . . by changing providers.”68  A different, complemen-
tary claim maintains that, rather than being fully censored, “a user 
whose actions online reveal him to be a risky user will be charged a 
higher price by his ISP,” and any adverse effects not captured by the 
willingness of the user to pay that fee could be counterbalanced by an 
appropriate subsidy.69  Since the cost of such risk premiums would 
presumably be no greater than the expected value of the sanctions 
threatened, the claim goes, the effect on the speaker would be identi-
cal to a sanction imposed directly, where the speaker insures against 
the sanction.70
The suggestion that the threat of subscriber “discipline” con-
strains overenthusiastic intermediaries from censorship is not wholly 
baseless.  A commercial ISP that blocked access to pornography en-
tirely, a network that refused to upload any music files, or a search en-
gine that systematically refused to respond to a query containing the 
word “sex” might well lose customers.  But there are substantial rea-
sons to believe that, in many circumstances, the threat of customer 
departure provides little hedge against a wide range of overzealous 
censorship. 
To begin with, many Americans access the Internet through ISPs 
that they do not select.71  The student at college or the employee at 
work is unlikely to “discipline” her ISP by departing, and the depar-
68 Douglas Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help 56-57 (U. Chi. Law Sch., 
John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper No. 232, 2005), available at http://ssrn.com/ 
abstract=629287; see also Lichtman & Posner, supra note 9, at 36 (“[M]arket forces will 
largely discipline this sort of behavior . . . .”). 
69 Lichtman & Posner, supra note 9, at 24-26.  The notion that a precisely balanced 
countervailing subsidy would in fact be adopted has a quaint counterfactual charm. 
70 Id.  The argument is not entirely spelled out with respect to listeners, but pre-
sumably in the world of Lichtman and Posner, listeners could pay premiums equiva-
lent to the expected value of the sanction. 
71 See Paul Harwood & Lee Rainie, Pew Internet & Am. Life Project, People Who Use 
the Internet Away From Home and Work 2 (March 2004), http://www.pewinternet.org/ 
pdfs/pip_other_places.pdf (reporting that “40% of those connecting to the Internet on 
a typical day log on from work,” and “23% have accessed the internet from a location 
other than home or place of work”). 
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ture of a library patron because the library censors Internet access at 
its computer terminals will serve only to lighten the burden of over-
used facilities.  There are a variety of more general reasons why both 
speakers and listeners may find it difficult to switch to a competing 
Internet intermediary to “discipline” those intermediaries that engage 
in overzealous censorship.  ISPs do not provide a la carte service pack-
ages; from a limited set of options customers must choose bundles of 
reliability, convenience, price, and freedom from censorship.  Like-
wise, the “first mover” advantage in networked environments is noto-
rious, and, to the degree that intermediaries exercise market power, 
the shield of consumer sovereignty is weakened.  The e-mail customer 
who seeks to avoid censorship must sacrifice her address; the browser 
customer must sacrifice her bookmarks; the search engine user must 
sacrifice familiar search techniques and the personalized search algo-
rithms that are likely to be increasingly important.  Similarly, if PayPal 
and the three major credit cards are persuaded to block payment to a 
website, the theoretical availability of a competing payment system is 
unlikely to save that site from commercial extinction. 
Even where an exit to competing intermediaries is available, if the 
target does not know about the censorship or is technologically unso-
phisticated and thus unable to shift its patronage, theoretically avail-
able market discipline may be at most a small check on overzealous 
censorship.  This condition is likely to be common, for the easiest way 
to avoid customer backlash and potential liability simultaneously is by 
censoring the flow of information without alerting either the sender 
or the receiver.  The challenge of ferreting out the terms of censor-
ship may be well beyond the capacity of all but the most sophisticated 
patrons,72 and, in any event, the necessity of devoting effort to detect-
ing the exercise of intermediary censorship is a distinct deterrent cost 
imposed on both speakers and listeners by the strategy of targeting in-
termediaries.  Standard terms of service that permit intermediaries to 
engage in censorship may be important to repeat-playing providers 
who are likely to encounter demands that they act as government 
72 To take a minor example, though Google Image Search bills itself as the  
“most comprehensive image search on the web,” Google Image Search,  
http://images.google.com (last visited Oct. 22, 2006), its default setting is a “moder-
ate” filter that “excludes most explicit images,” Google Help: Search Preferences, 
http://images.google.com/intl/en/help/customize.html#safe (last visited Oct. 22, 
2006).  The existence of the filter is revealed only if a customer clicks on the “prefer-
ences” link.  Google Image Search, http://images.google.com (follow hyperlink to 
“preferences”) (last visited Oct. 22, 2006).  Google does not reveal at all its periodic 
exclusions of search results due to DMCA takedown notices or political pressure. 
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proxies, but are unlikely to loom large in the consciousness of any but 
the most zealously attentive end users.  And even if end users are 
aware of and concerned about the issue, they may be in no realistic 
position to do anything about it.  If censorship is imposed by an in-
termediary one or two layers into the stream of communication, an 
objecting end user must not only uncover the censorship, but per-
suade her immediate access point to bargain with its own upstream 
provider.73
The related claim that the equilibrium outcome of a sanction di-
rected against intermediaries will not be proxy censorship, but rather 
targeted increases in the price of access, relies on the capacity of 
speakers (or listeners) to make side payments compensating interme-
diaries for their risk of loss.  There are reasons to doubt that many 
speakers or listeners will in fact be in a position to make these side 
payments, and in the absence of payments, censorship is the likely 
outcome.  Many intermediaries have business models that depend on 
advertising revenues or similar third party payment mechanisms, 
which are wholly unadapted to the process of levying risk premiums.  
Google charges neither searchers nor sites for its services.  In response 
to pressure to drop risky sites from search results, it could conceivably 
contact each targeted site to ask for a side payment, but it would be far 
more likely to simply block access.  So too, ISPs that charge subscrib-
ers for Internet access have no contact with the websites viewed, and 
do not closely monitor their subscribers’ viewing habits.  Threatened 
with liability for allowing subscribers to access proscribed websites, the 
ISP is far more likely to block the websites than to negotiate a side 
payment with either websites or subscribers. 
The pricing structure of ISPs whose revenue comes directly from 
speakers who could make side payments tends to be undiscriminat-
ing.74  And the possibility of crafting particular deals with fringe cus-
tomers is likely to be unattractive to an established intermediary,  
particularly where other customers (or customers of integrated busi-
nesses) may be alienated.75
73 Worse, if the fear of third party liability shapes development of software, hard-
ware, or payment systems, it may be virtually impossible to alter the standard operating 
procedure. 
74 See Christopher S. Yoo, Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. 
L.J. 1847, 1868 (2006) (predicting that the transaction costs associated with usage-
based metering and billing for access to the Internet are likely to be substantial).
75 See CLAYTON M. CHRISTENSEN, THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA:  WHEN NEW TECH-
NOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL 158-60 (1997) (arguing that established firms 
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Even where price discrimination might be commercially feasible, 
it could only be imposed on the basis of actuarial predictions.  A sys-
tem that keyed the costs of access to Internet to the content of a class 
of communications including both constitutionally protected and un-
protected material would raise problems both of equity and of consti-
tutional substance.  The class of teenagers living alone is doubtless 
more likely to illegally share music than the class of suburban grand-
mothers, but raising the price of Internet access for the former as a 
class is a dubious form of guilt by association.  The fact that a particu-
lar teenager is unwilling to pay the premium assessed for her class may 
reflect an unwillingness to pay for costs incurred by the conduct of 
others, and the process of adverse selection may quickly lead providers 
to eliminate service to the class of teenagers as a whole.76
Even if adverse selection halts short of prohibitive cost escalation, 
the predictable impact of a sanction that targets intermediaries will be 
greater than that of a sanction which targets speakers.  An actuarially 
accurate premium to compensate intermediaries will characteristically 
overdeter speakers whose real risk is less than the class average.  The 
designer of a dissident website who carefully tailors her product to 
remain within the bounds of protected speech will be forced to pay a 
premium for access to government-targeted intermediaries that is 
keyed not to her own actual low risk of illegal content, but to the 
higher, average risk posed by the class of which she is a member.  
Moreover, even for those speakers whose probability of violation falls 
precisely at the actuarial average of their class, the payment of a pre-
mium will not immunize them from primary legal sanctions.  Thus, 
the imposition of intermediary liability will deter more speech than 
go for high margins and large markets, avoid higher risk, and avoid strategies that en-
danger other parts of the business).  In a fully competitive market, one could imagine 
the emergence of specialized intermediaries who serve particularly risky speakers.  But 
the market for intermediaries is increasingly concentrated, casting doubt on the broad 
availability of niche ISPs.  See Eli M. Noam, Deregulation and Market Concentration:  An 
Analysis of Post-1996 Consolidations, 58 FED. COMM. L.J. 539 (2006) (examining the 
competitive pressures on the Internet market, and arguing that the market for ISPs is 
increasingly concentrated); Eli M. Noam, The Internet:  Still Wide Open and Competitive? 
(Oxford Internet Inst., Internet Issue Brief No. 1, Aug. 2003), http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/ 
resources/publications/IB1all.pdf (same). 
76 Cf. Michael R. Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance 
Markets:  An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. ECON. 629 (1976) (de-
scribing a cycle in insurance markets in which good-risk customers are unwilling to pay 
a price that includes the risk imposed by bad-risk customers and withdraw from the 
market, resulting in the need for insurers to raise their premiums, which triggers an-
other round of adverse selection). 
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primary liability:  to access the Internet, a speaker will have to pay a 
premium to the intermediary and still face the additional expected 
costs of potential primary sanctions. 
The demand by an intermediary for a risk premium would often 
result in a deterrent substantially greater than the equivalent expected 
risk of sanctions being imposed on the primary actor.  A speaker who 
is willing to risk draconian sanctions, by reason of the availability of 
bankruptcy protection, by reason of ideological commitment, or by 
reason of her expectation of future payoffs, will often be unable to 
turn those buffering assets into a stream of funds sufficient to induce 
an intermediary to adopt a similar approach.77  Neil Netanel argues 
persuasively that the virtues achieved by the copyright system include 
not only the production of information and culture, but also the 
stimulation of such production by entities that are not as dependent 
on the government as subsidy recipients would be.78  Intermediaries 
do not have the portfolio of copyright resources that primary speakers 
have to fall back on in order to resist government pressure.  Further, 
they are likely to be vulnerable to collateral consequences, such as 
public pressure manifested in the loss of business, which would not 
affect primary speakers. 
The deterrent incidence of intermediary sanctions provides an-
other cause for concern.  The class of gay liberation sites is more likely 
to cross the boundary into “obscenity” than the class of Colonial 
American recipe sites, but charging a government-generated premium 
for hosting the former seems precisely the sort of content discrimina-
tion that the American system of free expression seeks to prohibit.79  
77 From the point of view of the intermediary, as Judge Richard Posner observed, 
“[t]he provider might find it impossible to estimate its potential damages liability to 
the copyright holders and would anyway face the risk of being enjoined.”  In re Aimster 
Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 649 (7th Cir. 2003).  From the point of view of the 
speaker or listener, the willingness of an individual to run risks of liability is not limited 
by current assets, but by her taste for risk and the availability of bankruptcy.  Both 
speakers and listeners are likely to generate external benefits that they cannot 
monetize, but that may guide their willingness to accept risks of loss. 
78 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Copyright and a Democratic Civil Society, 106 YALE L.J. 283, 
347-52 (1996). 
79 The proposition that the First Amendment forbids the imposition of cost struc-
tures that burden particular types of speech recurs in a well-established line of cases.  
See, e.g., Forsyth County v. Nationalist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 134-35 (1992) (enjoin-
ing the imposition of a fee for the use of a public forum based on possible costs of po-
licing, declaring that “[s]peech cannot be financially burdened, any more than it can 
be punished or banned, simply because it might offend a hostile mob”); Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (striking down a statute 
that limited the ability of convicted criminals to receive compensation for their writing, 
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Since mainstream speakers are less likely to push the boundaries of 
acceptable discourse, insurgent speakers, whose shelter from majori-
tarian suppression is the special concern of the First Amendment,80 
are likely to face the harshest premiums.  Indeed, to the extent that 
the premiums reflect the expected cost of litigation, strategic manipu-
lation by ideological opponents of online primary speakers is entirely 
predictable:  one way to raise the costs of the speaker’s website is to 
regularly sue the intermediaries that connect that website to the 
Internet.81
stating that, “[i]n the context of financial regulation, it bears repeating . . . that the 
government’s ability to impose content-based burdens on speech raises the specter 
that the government may effectively drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the market-
place”); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 229 (1987) (invalidating a 
tax on magazines where tax exemptions were available to sports and religious publica-
tions, stating that “the basis on which Arkansas differentiates between magazines is par-
ticularly repugnant to First Amendment principles:  a magazine’s tax status depends 
entirely on its content”); Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 
460 U.S. 575, 592 (1983) (striking down a tax on newspapers that entailed the power 
“to single out the press but also to tailor the tax so that it singles out a few members of 
the press” because of its “potential for abuse”); Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 
233, 245-51 (1936) (canvassing the history of “taxes on knowledge” as constraints on 
free expression and striking down a discriminatory tax on newspapers). 
80 See Seth F. Kreimer, Technologies of Protest:  Insurgent Social Movements and the First 
Amendment in the Era of the Internet, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 119, 121-23 (2001) (outlining the 
history of cases in which “the Court has taken special pains to provide protection 
against government interference with mechanisms of communication that are, as Jus-
tice Black put it, ‘essential to the poorly financed causes of little people’”).  Lichtman 
and Posner’s suggestion that any inefficiencies can be avoided by providing a blanket 
subvention for Internet access, supra note 9, at 7, of course provides no remedy for this 
sort of selective suppression.  Moreover, to the extent that intermediaries (or speakers) 
are dependent on a continued stream of government subvention, the independence 
that lies at the base of the system of free expression is compromised. 
81 See Lyons, supra note 65, at 132 (suggesting that businesses threaten to sue ISPs 
on marginal claims in order to induce them to silence critical blogs); cf.  Nike, Inc. v. 
Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 679-80 (2003) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“The delegation of state 
authority to private individuals authorizes a purely ideological plaintiff, convinced that 
his opponent is not telling the truth, to bring into the courtroom the kind of political 
battle better waged in other forums.  Where that political battle is hard fought, such 
plaintiffs potentially constitute a large and hostile crowd freely able to bring prosecu-
tions designed to vindicate their beliefs, and to do so unencumbered by the legal and 
practical checks that tend to keep the energies of public enforcement agencies focused 
upon more purely economic harm.”); Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 880 (1997) (reject-
ing a proposed rule that “would confer broad powers of censorship, in the form of a 
‘heckler’s veto,’ upon any opponent of indecent speech who might simply log on and 
inform the would-be discoursers that his . . . child . . . would be present”); Forsyth 
County, 505 U.S. at 134-35 (indicating that the First Amendment forbids “charging a 
premium in the case of a controversial political message delivered before a hostile au-
dience”). 
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Finally, there is an important class of regulation targeted at inter-
mediaries where the claim that commercial forces will moderate cen-
sorship is almost wholly illusory.  In the case of threatened criminal 
punishments, side payments will almost always be insufficient to in-
duce intermediaries to avoid censorship.  A speaker who is willing her-
self to risk imprisonment is not often in a position to “cash out” that 
willingness and pay it to the intermediary.  Moreover, the risk prefer-
ences of an intermediary regarding criminal conviction are likely to 
differ substantially from those of a committed first-party speaker.  The 
threat of criminal conviction is not something that can be insured 
against by plausibly available policies. 
To be sure, censorship by intermediaries, like direct censorship by 
governments, is unlikely to fully eradicate access to any particular pub-
lication on the Internet.  The long tail82 of distributors and redistribu-
tors ensures that an effort to bar a discrete piece of information from 
public discourse is unlikely to be completely successful; there are too 
many ways for the embargoed bit of data to leak out.83  If the informa-
tion is likely to replicate, the vast bulk of unregulable small fry may be 
adequate to hold the line against government suppression of incon-
venient information.  But a censor need not stamp out information 
entirely to effectively rig the market of ideas.  The salience of Internet 
communication is famously sensitive to marginal changes in availabil-
ity.84  If the goal of the government is to control the arguments that 
organize popular opinion, affecting the central actors may well be 
82 Chris Anderson, About Me, The Long Tail Blog, http://www.longtail.com/ 
about.html (explaining that, as presented in more depth in the author’s book on the 
subject, “[t]he theory of the Long Tail is that our culture and economy is increasingly 
shifting away from a focus on a relatively small number of ‘hits’ (mainstream products 
and markets) at the head of the demand curve and toward a huge number of niches in 
the tail”). 
83 See, e.g., Eschenfelder & Desai, supra note 2 (describing the replication of the 
DeCSS decryption program in the face of efforts to suppress it); Eschenfelder et al., 
supra note 2 (describing DeCSS postings in European Union member nations, China, 
Hong Kong, and Macau). 
84 See e.g., Steven Lohr, New Microsoft Browser Raises Google’s Hackles, N.Y. TIMES, May 
1, 2006, at A1 (reporting that on-screen boxes are the starting point for thirty to fifty 
percent of user searches); Thorsten Joachims et al., Accurately Interpreting Click-
Through Data as Implicit Feedback 3 fig.1 (2005), http://www.cs.cornell.edu/People/ 
tj/publications/joachims_etal_05a.pdf (illustrating that forty-two percent of users 
clicked the number one result on searches of scholarly journal abstracts, and only six-
teen percent clicked on the number two results); Jakob Nielsen, Alertbox Column, 
The Power of Defaults (Sept. 26, 2005), http://www.useit.com/alertbox/defaults.html 
(arguing that “[s]earch engine users click the results listings’ top entry much more of-
ten than can be explained by relevancy ratings”). 
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adequate for the task.85  To assure the presence of countervailing 
sources of cultural power, major actors are crucial because they stand 
astride the attention of the central mass of the population. 
So too, excision of particular viewpoints from mainstream dis-
course may be sufficient to defeat the “wisdom of crowds.”86  Even if 
those perceptions are available to the segments willing to expend the 
time, effort, and expertise to search for them, the balance of popular 
perception may be skewed away from a proper evaluation of the mat-
ters before the public for decision. 
III.  FIRST AMENDMENT DOCTRINE AND THE  
PROBLEM OF PROXY CENSORSHIP 
A.  Learning from History:  The McCarthy Era, Indirect Sanctions, 
and the Suppression of Dissent 
Though some argue that the “law of the Internet” requires novel 
doctrines, the emerging strategy of censorship by proxy is not without 
precedent.  The McCarthy era saw the rise of efforts by state and fed-
eral governments in the United States to persuade private parties to 
control speakers and publishers whom the accepted free speech juris-
prudence placed beyond the reach of official prosecution.  The dan-
gers of this strategy, in turn, induced the courts to develop free ex-
pression doctrines that can provide guidance in evaluating the efforts 
to spawn proxy censorship of the Internet. 
During the first century and a quarter of America’s constitutional 
history, judges imposed few constitutional constraints on governmen-
tal efforts to sanction the authors of disfavored communications.  The 
press could claim a constitutional protection against prior restraints at 
85 See e.g., John McMillan & Pablo Zoido, How to Subvert Democracy:  Montesinos in Peru 
6-11 (CESifo, Working Paper No. 1173, April 2004), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/ 
sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=520902 (estimating that the bribes paid by the Peruvian 
government to  television channel owners were about one hundred times those paid to 
judges and politicians); Anick Jesdanun, Iran Tightens Net Control, LAS VEGAS SUN, June 
22, 2005, http://www.lasvegassun.com/sunbin/stories/tech/2005/jun/22/062209840.html 
(“‘If you’re looking to stem . . . the mobilization of political groups, it’s not what the 
BBC or Amnesty International is saying that you’re concerned with.  It’s what some 
Iranian dissident is saying in Farsi language to compatriots.’” (quoting Ron Deibert, a 
Univeristy of Toronto professor who studied censorship in Iran for the OpenNet Ini-
tiative)). 
86 JAMES SUROWIECKI, THE WISDOM OF CROWDS:  WHY THE MANY ARE SMARTER 
THAN THE FEW AND HOW COLLECTIVE WISDOM SHAPES BUSINESS, ECONOMIES, SOCIE-
TIES, AND NATIONS (2004). 
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the federal level under the First Amendment—though the protection 
was rarely vindicated by the courts.87  First Amendment doctrine 
posed no barrier to subsequent punishment of speakers and publish-
ers, either in the form of criminal prosecution or civil liability.  Such 
efforts were limited, if at all, by common law immunities and the con-
strained scope of federal police powers.  State constitutional protec-
tion–-which provided the only shelter against suppression at the state 
and local level before the incorporation of the First Amendment in 
1925–-was similarly forgiving.  When social disorder or other ills 
threatened, therefore, direct sanctions against speech went to federal 
court free of constitutional constraint. 
In the aftermath of the World War I and the succeeding Red 
Scare, First Amendment doctrine began to include more substantial 
bulwarks against efforts to criminally punish speakers or listeners.  In 
the years before World War II, when faced with the challenge of seek-
ing to suppress speech and publication regarded as dangerous, the 
federal government could no longer freely apply criminal sanctions.  
It began, instead, to turn to indirect methods. 
Private sanctions, catalyzed by public disclosure, were summoned 
to reach proponents of dangerous ideas who lay beyond the grasp of 
federal law enforcement.  Thus, the Special Committee on Un-
American Activities (the precursor of the House Un-American Activi-
ties Committee) took the position that “[w]hile Congress does not 
have the power to deny to citizens the right to believe in, teach, or ad-
vocate communism, fascism, and nazism, it does have the right to fo-
87 The Sedition Act, which was successfully defended as a subsequent punishment 
in the lower courts, was ultimately repudiated by Congress.  Antebellum efforts to cen-
sor antislavery mail were defeated in the legislature in part on the basis of constitu-
tional argument, but the 1873 Comstock Act imposed prohibitions on the mailing of 
“obscene, lewd, or lascivious” matter, along with information regarding birth control.  
See Ex parte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727, 736 (1877) (“All that Congress meant by this act was, 
that mail should not be used to transport such corrupting publications and articles, 
and that any one who attempted to use it for that purpose should be punished.”).  
Federal efforts to exclude antiwar publications from effective access to the mail during 
World War I were upheld in United States ex rel. Milwaukee Social Democratic Publishing Co. 
v. Burleson, 255 U.S. 407 (1921).  See also Leach v. Carlile, 258 U.S. 138, 140 (1922) (af-
firming the right of the Postmaster General to issue a fraud order, over dissents by Jus-
tices Holmes and Brandeis); Lewis Publ’g Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 288, 313-16 (1913) 
(upholding the validity of section 2 of the Post Office Appropriation Act of 1912, 
which allowed the denial of mail privileges for publications that did not comply with 
certain reporting requirements).  See generally Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and Expertise:  
Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 VA. L. REV. 1 
(2000) (detailing twentieth-century censorship efforts on the state and federal levels). 
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cus the spotlight of publicity upon their activities.”88  So too, the 
House Committee on the Judiciary introduced legislation requiring 
registration and labeling, but not censorship, of foreign propaganda 
on the ground that “the spotlight of pitiless publicity [would] serve as 
a deterrent to the spread of pernicious propaganda.”89
These efforts took deeper root in the years following World War 
II.90  The anticommunist crusade that culminated in the McCarthy era 
saw efforts to criminally punish “dangerous” expression directly, but 
more governmental attention was focused on mobilizing private sanc-
tions to discipline First Amendment exercises that were either consti-
tutionally or practically immune to prosecution.91  The “spotlight of 
88 SPEC. COMM. ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN 
ACTIVITIES AND PROPAGANDA, H.R. REP. NO. 76-2, at 13 (1939); see H.R REP. NO. 77-1, 
at 24 (1941) (“This committee is the only agency of Government that has the power of 
exposure. . . . There are many phases of un-American activities that cannot be reached 
by legislation or administrative action.”); H.R. REP. NO. 76-1476, at 3-4, 24 (1940) 
(“The committee conceives its principal task to have been the revelation of the at-
tempts now being made by extreme groups in this country to deceive the great mass of 
earnest and devoted American citizens. . . . The purpose of this committee is the task 
of protecting our . . . constitutional democracy by turning [on] the light of pitiless 
publicity . . . .”). 
89 H.R. REP. NO. 75-1381, at 2 (1937); see Inst. of Living Law, Combating Totalitarian 
Propaganda:  The Method of Exposure, 10 U. CHI. L. REV. 107, 107-08 (1943) (arguing that 
“[o]ne of the methods of destroying the poison of totalitarian propaganda is to expose 
it to the sun and air of informed criticism”); Bruce Lannes Smith, Democratic Control of 
Propaganda Through Registration and Disclosure I, 6 PUB. OPINION. Q. 27, 30 (1942) (ar-
guing for both the “further development of the principle of balance in discussion” and 
the “development of administrative agencies for disclosing to the average voters the 
real affiliations of influential propagandists”). 
90 This account of the strategy of “pitiless publicity” is adapted from my analysis in 
Seth F. Kreimer, Sunlight, Secrets, and Scarlet Letters:  The Tension Between Privacy and Dis-
closure in Constitutional Law, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 15-28 (1991). 
91 See MORTON J. HOROWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 61 
(1998) (reporting that HUAC issued 135 contempt citations); LUCAS A. POWE, JR., THE 
WARREN COURT AND AMERICAN POLITICS 75 (2000) (stating that less than two hundred 
people were prosecuted under domestic security statutes); Corey Robin, Fragmented 
State, Pluralist Society:  How Liberal Institutions Promote Fear, 69 MO. L. REV. 1061, 1084 
(2004) (stating that “liberal limitations upon the state ensured that no more than two 
hundred people spent time behind bars” during the McCarthy years); William M. 
Wiecek, The Legal Foundations of Domestic Anticommunism:  The Background of Dennis v. 
United States, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 375, 428 (detailing criminal prosecution efforts dur-
ing the McCarthy era); see also Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 256 (D.C. Cir. 
1948) (Edgerton, J., dissenting) (“The Committee and its members have repeatedly 
said in terms or in effect that its main purpose is to do by exposure and publicity what 
it believes may not validly be done by legislation.”).  For discussion of the dynamics of 
the McCarthy era, see generally DAVID CAUTE, THE GREAT FEAR:  THE ANTI-COMMUNIST 
PURGE UNDER TRUMAN AND EISENHOWER (1978); ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, MANY ARE THE 
CRIMES:  MCCARTHYISM IN AMERICA (1998). 
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pitiless publicity” was directed against those who engaged in “disloyal” 
or “subversive” activities, and blacklists were published with the expec-
tation that private parties would seek out and sanction malefactors 
who lay beyond the reach of the government.92  The House Un-
American Activities Committee (HUAC) regularly issued indices of 
identified “communist sympathizers,” which became the basis of for-
mal and informal blacklists in the public and private sectors.93  HUAC 
and its imitators continued their efforts with substantial effect through 
the mid-1950s; official designation was expected to, and in fact re-
sulted in, private sanctions.  Often these sanctions resulted not only 
from the ideological commitment of private employers or publishers, 
but from a desire of those intermediaries to avoid pressure on the part 
of the American Legion, the Catholic Church, and large numbers of 
92 See, e.g., SCHRECKER, supra note 91, at 211-17, 266-305 (discussing the dissemina-
tion of blacklists by the FBI “Responsibilities Program”). 
93 The chair of the HUAC, J. Parnell Thomas, characterized its activities in this 
way:  “The chief function of the committee has always been the exposure of un-
American activities.  This is based upon the conviction that the American public will 
not tolerate efforts to subvert or destroy the American system of government once such 
efforts have been pointed out.”  80 CONG. REC. A4277 (1947) (statement of Rep. Rich-
ard M. Nixon) (quoting Chairman Thomas’ remarks from a November 4, 1947 ABC 
Radio address).  The Committee’s program sought “[t]o expose and ferret out . . . 
Communist sympathizers in the Federal Government . . . [and t]o spotlight . . . Com-
munists controlling . . . vital unions,”  H. COMM. ON UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES, 80TH 
CONG., INVESTIGATION OF UN-AMERICAN ACTIVITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 2 (Comm. 
Print 1948), and “to permit American public opinion . . . to evaluate the merit of many 
in private life who either openly associate with and assist disloyal groups or covertly op-
erate[d] as members or fellow-travellers of such organizations,”  Corey Rubin, Frag-
mented State, Pluralist Society:  How Liberal Institutions Promote Fear, 69 MO. L. REV. 1061, 
1066 (2004) (quotation marks omitted).  See generally Barenblatt v. United States, 360 
U.S. 109, 157-59, 163-68 (1959) (Black, J., dissenting) (detailing HUAC’s intent to pun-
ish by exposure, and providing an appendix of supporting quotations from the hear-
ings); M.J. HEALE, AMERICAN ANTICOMMUNISM: COMBATTING THE ENEMY WITHIN: 
1830-1970, at 155-61 (1990) (discussing “Congressional Anticommunism”). 
 In addition to providing evidence or proof of disloyalty to government loyalty 
boards, defiance of or designation by HUAC meshed with sanctions administered by 
the private sector.  Between 1949 and 1959, HUAC directly furnished to employers in-
formation on 60,000 persons.  CAUTE, supra note 91, at 102-03.  Private networks also 
disseminated the findings of the Committee.  See HEALE, supra 139, 156, 170, 173. 
 In the area of entertainment, see LARRY CEPLAIR & STEVEN ENGLUND, THE INQUI-
SITION IN HOLLYWOOD:  POLITICS IN THE FILM COMMUNITY:  1930-60, at 161-73, 210-25, 
376-86 (1983); RICHARD M. FRIED, NIGHTMARE IN RED:  THE MCCARTHY ERA IN PER-
SPECTIVE 156-57 (1990); Harold W. Horowitz, Legal Aspects of “Political Black Listing” in 
the Entertainment Industry, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 263 (1956). 
 In the field of higher education, see LIONEL S. LEWIS, COLD WAR ON CAMPUS:  A 
STUDY OF THE POLITICS OF ORGANIZATIONAL CONTROL 49 (1988); ELLEN W. SCHRECKER, 
NO IVORY TOWER: MCCARTHYISM AND THE UNIVERSITIES 10, 126-307 (1986). 
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concerned citizens for whom radical associations were a sign of disloy-
alty.94  As one commentator observed: 
[I]t helps to view McCarthyism as a process. . . . First the objectionable 
groups and individuals were identified [through] a committee hearing, 
for example, or an FBI investigation; then, they were punished, usually 
by being fired. . . . In most cases it was a government agency which iden-
tified the culprits and a private employer which fired them.95
Similarly, sanctions directed against association rather than expression 
were marshaled to persuade private parties to cut off support for 
problematic activities.96
The enterprise that Senator McCarthy emblematized achieved a 
substantial impact on citizens’ lives, the discourse of the republic, and 
the exercise of the First Amendment rights of speech, belief, and as-
sociation, in large measure through the mobilization of entities out-
side of government and indirect governmental sanctions.  Conven-
tional criminal prosecutions ultimately were brought against active 
members of the Communist Party itself.  Fellow travelers and former 
Party members, though they fell within the terms of statutes, were 
usually not prosecuted in their own right unless they refused to reveal 
information.  Official loyalty dismissals were often predicated on pre-
vious disclosures, and were themselves effective intimidation in large 
measure because of the stigma that they precipitated.  The sanctions 
at the command of Senator McCarthy, his precursors, and his imita-
tors, lay primarily in the ability to obtain and publish information, 
with the expectation that private parties would respond.  So well rec-
ognized was this dynamic at the time that massive resistance in the 
94 See, e.g., Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702, 709-10 & n.8, 717 (1966) (revers-
ing a conviction for the refusal to testify at 1955 HUAC hearings, which were part of a 
“plan for driving Reds out of important industries”—according to the hearings’ chair, 
once communists were exposed “loyal Americans who work[ed] with them [would] do 
the rest of the job” (quotation marks omitted)); Russell v. United States, 369 U.S. 749, 
767 (1962) (detailing 1955 and 1956 investigations by the Senate Internal Security 
Subcommittee into alleged communist influence in the press). 
95 SCHRECKER, supra note 93, at 9; see also SCHRECKER, supra note 91, at 272 
(“[M]ost dismissals that took place within the private sector seemed to have occurred 
as a result of an employer’s willingness to collaborate with an official agency.”). 
96 See David Cole, The New McCarthyism:  Repeating History in the War on Terrorism, 38 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 1, 6 (2003) (“In the Cold War, most ‘radicals’ were punished 
not for their speech but for their membership, affiliation, or sympathetic association 
with the Communist Party.”). 
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American South consciously adopted similar tactics in the effort to 
eviscerate civil rights initiatives.97
These efforts at censorship by proxy and indirect sanctions gener-
ated what are now generally recognized as pathologies.  Since indirect 
sanctions could be imposed without either due process or public over-
sight, the actual targets of the sanctions were often innocent of the of-
fenses for which they were singled out, and the “offenses” themselves 
were often actions that were constitutionally protected.  Even where 
the targets were “guilty,” others who engaged in innocent activities 
were induced to avoid perfectly legitimate undertakings for fear of be-
coming the focus of zealous private retaliation.  Third parties tried to 
insulate themselves by cutting off contact with those who might bring 
down wrath.  And the spread of private sanctions set a tone in society 
that legitimated formal efforts at repression, which in turn generated 
still greater private efforts.  The attentive reader will note that these 
dynamics track the concerns articulated earlier about the potential pa-
thologies of proxy censorship on the Internet:  private enforcement 
tended to be overzealous, inaccurate, heedless of constitutional dis-
tinctions, and vulnerable to strategic abuse. 98
B.  Doctrinal Responses to Indirect Sanctions 
In reaction to the excesses of the McCarthy era–-as well as the ef-
forts by massive resistance in the South to deploy similar indirect sanc-
tions against civil rights organizations—the Supreme Court during the 
late 1950s and early 1960s evolved a series of doctrinal structures to 
safeguard against the pathologies created by indirect sanctions.99  An 
awareness of the reluctance of most individuals to risk social sanctions 
97 See POWE, supra note 91, at 165 (comparing efforts in the South to constrict the 
NAACP, such as demanding that membership lists be made public, to congressional 
anticommunist tactics); HOROWITZ, supra note 91, at 34-35; SCHRECKER, supra note 91, 
at 392-94; cf. Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487-88 (1965) (describing the seizure 
of the membership lists of a civil rights organization during a police raid of the execu-
tive director’s home and office, along with the announcement that the organization 
was subversive in order to “frighten off potential members”). 
98 For one recent account of the impact of McCarthyism on the polity, see 
SCHRECKER, supra note 91, at 276-77, 359-414. 
99 See Cole, supra note 96, at 1 (2003) (quoting Professor Ralph Brown’s 1958 ob-
servation that censorship was being directed toward “the speaker rather than the 
speech”). 
 For overviews of the complex of doctrines that emerged in response to the Cold 
War excesses, see HOROWITZ, supra note 91, at 65-73; Laurence H. Tribe & Patrick O. 
Gudridge, The Anti-Emergency Constitution, 113 YALE L.J. 1801, 1851-65 (2004). 
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and ostracism in order to challenge censorial interventions during the 
McCarthy era underpinned both a recognition by the Court of the 
importance of intermediate associations that might buffer individuals, 
and a willingness of the Court to accept third party challenges 
brought by associations or individuals whose situations rendered them 
more robust.  More broadly, the Court rejected the proposition that 
the First Amendment constrained only official efforts to criminally 
punish protected speech and association.  Against the backdrop of the 
indirect sanctions of the McCarthy era, the Court recognized the po-
tentially drastic effects of indirect gambits directed to vulnerable pres-
sure points, and declared that First Amendment freedoms “are pro-
tected not only against heavy-handed frontal attack, but also from 
being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.”100  It also 
recognized the particular leverage exercised by incentives directed to 
and against third parties, and in later cases highlighted the danger of 
“self-censorship” by intermediaries who transmit the speech of others.  
These are lessons courts can appropriately deploy in litigation regard-
ing the impact of efforts to mobilize proxy censorship on the Internet. 
The Court operationalized its recognition of these dangers in sev-
eral further lines of doctrine.  First, the Court acknowledged that even 
interventions directed at legitimate targets could inflict unacceptable 
collateral damage on the system of free expression.  In a series of 
cases, the Court determined that government interventions could be 
illegitimate not only because they were improperly censorial in intent, 
but because they were not sufficiently “narrowly drawn” to adequately 
avoid censorial effects.  The Court took account of not only the 
amount of protected activity that was directly punished, but also the 
“chilling effect”101 that could result in self-censorship by parties who 
sought to avoid the reach of government regulation.  Second, the ex-
perience of the scope of self-censorship that resulted from the 
McCarthy era impelled the Court to look with disfavor on regulatory 
schemes that posed risks that innocent activities would be caught up 
in the net of government suppression.  This concern raised barriers to 
vague regulations whose shadows impelled possible dissenters to steer 
clear of actions that might have offended authorities.  It inclined the 
Court toward skepticism of regulations that imposed vicarious liability 
100 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). 
101 Vincent Blasi, The Pathological Perspective and the First Amendment, 85 COLUM. L. 
REV. 449, 482 (1985) (“[T]he chilling effect doctrine was forged in the judicial effort 
to repudiate McCarthyism and forestall repression of the civil rights movement.”). 
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for association with the wrongs of others.  It also underpinned the 
construction of safe harbors for the transmission of true facts.  Each of 
these doctrinal responses remains a part of our constitutional juris-
prudence, and each is an important element of the appropriate judi-
cial response to the problems of proxy censorship of Internet com-
munications. 
1.  “Subtle Government Interference”:  Indirect Censorship  
as Constitutional Violation 
The outset of the McCarthy era, as we have noted, saw claims that 
indirect efforts to interfere with the dissemination of “subversive” 
speech provided an end run around First Amendment constraint.  
The government was free, it was argued, to suppress through indirect 
incentives so long as it avoided criminal prosecutions and prior re-
straint; the results of “pitiless publicity” were not the responsibility of 
the government but of the aroused citizenry.  These claims were ad-
vanced not only by the members of HUAC but by some of the judges 
first asked to review the elements of the anticommunist crusade.102
This rationale crumbled, however, under the manifest impact of 
McCarthyism on free expression.  During the 1950s and early 1960s, 
the Court recognized that censorship need be neither irresistibly 
backed by official force nor directed initially at speakers to fall within 
the proscription of the First Amendment.  It rejected the claim that 
McCarthy-era governmental blacklists were immune from constitu-
tional scrutiny because their impact was mediated by private imple-
mentation.  In evaluating blacklists and similar efforts to mobilize cen-
sorship by intermediaries, the Court recognized the often fragile 
status of intermediaries in the system of free speech, the importance 
of “chilling effects” experienced by intermediaries, and the dangers of 
102 See, e.g., Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 200 (1951) 
(Reed, J., dissenting) (arguing that promulgation of a list of “Communist-action” or 
“Communist-front” organizations by the Attorney General did not constitute an 
abridgement of the First Amendment rights of organizations so listed); id. at 183-84 
(Jackson, J., concurring) (“[M]ere designation as subversive deprives the organizations 
themselves of no legal right or immunity. . . . Their claim of injury [results from] sanc-
tions applied by public disapproval.”); Barsky v. United States, 167 F.2d 241, 249 & 
n.28 (D.C. Cir. 1948) (“[D]amage . . . would not occur because of the Congressional 
act itself; that is, the Congress is not imposing a liability, or attaching by direct enact-
ment a stigma.”); United States v. Josephson, 165 F.2d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 1947) (rejecting 
the theory that Congress’ investigation of “Un-American or subversive propaganda im-
pairs in some way . . . freedom of expression”). 
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censorship by proxy.  That recognition provides the roots for the First 
Amendment doctrines that currently govern proxy censorship. 
In 1950, the Court acknowledged in dicta that “[u]nder some cir-
cumstances, indirect ‘discouragements’ undoubtedly have the same 
coercive effect upon the exercise of First Amendment rights as im-
prisonment, fines, injunctions or taxes.  A requirement that adherents 
of particular . . . political parties wear identifying arm-bands . . . is ob-
viously of [that] nature.”103  The next year, the Court’s majority joined 
in Justice Frankfurter’s conclusion that “it would be blindness” to ig-
nore the drastic impact of placement on a blacklist of communist-
front organizations.104  By 1957, as McCarthyism began to fade, Chief 
Justice Warren could speak for all but Justice Clark in describing the 
impact of HUAC investigations on freedom of speech and association, 
and in rejecting the claim that the government was not responsible: 
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify, against 
his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of gov-
ernmental interference. . . . Those who are identified by witnesses and 
thereby placed in the same glare of publicity are equally subject to public 
stigma, scorn and obloquy.  Beyond that, there is the more subtle and 
immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most ortho-
dox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a simi-
lar fate at some future time . . . . That this impact is partly the result of 
non-governmental activity by private persons cannot relieve the investi-
gators of their responsibility for initiating the reaction.
105
The next year, in NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, Justice Harlan 
wrote for a unanimous court, invalidating a requirement that the Ala-
bama NAACP disclose its membership lists: 
In the domain of these indispensable liberties, whether of speech, press, 
or association, the decisions of this Court recognize that abridgment of 
such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from varied 
forms of governmental action. . . . It is not sufficient to answer, as the 
103 Am. Commc’ns Ass’n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 402 (1950). 
104 Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm., 341 U.S. at 161 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see 
also id. at 158 (noting that generating publicity and securing meeting places became 
difficult once a group had been labeled “communist”); United States v. Rumely, 345 
U.S. 41, 44 (1953) (remarking that “we would have to be that ‘blind’ Court, against 
which Mr. Chief Justice Taft admonished . . . , that does not see what ‘[a]ll others can 
see and understand’ not to know” that the effect of exposure is cause for concern (ci-
tation omitted)). 
105 Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197-98 (1957); see also Sweezy v. New 
Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 248 (1957) (describing the “inhibiting effect in the flow of 
democratic expression and controversy upon those directly affected and those touched 
more subtly” by legislative investigations). 
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State does here, that whatever repressive effect compulsory disclosure of 
names of petitioner’s members may have upon participation by Alabama 
citizens in petitioner’s activities follows not from state action but from 
private [action].
106
By the beginning of the 1960s, the Supreme Court could unani-
mously avow that freedoms of speech, press, assembly, and association 
were protected against both “heavy-handed frontal attack” and “subtle 
interference” designed to mobilize private sanctions.107
2.  The Problem of Chilled Intermediaries in  
Old Media and New         
The concern that “subtle government interference”108 might trig-
ger censorship by private parties drew particular force from the effi-
cacy of McCarthy-era blacklists in shaping the practices of the enter-
tainment industry.  The Court was well aware that the coercive effect 
of indirect sanctions is magnified when deployed against intermediar-
ies who transmit the work of others.  The effect of the blacklists high-
lighted the fact that intermediaries are likely to have fragile commit-
ments to the free expression rights of the speakers whose speech they 
carry, and the Court’s legal doctrine, forged in the crucible of the 
McCarthyite repression, recognized the need to guard against the 
tendency of intermediaries to yield to censorial pressure. 
Cognizant of the fact that particular links in the chain of commu-
nication are often reluctant or unable to bring First Amendment chal-
106 357 U.S. 449, 461-463 (1958); see also Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 526 
(1958) (expressing hostility to devices whose “practical operation . . . must necessarily 
produce a result that the State could not command directly”). 
107 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523-24 (1960) (striking down a de-
mand for the membership list of Little Rock’s NAACP branches and finding that 
“[t]here was substantial uncontroverted evidence that public identification of persons 
in the community as members of the organizations had been followed by harassment 
and threats of bodily harm” and that “[t]his repressive effect, while in part the result of 
private attitudes and pressures, was brought to bear only after the exercise of govern-
mental power had threatened to force disclosure of the members’ names”); see also 
Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 550-57 (1963) (refusing 
to allow a state legislative committee to compel the production of NAACP membership 
lists); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293 (1961) (prohibiting Louisi-
ana from requiring the NAACP to annually deny that any of its members were com-
munists); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485-87 (1960) (refusing to allow Arkansas to 
require schoolteachers to reveal organizational affiliations); Talley v. California, 362 
U.S. 60, 64 (1960) (overturning a city ordinance requiring handbills to contain names 
and addresses of their sponsors). 
108 Bates, 361 U.S. at 523. 
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lenges, the Court developed a procedural scaffolding that allowed 
more robust litigants willing to appear in court to raise the interests of 
others elsewhere in the chain.  Thus, the Court acknowledged that lis-
teners as well as speakers had First Amendment rights to unimpeded 
communication,109 and that these rights could be raised by speakers or 
intermediaries.110 The Court also allowed associations to raise the 
rights of their members,111 and speakers to challenge the impact of re-
strictions on intermediaries.112  These doctrines continue to frame the 
rights of litigants in modern litigation over efforts to chill weak links 
in the chain of Internet communications.113
Equally significant, as we will see, the Court recognized the impor-
tance of intermediaries to substantive analysis.  In evaluating the dan-
109 Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 301, 306-07 (1965) (“The [disputed] Act 
sets administrative officials astride the flow of mail to inspect it, appraise it, write the 
addressee about it, and await a response before dispatching the mail. . . . This amounts 
in our judgment to an unconstitutional abridgment of the addressee’s First Amend-
ment rights.”); see also Kleindienst v. Mandel, 408 U.S. 753, 762-63 (1972) (recognizing 
a First Amendment right to “‘receive information and ideas’” (quoting Stanley v. 
Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969))). 
110 See Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 
756 (1976) (“Freedom of speech presupposes a willing speaker.  But where a speaker 
exists, as is the case here, the protection afforded is to the communication, to its 
source and to its recipients both.”); see also Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S. 396, 408-09 
(1974) (allowing speakers to raise the rights of listeners). 
111 See, e.g., NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428 (1963); Louisiana ex rel. Gremillion, 
366 U.S. at 296; Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 n.9 (1960); NAACP v. 
Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 459 (1958); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. 
v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 183-87 (1951) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
112 See Bantam Books v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 65 n.6 (1963) (“The distributor who 
is prevented from selling a few titles is not likely to sustain sufficient economic injury to 
induce him to seek judicial vindication of his rights.  The publisher has the greater 
economic stake, because suppression of a particular book prevents him from recoup-
ing his investment in publishing it.  Unless he is permitted to sue, infringements of 
freedom of the press may too often go unremedied.”).  
113 See, e.g., Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 875 (1997) (indicating that, in evaluating 
claims of speakers, courts must weigh the rights of potential listeners); Am. Library 
Ass’n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (stating that university librarians have 
standing to challenge technology regulations directed at equipment manufacturers 
because, “if the regulations implemented . . . take effect, there is a substantial probabil-
ity that the [librarians] would be prevented from assisting faculty to make broadcast 
clips available to students in their distance-learning courses via the Internet”); ACLU v. 
Ashcroft, 322 F.3d 240, 266 n.33 (3d Cir. 2003) (approving a district court holding that 
the ACLU had “listener” standing, as a user of the Internet, to challenge a statute re-
quiring web posters to impose burdens on access), aff’d, Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 
656 (2004); Ctr. for Democracy & Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 647 (E.D. Pa. 
2004) (recognizing standing for an organization whose members were denied access to 
information that was suppressed by a regulatory scheme directed against intermediar-
ies). 
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
52 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 155: 11 
 
gers to free expression from “subtle” government regulation, the 
Court was alive to the potential for suppression that arose out of ef-
forts to manipulate intermediaries in a variety of media over the last 
two generations. 
a.  Print, Film, and Broadcast Intermediaries 
The analysis in Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union, North Da-
kota Division v. WDAY, Inc.114 set the tone in broadcasting; the Court 
granted an implied immunity against state libel actions to broadcast-
ers who provided airtime to qualified candidates because of the dan-
ger that broadcasters would be impelled to censor controversial pro-
gramming.  Justice Black reasoned: 
[I]f a station were held responsible for the broadcast of libelous mate-
rial, all remarks even faintly objectionable would be excluded out of an 
excess of caution. . . . It follows from all this that allowing censorship, 
even of the attenuated type advocated here, would almost inevitably 
force a candidate to avoid controversial issues during political debates 
over radio and television. . . .
115
In the next term, the Court returned to this theme in print media.  
Reversing the conviction of a bookseller under a statute that imposed 
absolute liability for possession of “obscene or indecent writing,” the 
Court in Smith v. California determined that an obscenity statute with-
out an element of scienter imposed an unconstitutional “collateral ef-
fect of inhibiting the freedom of expression, by making the individual 
the more reluctant to exercise it.”116  Justice Brennan continued for 
the Court, reasoning: 
The bookseller’s limitation in the amount of reading material with which 
he could familiarize himself, and his timidity in the face of his absolute 
criminal liability, thus would tend to restrict the public’s access to forms 
of the printed word which the State could not constitutionally suppress 
directly.  The bookseller’s self-censorship, compelled by the State, would 
be a censorship affecting the whole public, hardly less virulent for being 
privately administered.117
114 360 U.S. 525 (1959). 
115 Id. at 530. 
116 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959). 
117 Id. at 153-54; see also Manual Enters., Inc. v. Day, 370 U.S. 478, 493 (1962) 
(“Since publishers cannot practicably be expected to investigate each of their advertis-
ers, and since the economic consequences of an order barring even a single issue of a 
periodical from the mails might entail heavy financial sacrifice, a magazine publisher 
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So too, Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan invalidated the practice of 
the Rhode Island Commission to Encourage Morality in Youth of noti-
fying distributors of designated books and magazines that those items 
had been reviewed by the Commission and declared objectionable for 
sale or display to youths under eighteen years of age.118  Striking down 
the stratagem as improper administrative censorship, the majority re-
lied on McCarthy-era precedent in rejecting the claim that the state 
could avoid the strictures of the First Amendment by bypassing official 
criminal proceedings and relying on “informal censorship” by an en-
tity lacking enforcement authority: 
It is not as if this were not regulation by the State of Rhode Island. . . . 
These acts and practices directly and designedly stopped the circulation 
of publications in many parts of Rhode Island.  It is true, as noted by the 
Supreme Court of Rhode Island, that Silverstein [the distributor] was 
“free” to ignore the Commission’s notices . . . [but t]he Commission’s 
notices, phrased virtually as orders, reasonably understood to be such by 
the distributor, invariably followed up by police visitations, in fact 
stopped the circulation of the listed publications ex proprio vigore.  It 
would be naive to credit the State’s assertion that these blacklists are in 
the nature of mere legal advice . . . .
119
The Bantam Books Court observed that orders directed to inter-
mediary distributors had the effect of suppressing the books of pub-
lishers who depended on those intermediaries to convey their books 
to the public: 
The constitutional guarantee of freedom of the press embraces the cir-
culation of books as well as their publication, and the direct and obvi-
ously intended result of the Commission’s activities was to curtail the cir-
culation in Rhode Island of books published by appellants. . . . The 
distributor who is prevented from selling a few titles is not likely to sus-
tain sufficient economic injury to induce him to seek judicial vindication 
might refrain from accepting advertisements from those whose own materials could 
conceivably be deemed objectionable by the Post Office Department.”). 
118 372 U.S. 58, 71-72 (1963). 
119 Id. at 68-69; see also id. at 72 (“Their operation was in fact a scheme of state cen-
sorship effectuated by extralegal sanctions; they acted as an agency not to advise but to 
suppress.”); Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676, 684 (1968) (striking down a 
requirement that film exhibitors submit films for “classification” by a local “classifica-
tion board,” expressing concern that “a local exhibitor who cannot afford to risk losing 
the youthful audience when a film may be of marginal interest to adults . . . may con-
tract to show only the totally inane”). 
 The Court in Meese v. Keene acknowledged the proposition that official designa-
tions could induce intermediaries to censor speech, but found on the facts before it 
that the statutory duty for exhibitors to label films “political propaganda” “places no 
burden on protected expression.”  481 U.S. 465, 480 (1987). 
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of his rights.
120
This concern for the danger of proxy censorship lies at the core of 
two keystones of the modern First Amendment doctrinal structure.  In 
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,121 the Court began its analysis with the 
observation that the speech at issue was contained in a paid adver-
tisement.  Citing both Smith and Bantam Books, the Court recognized 
the importance of intermediaries to a system of free expression: 
That the Times was paid for publishing the advertisement is as immate-
rial in this connection as is the fact that newspapers and books are sold.  
Any other conclusion would discourage newspapers from carrying “edi-
torial advertisements” of this type, and so might shut off an important 
outlet for the promulgation of information and ideas by persons who do 
not themselves have access to publishing facilities—who wish to exercise 
their freedom of speech even though they are not members of the 
press.
122
The Court went on to quote the reasoning regarding “self-censorship” 
by booksellers expressed in Smith.  In the context of libel judgments, 
the Court discerned the potential for “a comparable ‘self-censorship’” 
that justified requiring both a showing of falsehood and “actual mal-
ice” as prerequisites to recovery of libel judgments by public offi-
cials.123
In Freedman v. Maryland, the Court again evinced concern with the 
potential of chilling effects to induce intermediaries to engage in 
proxy censorship.124  It struck down a state scheme for administrative 
censorship of films, announcing that any such undertaking must pro-
vide prompt judicial review of any government decision to censor a 
particular film.125  The Court expressed the view that even a temporary 
120 372 U.S. at 65 n.6 (citation omitted). 
121 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
122 Id. at 266.  Nor did the Court hesitate to brush aside the claim that private 
agency in the lawsuit broke the chain of responsibility to the state.  See id. at 265 (“It 
matters not that that law has been applied in a civil action and that it is common law 
only, though supplemented by statute.”). 
123 Id. at 279-80; cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y. State Crime Vic-
tims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (striking down a statute forbidding payment for 
writings about a crime because “the statute plainly imposes a financial disincentive only 
on speech of a particular content”); Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 
257 (1974) (“Faced with the penalties that would accrue to any newspaper that pub-
lished news or commentary arguably within the reach of the right-of-access statute, edi-
tors might well conclude that the safe course is to avoid controversy.”). 
124 380 U.S. 51, 61 (1965). 
125 Id. at 60. 
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administrative restraint could chill intermediaries.  Citing Bantam 
Books, it observed: 
[A]n administrative refusal to license, signifying the censor’s view that 
the film is unprotected, may have a discouraging effect on the exhibi-
tor. . . . Particularly in the case of motion pictures, it may take very little 
to deter exhibition in a given locality.  The exhibitor’s stake in any one 
picture may be insufficient to warrant a protracted and onerous course 
of litigation.
126
b.  New Media and the Problem of Chilled Intermediaries 
Both New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and Freedman v. Maryland have 
thrived as part of the First Amendment doctrine of the late twentieth 
and early twenty-first centuries.127  With the rise of new media, more-
over, the Court has continued to manifest concern for the potential 
impact of regulatory schemes that may give rise to proxy censorship by 
intermediaries.128
126 Id. at 59; see also McKinney v. Alabama, 424 U.S. 669, 675-76 (1976) (“[W]e rec-
ognized in Freedman that individual exhibitors as well as distributors may be unwilling, 
for various reasons, to oppose a state claim of obscenity regarding certain material.”); 
Blount v. Rizzi, 400 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1971) (invalidating as inconsistent with Freedman 
a statute empowering the Postmaster General, without judicial intervention, to refuse 
payment of money orders to a person shown “on satisfactory evidence” to be selling 
obscene materials, and to stamp as “Unlawful” and return to senders mail addressed to 
that person). 
127 For instances of the Court relying on New York Times, see, for example, Nike, 
Inc. v. Kasky, 539 U.S. 654, 659 (2003) (Stevens, J., concurring) (discussing the New 
York Times definition of “malice”); Illinois ex rel. Madigan v. Telemarketing Assocs., 538 
U.S. 600, 620-21 (2003) (noting the “breathing space” protection of speech); BE&K 
Constr. Co. v. NLRB, 536 U.S. 516, 531 (2002) (same); Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 
514, 534-35 (2001) (citing the commitment to “debate on public issues”); Legal Servs. 
Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533, 548 (2001) (citing the commitment to debate for 
“political and social changes”).  For instances of the Court reaffirming Freedman, see 
City of Littleton v. Z. J. Gifts D-4, L.L.C., 541 U.S. 774, 776, 782 (2004) (explicating 
Freedman’s protections of potentially chilled yet constitutional speech); Madigan, 538 
U.S. at 620 n.9 (same); Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (same); 
FW/PBS, Inc. v. City of Dallas, 493 U.S. 215, 217 (1990) (same). 
128 The partial exception has been the sui generis regulation of broadcast media, 
where the Court sought to walk a “‘tightrope’” between the dangers of public and pri-
vate censorship identified from the early days of broadcasting.  CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 
U.S. 367, 394 (1981) (quoting CBS, Inc. v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 117 
(1973)).  Given the potential interference of signals from competing broadcast sta-
tions, some regulation was regarded as essential, but regulation threatened to bring 
either government censorship or private monopolies that stood astride the new me-
dium.  The initial account of the dilemma observed:  “‘We can not allow any single 
person or group to place themselves in [a] position where they can censor the material 
which shall be broadcasted to the public, nor do I believe that the Government should 
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i.  Video Recorders:  The Manufacturer as Intermediary 
In Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., the Court re-
fused to impose vicarious liability for copyright infringement on 
manufacturers of then-novel videotape recorders (VTRs), which could 
be used to tape material broadcast over the air.129  In part, that deter-
mination was based on a perception that the equipment manufactur-
ers functioned as intermediaries, opening up a channel of communi-
cation between broadcast programmers who were eager to have their 
material “time-shifted” and potential viewers who could use the re-
corders to view material that was otherwise inaccessible.  Imposing vi-
carious liability at the behest of other broadcast programmers who 
sought to enforce their copyright claims, the Court observed, could 
induce manufacturers to close down that channel of communication, 
effectively imposing censorship of free broadcasters by those who 
sought compensation: 
 If there are millions of owners of VTR’s who make copies of televised 
sports events, religious broadcasts, and educational programs such as 
Mister Rogers’ Neighborhood, and if the proprietors of those programs 
welcome the practice, the business of supplying the equipment that 
makes such copying feasible should not be stifled simply because the 
equipment is used by some individuals to make unauthorized  reproduc-
tions of respondents’ works. . . . [A] finding of contributory infringe-
ment would  inevitably frustrate the interests of broadcasters in reaching 
the portion of their audience that is available only through time-
shifting.
130
ever be placed in the position of censoring this material.’”  Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 
U.S. at 104 (quoting To Regulate Radio Communication:  Hearings on H.R. 7357 Before the 
H. Comm. on the Merchant Marine and Fisheries, 68th Cong. 8 (1924) (Statement of Her-
bert Hoover, Secretary of Commerce)). 
 For the navigation of this “tightrope,” see, for example, Ark. Educ. Television 
Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 681 (1998) (allowing journalistic discretion to deter-
mine the qualifications of candidates for televised political debate); FCC v. League of 
Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking down a prohibition on “edi-
torializing” by public broadcasters); CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. at 396-97 (upholding the 
requirement that broadcasters must sell time to federal candidates); FCC v. Pacifica 
Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978) (upholding “decency” time channeling); Red 
Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 400-01 (1969) (upholding the Fairness Doctrine 
imposed on broadcasters by the FCC). 
129 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984). 
130 Id. at 446. 
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ii.  The Cable Trilogy:  The Danger of Networks as Proxy Censors 
As telecommunications policy grappled with the rise of federally 
regulated cable networks, the Court again confronted the threat that 
the subjects of government regulation would censor material they 
transmitted in response to regulatory incentives.  That threat was suf-
ficient to persuade the Court to require heightened levels of justifica-
tion for regulatory interventions.  In Turner Broadcasting System, Inc. v. 
FCC, the Court began its review of provisions of the Cable Television 
Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, which required 
cable systems to carry local broadcast channels.131  The Court recog-
nized the threat of censorship by cable systems: 
 When an individual subscribes to cable, the physical connection be-
tween the television set and the cable network gives the cable operator 
bottleneck, or gatekeeper, control over most (if not all) of the television 
programming that is channeled into the subscriber’s home.  Hence, 
simply by virtue of its ownership of the essential pathway for cable 
speech, a cable operator can prevent its subscribers from obtaining ac-
cess to programming it chooses to exclude.  A cable operator, unlike 
speakers in other media, can thus silence the voice of competing speak-
ers with a mere flick of the switch.  The potential for abuse of this private 
power over a central avenue of communication cannot be overlooked.
132
Yet the effort to alleviate this danger raised other concerns.  In 
addition to an interference with the unfettered control of the net-
works themselves–-and one man’s “censor” is another’s “editor”—the 
Court discerned a second harm in the “must-carry” requirements:  the 
reservation of channels for local broadcasters induced the networks to 
censor other cable programmers.133  For the majority of the Court, 
these overlapping dangers were sufficient to require heightened First 
131 512 U.S. 622, 626 (1994). 
132 Id. at 656-57 (footnote omitted). 
133 Id. at 637; see id. at 645 (“The must-carry provisions also burden cable pro-
grammers by reducing the number of channels for which they can compete.”).  The 
Court remanded for a determination of whether these burdens could be adequately 
justified under the First Amendment.  Id. at 668.  When the Court later returned to its 
examination of the “must-carry” provisions, it observed again the provisions’ “potential 
to interfere with protected speech in two ways”:  by reducing the number of channels 
over which cable operators “exercise unfettered control,” and by “render[ing] it more 
difficult for cable programmers to compete for carriage on the limited channels re-
maining.”  Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 520 U.S. 180, 214 (1997) (quotation marks 
omitted).  The Court upheld the “must-carry” rule, observing that the “actual effects” 
of the rule were “modest” and “congruent to the benefits it affords.”  Id. at 214-15. 
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Amendment scrutiny of the “must-carry” provisions, and the case was 
remanded for analysis of the justification for the statute. 
The 1992 cable statute and the problem of proxy censorship re-
turned to the Court two years later in Denver Area Educational Telecom-
munications Consortium, Inc. v. FCC.134  There the Court reviewed a sec-
ond set of provisions structuring the dealings of cable networks with 
“indecent” programming carried by channels that used the networks 
as intermediaries.135  The case generated a fractured constellation of 
six opinions and three separate holdings that ultimately highlight the 
importance of structuring constitutional doctrine to limit the dangers 
of proxy censorship. 
On one issue regarding proxy censorship there was a clear major-
ity.  Justice Breyer wrote an opinion that gained the votes of six Jus-
tices for the proposition that the portion of the statute which required 
cable operators to block and segregate “indecent” programs sent 
through their networks over “leased channels” was unconstitutional.136  
Although the statute neither imposed criminal penalties on speakers 
nor directly prohibited carriage of disfavored messages, the majority 
opinion harked back to the McCarthy-era recognition that indirect as 
well as direct censorship can distort the system of free expression.  It 
recognized the effective censorship that resulted from imposing pro-
cedural burdens on intermediaries who carry unpopular modes of ex-
pression. 
The statute and its implementing regulations required cable net-
work operators to place “patently offensive” leased-channel programs 
on a separate channel and to block that channel in the absence of a 
specific written request to view it.137  Imposing that regime on the ca-
ble networks, in the view of the majority, had at least three censorial 
impacts on the flow of communication from programmer to viewer.  
First, the challenged system burdened the choices of viewers.  A sub-
scriber seeking the disfavored content could not “decide to watch a 
single program [subject to the system] without considerable advance 
134 518 U.S. 727 (1996). 
135 The provisions dealt both with channels that local franchising authorities re-
quired cable networks to make available for “public access,” and with “leased” channels 
that the federal statute required networks to make available for paid carriage of com-
mercial content that originated outside of the cable system.  Id. at 732, 734. 
136 Id. at 732, 753-60 (Breyer, J., joined by Stevens, O’Connor, Souter, Kennedy, 
Ginsburg, JJ., as to Part III). 
137 Id. at 753-54. 
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planning.”138  The majority recognized an additional burden on view-
ers:  “the ‘written notice’ requirement will further restrict viewing by 
subscribers who fear for their reputations should the operator, advert-
ently or inadvertently, disclose the list of those who wish to watch the 
‘patently offensive’ channel.”139  Second, the regulatory scheme bur-
dened the opportunities of programmers to communicate.  Pro-
grammers whose content fell within the disfavored class could not 
reach “viewers who select programs day by day (or, through ‘surfing,’ 
minute by minute).”140  Third, the incentives of the regulatory system 
were likely to encourage active censorship by the system operators.  By 
simply refusing to carry potentially troublesome programming at the 
outset, the cable network could avoid the burdens of monitoring pro-
grams for “patently offensive” content, establishing separate channels, 
and responding to viewer requests.  In the Court’s view, the likely im-
pact of the system on the decisions of cable system operators was to 
impair the opportunities of both programmers and viewers by en-
couraging cable operators “to ban programming that the operator 
would otherwise permit to run” as a means of avoiding the “costs and 
burdens” associated with statutory compliance.141  These impacts were 
not adequately justified, in the view of the majority, since an alterna-
tive and less burdensome system that allowed subscribers to request 
blocking of offensive channels or programming would serve equally 
well the purpose of safeguarding children whose parents sought to 
shield them from indecency.142
Five of the six Justices who joined the holding on the “block and 
segregate” provision also found a second provision of the statute un-
constitutional.  Cable system operators were historically barred by 
their franchise agreements with local governments from engaging in 
censorship of “public access channels,” which were entitled under 
138 Id. at 754. 
139 Id. (citing Lamont v. Postmaster Gen., 381 U.S. 310, 307 (1965), which held 
unconstitutional a law requiring that the Post Office be notified by those wishing to 
receive communist literature). 
140 Id. 
141 Id. 
142 Id. at 755-70.  Justice Thomas, writing for Justice Scalia and Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, acknowledged some burden on free speech rights, but downplayed the im-
pact of the regulatory scheme.  The opinion echoed the arguments of the defenders of 
McCarthy blacklists by minimizing the impact on speech:  “[P]etitioners’ allegations of 
an official list . . . are pure hyperbole. . . . [T]his is hardly the kind of chilling effect 
that implicates the First Amendment.”  Id. at 834-35 (Thomas, J., concurring in part 
and dissenting in part). 
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these agreements to use system facilities.  By contrast, section 10(c) of 
the 1992 Act empowered system operators to refuse carriage to the 
limited class of “indecent” programs carried by those “public access” 
channels. In his concurrence, Justice Kennedy inferred that 
“[p]erhaps Congress drafted the law this way to avoid the clear consti-
tutional difficulties of banning indecent speech from access chan-
nels,”143 but a majority of the Court found the effort to empower 
proxy censors unconstitutional. 
In reaching this conclusion, this group of Justices rejected the po-
sition–-analogous again to the claims of defenders of the McCarthy 
blacklists—that any decision to ban “indecent” material could not be 
attributed to official action, but only to the intervening private deci-
sion of cable operators.144  No single opinion, however, commanded a 
majority.  The opinion of Justice Kennedy, writing for himself and Jus-
tice Ginsburg, is the clearest:  a provision that “singles out one sort of 
speech for vulnerability to private censorship” can only be constitu-
tional if it is “narrowly tailored to serve a compelling state interest.”145  
The statutory provisions “do not require direct action against speech, 
but do authorize a cable operator to deny the use of its property to 
certain forms of speech. . . . When the government identifies certain 
speech on the basis of its content as vulnerable to exclusion from a 
common carrier or public forum, strict scrutiny applies.”146
143 Id. at 807 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, 
and dissenting in part). 
144 That position had prevailed before the D.C. Circuit.  See Alliance for Cmty. Me-
dia v. FCC, 56 F.3d 105, 112-21 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (focusing on the “state action” ques-
tion), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, 
Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727 (1996).  It was echoed in modified form by the opinion of 
Justice Thomas, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Scalia, which would have 
upheld this part of the statute on the ground that it “merely restore[s] part of the edi-
torial discretion an operator would have absent Government regulation without bur-
dening the programmer’s underlying speech rights.”  Denver Area Educ., 518 U.S. at 823 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
145 Denver Area Educ., 518 U.S. at 782, 803 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, con-
curring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part). 
146 Id. at 783; see also id. at 797 (“Laws removing common-carriage protection from 
a single form of speech based on its content should be reviewed under the same stan-
dard as content-based restrictions on speech in a public forum.”); id. at 802-03 (“The 
provisions here are content-based discriminations in the strong sense of suppressing a 
certain form of expression that the Government dislikes or otherwise wishes to exclude 
on account of its effects, and there is no justification for anything but strict scrutiny 
here. . . . It contravenes the First Amendment to give Government a general license to 
single out some categories of speech for lesser protection so long as it stops short of 
viewpoint discrimination.”); id. at 806 (“[T]he discretion conferred by the law is slight.  
The operator is not authorized to place programs of its own liking on the leased access 
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Like McCarthy-era employers who could be expected to divest 
themselves of officially identified subversives, there was every reason to 
believe that cable system operators would exercise their discretion to 
the detriment of those who were out of the mainstream: 
 Perhaps some operators will choose to show the indecent program-
ming they now may banish if they can command a better price than 
other access programmers are willing to pay. . . . [But there is little] rea-
son to think cable operators will choose to show indecent programs on 
public access channels.  The operator is not paid, or paid much, for 
transmitting programs on these channels . . . [and] the operator will 
wish to avoid unwanted controversy . . . . The obvious consequence in-
vited by the discretion is exclusion.147
The plurality opinion of Justice Breyer, writing for himself and 
Justices Stevens and Souter, likewise rested its condemnation of the 
system on the censorial dangers of the “cable operator’s veto.”  It rec-
ognized the “risk that the veto itself may be mistaken; and its use, or 
threatened use, could prevent the presentation of programming, that, 
though borderline, is not ‘patently offensive’ to its targeted audi-
ence.”148  Justice Breyer’s plurality concluded that the proposed system 
was unconstitutional; it “would greatly increase the risk that certain 
categories of programming (say, borderline offensive programs) will 
not appear” without any “obvious” justifying need.149
The opacity of Justice Breyer’s approach arises from the fact that 
the Justices joining his analysis combined with the quite different 
analysis of Justices Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist150 to form a majority 
channels, nor to remove other speech (racist or violent, for example) that might be 
offensive to it or to viewers.  The operator is just given a veto over the one kind of law-
ful speech Congress disdains.”). 
147 Id. at 811.  Justice Stevens’s separate analysis on this point was similar.  He ar-
gued that this provision of the statute was invalid because “[i]t would inject federally 
authorized private censors into fora from which they might otherwise be excluded, and 
it would therefore limit local fora that might otherwise be open to all constitutionally 
protected speech.”  Id. at 773 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
148 Id. at 763 (plurality opinion). 
149 Id. at 766. 
150 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist, would 
have viewed any government rule that gave discretion to cable operators as per se 
permissible.  They took the position that, as with the “public access” channels, any de-
cision by cable operators to bar “indecent” programming should not be regarded as 
“censorship,” but as private choice.  Id. at 823-24 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part).  The seven-member majority on this point was completed by Justice 
O’Connor, who joined the Breyer camp’s balancing analysis of the problems, but di-
verged from their conclusion that the public access provisions were unconstitutional.  
Id. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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holding on a third issue.  This group of seven Justices determined that 
the parallel provision of the Act that allowed cable operators to bar 
“indecent” programming on leased channels—as opposed to public 
access channels—comported with the strictures of the First Amend-
ment. The Breyer opinion acknowledged that the “leased channel” 
provision, like the “public access” provision, regulated speech and re-
quired assurance that “it properly addresses an extremely important 
problem, without imposing, in light of the relevant interests, an un-
necessarily great restriction on speech.”151
Characterizing the goal of the statute as a compelling need “to 
protect children from exposure to patently offensive sex-related mate-
rial,” the opinion noted that such materials “confront[] the citizen” in 
the “privacy of the home.”152  The conceded cost to free expression “is 
not the same as the certainty that accompanies a governmental ban” 
and in any event the system was no more restrictive than the FCC 
regulation of indecency in broadcasting that had been upheld previ-
ously.153  Justice Breyer went on to observe that costs to the free ex-
pression interests of programmers and viewers were in part counter-
balanced by the benefits to the rights of cable operators.  In his view, 
the statute sought to strike a balance between  
those interests served by the access requirements themselves (increasing 
the availability of avenues of expression to programmers who otherwise 
would not have them), and the disadvantage to the First Amendment in-
terests of cable operators and other programmers (those to whom the 
cable operator would have assigned the channels devoted to access).
154
Taken alone, this balancing act on “leased channels” is under-
standable.  It acknowledges the risk of proxy censorship, but views that 
risk as being warranted by the combination of government and free 
expression interests served by the rule.  But, as the partial dissents of 
Justice Kennedy on one hand and Justice Thomas on the other hand 
point out, reconciling the holding with the invalidation of an identical 
scheme on “public channels” is a challenge.  Justice Breyer’s opinion 
proceeds to distinguish “public access channels” from “leased chan-
nels” on two lines of argument.  First, he observes that historically, the 
“public access channels” had not been controlled by the cable opera-
tors at the time the indecency provisions were adopted.  Rather, they 
151 Id. at 743 (plurality opinion). 
152 Id. at 743-44 (quotation marks omitted). 
153 Id. at 743-44, 746. 
154 Id. at 743-44 (citation omitted). 
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were under the control of local public franchising authorities, so 
transferring control to operators could not be characterized as “re-
storing editorial rights.”  The “much diminished” claim that the re-
gime in public access channels provided countervailing free expres-
sion benefits to displaced “editors” was accordingly less powerful than 
in the “leased channel” context in justifying the likely censorial ef-
fects.  Second, the Breyer opinion maintains that the control by local 
authorities—which is absent in the case of leased channels—casts 
doubt on the child-protective interest in providing a “cable operator’s 
veto”:  “given present supervisory mechanisms, the need for this par-
ticular provision, aimed directly at public access channels, is not obvi-
ous,” and on the record before the Court “the Government cannot 
sustain its burden of showing that § 10(c) is necessary to protect chil-
dren or that it is appropriately tailored to secure that end.”155
The most recent chapter in federal cable regulation brought an-
other issue of proxy censorship to the Court, and resulted in some 
clarification.  United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc. addressed 
a provision of the 1996 Communications Decency Act in which Con-
gress imposed limits on the freedom of cable operators to carry chan-
nels “primarily dedicated to sexually oriented programming.”156  Be-
fore the adoption of the statute, as a matter of economic self interest, 
cable operators treated “adult” channels as “premium” channels avail-
able only upon special payment, and scrambled transmission of those 
channels to subscribers who did not pay for the premium service.  A 
technological artifact, however, provoked congressional intervention.  
While it was technologically possible to block transmission of the 
channels entirely, operators found it cheaper to simply “scramble” the 
transmission using a technology by which signals occasionally “bled” 
into visibility, creating a context in which “viewers who [had] not paid 
to receive [sexually explicit] channels [could have] happen[ed] 
across discernible images of a sexually explicit nature.”157 
In response to accounts of children who had been exposed to 
sexually explicit signal bleed, section 504 of the Communications De-
cency Act required cable operators to use the more expensive tech-
nology to “fully block” any channel that subscribers affirmatively re-
quested not to receive.158 In addition, for channels “primarily 
155 Id. at 766. 
156 529 U.S. 803, 806 (2000) (quotation marks omitted). 
157 Id. at 808. 
158 47 U.S.C. § 560 (2000). 
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dedicated to sexually oriented programming,” section 505 requires 
cable operators to choose either to adopt a still more expensive sys-
temwide “fully blocking” technology, or to limit the transmission of 
the targeted channels to hours between 10 p.m. and 6 a.m.–-times 
when children were thought to be less likely to be exposed to discern-
able images.159  The bulk of cable operators responded by choosing to 
act as proxy censors.  Because of the cost of “full blocking” and the 
risk of sanctions if any signals bled through, “the only reasonable way 
for a substantial number of cable operators to comply with the letter 
of section 505 is to time channel, which silences the protected speech 
for two-thirds of the day in every home in a cable service area, regard-
less of the presence or likely presence of children or of the wishes of 
the viewers.”160
As with other “subtle interferences,” it could be argued that this si-
lencing was not a government ban:  the decision to “time channel” 
rather than adopt more expensive blocking technology was a choice 
of the system operators, and some chose not to engage in censorship.  
Moreover, the “time channeling” did not entirely prevent receipt of 
the channels:  recipients who sought the targeted channels could view 
them either by “time shifting” with VCRs or by waiting for the time 
channel to open at 10 p.m.  But the majority of the Court took the po-
sition that “[i]t is of no moment that the statute does not impose a 
complete prohibition.  The distinction between laws burdening and 
laws banning speech is but a matter of degree.  The Government’s 
content-based burdens must satisfy the same rigorous scrutiny as its 
content-based bans.”161  Under that level of scrutiny, the Court deter-
mined that the challenged provision was unconstitutionally intrusive.  
The government failed to carry its burden of demonstrating that the 
less restrictive alternative of publicizing the “opt out” rights under sec-
159 Id. § 561. 
160 Playboy Entmn’t Group, 529 U.S. at 812; see also id. at 809 (noting that “most cable 
operators had no practical choice but to curtail [the targeted] programming during 
the [regulated] sixteen hours or risk the penalties imposed” and that sixty-nine per-
cent of operators time channeled) (quotation marks omitted); id. at 821 (“A rational 
cable operator, faced with the possibility of sanctions for intermittent bleeding, could 
well choose to time channel even if the bleeding is too momentary to pose any con-
cern to most households.”). 
161 Id. at 812; see also id. at 826 (“[S]pecial consideration or latitude is not accorded 
to the Government merely because the law can somehow be described as a burden 
rather than outright suppression.”). 
 The four dissenters acknowledged that the statute imposed “speech related restric-
tions,” but argued that this was a “burden” which “[increased] the cost of adult chan-
nel broadcasting,” rather than “banning” it.  Id. at 845 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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tion 504 would inadequately address legitimate concerns; “the gov-
ernment has failed to establish a pervasive, nationwide problem justi-
fying its nationwide daytime speech ban.”162
iii.  Subtle Interference and Internet Intermediaries 
Analysis of efforts by the government to target weak links in Inter-
net chains of communication thus takes place against the background 
of the long-standing position, rooted in the lessons of the McCarthy 
era, that “subtle interferences” and efforts to dissuade transmission by 
intermediaries constitute cognizable dangers to free expression, no 
less than threats of direct prosecution of speakers or listeners.  The 
fact that these efforts enlist the cooperation of private parties makes 
them more, rather than less, dangerous in comparison to direct regu-
lation.  Private discretion is often less visible and less procedurally 
regular than public sanction. 
As yet, relatively few efforts to recruit proxy censors on the Inter-
net have reached adjudication, though the Court has recognized the 
danger that overbroad regulation of Internet communications poses.  
In the first encounter with Internet regulation, the Court warned that 
it “may well cause speakers to remain silent rather than communicate 
even arguably unlawful words, ideas, and images.”163  More recently, 
the Court expressed concern that efforts to limit speech “harmful to 
minors” on the Internet where “only an affirmative defense is avail-
able” imposes risks that “speakers may self-censor rather than risk the 
perils of trial.  There is a potential for extraordinary harm and a seri-
ous chill upon protected speech.”164  The tendency of intermediaries 
to engage in broadly prophylactic responses to government incentives 
calls forth the same concerns.  The dangers of proxy censorship 
should lead courts to regard efforts to enlist intermediaries as Internet 
censors as no less dangerous than efforts to encourage cable networks 
to bowdlerize their content or bookstores to purge their stocks. 
162 Id. at 823 (majority opinion); see also id. at 814 (concluding that “even where 
speech is indecent and enters the home,” the least restrictive alternative is required); 
id. at 815 (“[T]argeted blocking enables the Government to support parental authority 
without affecting the First Amendment interests of speakers and willing listen-
ers . . . .”). 
163 Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 872 (1997). 
164 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670-71 (2004). 
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C.  Doctrinal Structures To Address the Problem of the Weakest Link 
Having learned the lesson in the McCarthy era that “subtle inter-
ferences” and indirect attacks on free speech could deform the system 
of free expression, the Supreme Court elaborated two lines of First 
Amendment doctrine that bear with particular salience on the prob-
lem of proxy censorship.  The first set of doctrines requires courts to 
assess the degree to which a particular regulatory scheme is likely to 
reach beyond legitimate targets to impose collateral damage on pro-
tected speech.  The second set of doctrines provides safe harbors for 
intermediaries by treating vague regulations, efforts to impose vicari-
ous liability, and efforts to penalize dissemination of true facts as pre-
sumptively impermissible without a particularized evaluation of their 
propensity to impose collateral damage.  Each has implications for the 
analysis of proxy censorship in the context of the Internet. 
1.  The Doctrinal Heritage 
The reaction against the abuses of the McCarthy era catalyzed 
doctrinal formulations directed to the danger that efforts nominally 
addressed to legitimate problems might inflict severe collateral dam-
age on the system of free expression.  A net thrown widely in an effort 
to catch communist agents was likely to entangle a variety of legiti-
mate dissenters and political opponents; indeed, the experience of 
the McCarthy era suggested that broad prohibitions were not infre-
quently deployed for precisely this purpose.  Even if official discretion 
did not actively apply the sanctions to the entire spectrum of activity 
that fell within the scope of the nominal prohibitions, the possibility 
of official prosecution or private persecution could itself “chill” ex-
pression165 and induce “self-censorship” among those who might fall 
within the net should they catch the attention of hostile officials.166  
165 See, e.g., Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 195 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., con-
curring) (emphasizing that the punishment of protected association “affects not only 
those who, like the appellants, are immediately before the Court.  It has an unmistak-
able tendency to chill that free play of the spirit which all teachers ought especially to 
cultivate and practice; it makes for caution and timidity in their associations by poten-
tial teachers”); see also Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 487 (1960) (quoting from Wie-
man); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 555 (1963) (dis-
cussing alleged “subversive” activity within the Miami branch of the NAACP). 
166 The Supreme Court account of “self-censorship” as a phenomenon begins with 
Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 531 n.56 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concur-
ring) (noting how self-censorship distorted studio-era Hollywood’s depiction of his-
torical figures).  It next appears in Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 153 (1959) (“[I]f 
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To be sure, as long as there are varieties of speech that can be legiti-
mately suppressed, “self-censorship” cannot be an evil in and of itself, 
for “chilling” individuals from engaging in illegal activities is precisely 
the legitimate office of law.  Constitutional difficulty arises, however, 
when the “self-censorship” suppresses speech that is constitutionally 
protected; constitutional doctrine has internalized the lesson of the 
McCarthy era that the system of free expression can suffer not only 
from direct assault but also from collateral damage. 
In reaction to McCarthy-era excesses, the Court deployed doc-
trines that require courts to evaluate the dangers of collateral damage 
from sanctions directed at legitimate public harms.  Where the gov-
ernment defined specific communicative conduct that triggered sanc-
tions, the Court increasingly held, the definition could not constitu-
tionally extend to impose punishment on actions that were protected 
by the First Amendment.  “Broad prophylactic rules in the area of free 
expression are suspect.  Precision of regulation must be the touch-
stone in an area so closely touching our most precious freedoms”;167 
statutes that “burn[ed] the house to roast the pig” by forbidding both 
constitutional and unconstitutional conduct were deemed constitu-
tionally impermissible.168  Even where the official prohibition itself 
banned only unprotected activities, in deploying sanctions against 
communications the government was required to use “sensitive tools” 
to avoid the risk of error in applying the legal categories that could re-
the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents . . . he will tend to 
restrict the books he sells to those he has inspected, and thus the state will have im-
posed a restriction of constitutionally protected as well as obscene literature.”), and 
N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 278 (1964) (quoting from Smith). 
167 NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963) (citations omitted); see also Keyi-
shian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 609 (1967) (striking an employment exclusion 
for impermissible overbreadth where it bars “employment both for association which 
legitimately may be proscribed and for association which may not be proscribed consis-
tently with First Amendment rights”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265-66 
(1967) (striking a bar on employment where the “statute casts its net across a broad 
range of associational activities, indiscriminately trapping membership which can be 
constitutionally punished and membership which cannot be so proscribed” (citation 
omitted)); Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966) (striking down a loyalty oath 
requirement); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 507, 508 (1964) (striking as 
“unnecessarily broad[]” a statute revoking the passports of members of “communist-
front organizations”); Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191 (“Indiscriminate classification of inno-
cent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary power.”). 
 These cases drew on earlier requirements that statutes punishing speech be “nar-
rowly drawn to prevent the supposed evil.”  E.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 
307 (1940). 
168 Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957). 
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sult in the “deterrence of speech which the Constitution makes 
free.”169
The memory of the moral panics of the McCarthy era led to simi-
lar constraints on government regulations that did not directly punish 
expressive activities, but were likely to catalyze private persecution.  In 
reviewing requirements that teachers disclose “every conceivable kind 
of associational tie—social, professional, political, avocational, or reli-
gious,” with the collateral danger of “pressure upon a teacher to avoid 
any ties which might displease those who control his professional des-
tiny,” the Court concluded that “even though the governmental pur-
pose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by 
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end 
can be more narrowly achieved.”170
2.  Collateral Damage Doctrines and the Problem of  
Proxy Censorship of the Internet 
These concerns with collateral damage to free expression inflicted 
in pursuit of nominally legitimate goals have remained a vibrant part 
of First Amendment doctrine.  In some contexts the concern appears 
in free-standing form:  excessive suppression of protected speech is an 
evil sufficient to invalidate a regulatory intervention as unconstitu-
tionally “overbroad.”171  In others it is embedded in an analysis of the 
169 Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513, 525-26 (1958). See, e.g., NAACP v. Claiborne 
Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 916 n.50 (1982) (discussing the precision of regulation 
required and finding that the imposition of damages liability in the context of pro-
tected activity requires a clear showing of direct and proximate involvement in an 
unlawful objective). 
170 Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 486, 488 (1960); see also Louisiana ex rel. Gre-
million v. NAACP, 366 U.S. 293, 297 (1961) (striking a statute requiring the disclosure 
of NAACP membership lists as insufficiently “narrowly drawn to prevent the supposed 
evil” (quoting Cantwell, 310 U.S. at 307)); Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60, 64 (1960) 
(striking down as overbroad a requirement that all handbills bear identification).  
Again, the Court drew on earlier analyses that considered the unjustified impact of 
regulations on modes of communication as well as the legal proscription of speech.  
See, e.g., Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 163 (1939) (“[O]ne is not to have the exer-
cise of his liberty of expression in appropriate places abridged on the plea that it may 
be exercised in some other place.”). 
171 Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 665 (2004) (“A statute that ‘effectively sup-
presses a large amount of speech that adults have a constitutional right to receive and 
to address to one another . . . is unacceptable if less restrictive alternatives would be at 
least as effective . . . .’” (quoting Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997))); see also 
Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 252-53 (2002) (“The Government cannot 
ban speech fit for adults simply because it may fall into the hands of children. . . . The 
objective is to prohibit illegal conduct, but this restriction goes well beyond that inter-
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degree of congruence between means and ends required by “strict,”172 
“intermediate,”173 or “moderate”174 scrutiny.  On any “level of scrutiny” 
greater than “minimal,” regulations cannot stand where the govern-
ment’s legitimate goal can be accomplished effectively by other more 
“narrowly tailored” or “less intrusive” alternatives, or where there is 
“unnecessary and substantial” impact on protected speech.  Finally, 
the procedural mechanisms by which even facially appropriate regula-
tions are applied must be adequate to assure that the actual impact of 
est by restricting the speech available to law-abiding adults.”); Reno, 521 U.S. at 875 
(“[T]he governmental interest in protecting children from harmful materials . . . does 
not justify an unnecessarily broad suppression of speech addressed to adults.”); Loril-
lard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 564 (2001) (citing Reno); Sable Commc’ns of 
Cal., Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 127 (1989)(“In our judgment, this case, like Butler, pre-
sents us with ‘legislation not reasonably restricted to the evil with which it is said to 
deal.’” (quoting Butler v. Michigan, 352 U.S. 380, 383 (1957))); Bd. of Airport 
Comm’rs of L.A. v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 575, 577 (1987) (holding that a 
regulation prohibiting “all First Amendment activities” was substantially overbroad 
(quotation marks omitted)); Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 74 
(1983) (“The level of discourse reaching a mailbox simply cannot be limited to that 
which would be suitable for a sandbox.”); Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim, 452 U.S. 
61, 68 (1981) (holding that when a zoning law “infringes upon a protected liberty,” the 
Court must consider less intrusive alternatives). 
172 See, e.g., United States v. Playboy Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 814 (2000) 
(noting that, under strict scrutiny, “the objective of shielding children does not suffice 
to support a blanket ban if the protection can be accomplished by a less restrictive al-
ternative”). 
173 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 668 (1994) (inquiring 
under “intermediate scrutiny” into whether “‘substantially more speech than . . . neces-
sary’” was suppressed and “the availability and efficacy of ‘constitutionally acceptable 
less restrictive means’ of achieving the Government’s asserted interests” (quoting Sable 
Commc’ns of Cal., 492 U.S. at 129)).  Similarly, the Court has reviewed injunctions 
against speech carefully to assure that they are no broader than necessary to achieve 
their desired goals.  See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., 512 U.S. 753, 765 (1994) 
(discussing a trial judge’s ability to tailor injunctions to provide “more precise relief”); 
NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 912 n.47 (1982) (“‘[A] government 
regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Govern-
ment; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental interest [, and] if the gov-
ernmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of speech . . . .’” (quoting United 
States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968))); Carroll v. President and Comm’rs of 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 183 (1968) (holding that an injunction relating to First 
Amendment rights “must be couched in the narrowest terms that will accomplish the 
pin-pointed objective”). 
174 See, e.g., Edenfield v. Fane, 507 U.S. 761, 777 (1993) (“Even under the First 
Amendment’s somewhat more forgiving standards for restrictions on commercial 
speech, a State may not curb protected expression without advancing a substantial gov-
ernmental interest.”); Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 
447 U.S. 557, 569-72 (1980) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments re-
quire that the suppression of speech be “no more extensive than necessary” to achieve 
an important government interest). 
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the statute does not extend unconstitutionally beyond the realm of 
government necessity.175
This doctrinal structure carries important implications for the 
problem of proxy censorship of the Internet.  Because of the fragility 
of Internet intermediaries’ commitment to particular streams of car-
riage, when addressing efforts to target intermediaries, courts must 
take particularly careful account of the real impact of the regulatory 
intervention at two levels. 
First, the impact of challenged regulations will illuminate the 
“narrowness of the tailoring” of the regulation in question:  the 
broader the swath of communication effectively suppressed, the less 
narrowly the regulation is tailored, and the greater the burden of jus-
tification before it can be adjudged constitutionally acceptable.  Sec-
ond, in examining the intrusiveness of alternatives to challenged regu-
lations, courts must realistically evaluate the impact of the proposed 
regulatory regimes.  In both examinations, courts must be alive to the 
likely reactions of intermediaries to government regulation.  As we 
have noted, efforts to exert leverage against intermediaries are quite 
likely to result in impacts on the speech those intermediaries facilitate 
that are substantially broader than the explicit scope of the regula-
tion.  As weak links in the chain of communications, therefore, inter-
mediaries are particularly likely to generate the collateral damage at 
which overbreadth doctrines are directed.  Conversely, in contemplat-
ing the intrusiveness of alternatives to challenged regulations, courts 
also need to take account of the collateral damage intermediaries can 
be expected to wreak.  
a.  Precision of Regulation and Collateral Damage 
The clearest concern with the potential collateral damage 
wrought by regulation of Internet intermediaries emerges from the 
constellation of opinions in United States v. American Library Ass’n.176  
175 At least two lines of cases operationalize this concern.  First, prior restraint 
cases such as Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam), build 
on the earlier analysis of Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931), that a judgment inter-
fering with legitimate channels of communication cannot be premised on only a dem-
onstration that past communication has been unprotected.  Second, Freedman v. Mary-
land, 380 U.S. 51 (1965), and subsequent cases, see supra note 127, mandate that the 
procedures by which orders to prevent speech are implemented are accompanied by 
adequate notice and opportunity to be heard, and prompt judicial determination, lest 
overbroad administrative determinations chill protected speech. 
176 539 U.S. 194 (2003). 
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Stymied in its initial efforts to criminally punish any transmission or 
display of “indecent” material on the Internet,177 Congress turned to 
seek leverage over a more limited class of intermediaries who could 
block receipt of “indecent” images.  The Children’s Internet Protec-
tion Act (CIPA),178 adopted in 1998, required libraries receiving fed-
eral funds to act as censors by installing software to filter out “visual 
depictions” that were “harmful to minors” from transmissions to li-
brary terminals that accessed the Internet.  The impact of this re-
quirement was anything but precisely tailored.  On one hand, the 
available software blocked websites containing images that were sub-
ject to interdiction as “harmful to minors” yet lawful as to adults; on 
the other hand, it was conceded on all sides that the software that 
would in fact be deployed in response to this mandate effectively cen-
sored “content that is completely innocuous for both adults and mi-
nors, and that no rational person could conclude matches the filter-
ing companies’ category definitions, such as ‘pornography’ or 
‘sex.’”179  For three members of the Court, this collateral damage 
would have been sufficient to invalidate the statute.180
Two more Justices evinced concern about the effect of the statute 
on free expression, but concluded that the actual effects of the statute 
were slight because the record did not show that patrons were unable 
to bypass the filters.  Justice Breyer’s opinion acknowledged that 
“[t]he Act directly restricts the public’s receipt of information. . . . 
[a]nd it does so through limitations imposed by outside bodies (here 
Congress) upon two critically important sources of information—the 
177 See Reno v. ACLU 521 U.S. 844, 885 (1997) (holding that the challenged provi-
sions of the Communications Decency Act violated the First Amendment, because 
“[t]he interest in encouraging freedom of expression in a democratic society out-
weighs any theoretical but unproven benefit of censorship”). 
178 Pub. L. No. 106-554, §§ 1701-1741, 114 Stat. 2763 (2000) (codified at 20 U.S.C. 
§ 9134 (2001) and 47 U.S.C. § 254(h) (2000)). 
179 Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 208-09 (2003) (citations omitted); see also id. at 
233-34 (Souter, J., dissenting) (explaining that the plurality concedes that the filters 
will deny access to “text and pictures harmful to no one”). 
180 See id. at 220 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[CIPA] operates as a blunt nationwide 
restraint on adult access to an enormous amount of valuable information that individ-
ual librarians cannot possibly review. . . . In my view, this restraint is unconstitutional.” 
(quotation marks and citations omitted)); id. at 222 (“[A] statutory blunderbuss that 
mandates this vast amount of ‘overblocking’ abridges the freedom of speech protected 
by the First Amendment.”); id. at 231 (Souter, J., dissenting, joined by Ginsburg, J.) 
(concurring with Justice Stevens that CIPA “impose[s] an unconstitutional condition” 
on subsidies to local libraries). 
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Internet as accessed via public libraries.”181  Applying what he referred 
to as “heightened . . . scrutiny,”182 however, Justice Breyer concluded 
that the burden was de minimis, and therefore not “disproportion-
ate.”183  The Solicitor General had represented that under CIPA “the 
adult patron need only ask a librarian to unblock the specific Web site 
or, alternatively, ask the librarian, ‘Please disable the entire filter,’” 
and thus the “small burden” was insufficient to invalidate the stat-
ute.184  Justice Kennedy separately concurred in the result because of  
the absence of proof “that the ability of adult library users to have ac-
cess to the material is burdened in any significant degree.”185
Finally, the plurality opinion of Justice Rehnquist, joined by Jus-
tices Scalia, O’Connor, and Thomas, upheld CIPA both on the basis 
of the “ease with which patrons may have the filtering software dis-
abled” and on the additional ground that the statute involved the 
spending power, rather than “direct regulation of private conduct.”186
Taken at face value, these analyses imply that an effort to precipi-
tate effective proxy censorship by direct regulation would be viewed as 
impermissible by the entire Court, and that at least a majority of the 
Court would also view truly effective proxy censorship as impermissi-
ble, even if it resulted from financial incentives rather than direct 
regulation.187 
181 Id. at 216 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citations omitted). 
182 Id. at 217 (inquiring whether “the harm to speech-related interests is dispro-
portionate in light of both the justifications and the potential alternatives”). 
183 Id. at 220. 
184 Id. at 219. 
185 Id. at 215 (Kennedy, J., concurring).  Justice Kennedy observed that “[t]he Dis-
trict Court, in its ‘Preliminary Statement,’ did say that ‘the unblocking may take days, 
and may be unavailable, especially in branch libraries, which are often less well staffed 
than main libraries.’  That statement, however, does not appear to be a specific find-
ing.”  Id. at 214 (citations omitted).  Rather than relying on the account of the court 
that tried the evidence, the Justices relied on the Solicitor General’s contrary represen-
tation of fact at oral argument.  Id. at 209 (plurality opinion); id. at 214 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring).  But cf. id. at 232-33 (Souter, J. dissenting) (“I realize the Solicitor Gen-
eral represented this to be the Government’s policy . . . . [but] the District Court ex-
pressly found that ‘unblocking may take days, and may be unavailable, especially in 
branch libraries . . . .’”). 
186 Id. at 196, 209-10 n.4 (plurality opinion). 
187 The plurality’s analysis is in some tension with the recognition in other cases 
that the threat of exposure as the recipient of adult channels is a cognizable burden on 
the exercise of First Amendment rights.  See, e.g., Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Con-
sortium v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 754 (1996) (noting that the fear that television compa-
nies might “disclose the list of those who wish to watch the ‘patently offensive’ chan-
nel” will restrict subscription). 
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Center for Democracy & Technology v. Pappert188 provides a more re-
cent case study.  Concerned that concededly unprotected child por-
nography was available on the Internet to Pennsylvania residents, the 
Pennsylvania legislature sought to exert leverage not over the elusive 
posters of such material, but over the more easily targeted intermedi-
aries who facilitated transmission to residents of Pennsylvania.  It 
adopted a statute designed to recruit ISPs as proxy censors by requir-
ing them to bar access to “child pornography items” by subscribers in 
Pennsylvania.189  The statutory scheme provided for the state Attorney 
General or a district attorney to bring an ex parte proceeding to desig-
nate web pages by Uniform Resource Locator addresses (URLs) upon 
proof that there was probable cause to believe that the URL provided 
“access to” “child pornography items.”  Once informed of this desig-
nation, ISPs were required to “disable [Pennsylvania subscribers’] ac-
cess to” those URLs on pain of criminal penalties ranging up to seven 
years of imprisonment.190
In theory, an ISP could devise equipment and software to reach 
into the stream of data directed to each subscriber in Pennsylvania 
and precisely block access to the designated “child pornography” URL 
only.  In practice, however, the reaction of ISPs was to cut off access to 
a broad swath of protected speech.  Commercial and technical reali-
ties impelled ISPs toward less costly and more easily implemented 
 This analysis ignores, moreover, the burden that filters place on website commu-
nications by blocking the possibility of gaining willing listeners’ attention.  See, e.g., Hill 
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 728 (2000) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the right of 
every citizen to ‘reach the minds of willing listeners and to do so there must be the op-
portunity to win their attention.’” (quoting Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 87 (1949))); 
cf. id. at 780 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part) (arguing that a law forbidding leafleting is unconstitutional because 
it “leav[es] petitioners without adequate means of communication”); Lorillard To-
bacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 563 (2001) (invalidating a ban on outdoor advertising 
because it failed to provide sufficient “alternative avenues” for communication). 
 The plaintiffs before the American Library Ass’n trial court included such potential 
speakers, but the trial court assumed that the interests of all of the plaintiffs were iden-
tical.  Am. Library Ass’n v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 2d 401, 416 n.3 (E.D. Pa. 2002) 
(granting plaintiffs standing, over government objections).  Justice Stevens alludes to 
the issue in his dissent: 
Until a blocked site or group of sites is unblocked, a patron is unlikely to 
know what is being hidden and therefore whether there is any point in asking 
for the filter to be removed. . . . Inevitably, the interest of the authors of those 
works in reaching the widest possible audience would be abridged. 
Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. at 224-25 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
188 337 F. Supp. 2d 606 (E.D. Pa. 2004). 
189 18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 7622 (2003). 
190 Id. § 7624. 
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mechanisms that blocked subscribers’ access throughout their net-
works either to particular “domain names” used by the targeted web 
pages,191 or to IP addresses associated with those domain names.192  
Because both domain names and IP addresses are shared, either of 
these methods served to block substantial numbers of unrelated web-
sites, but faced with the prospect of criminal prosecution, ISPs reacted 
predictably.  Rather than challenging the demands to block websites, 
most ISPs complied with the blocking order in the least costly fashion, 
and in the first waves of designations, “[m]ore than 1,190,000 inno-
cent web sites were blocked in an effort to block less than 400 child 
pornography web sites.”193  Indeed, the ISPs generally did not even re-
quire a “probable cause” order; they were willing to block access to 
websites nationwide on the sole basis of a letter from the Attorney 
General threatening to invoke the statute.194
When Pennsylvania subscribers challenged the statute, the trial 
court viewed the statute with an appropriately critical eye.  Although it 
acknowledged that the statute on its face required only that ISPs block 
access to unprotected material, the court rejected the state’s argu-
ment that the predictable collateral damage regarding access to inno-
cent websites “does not violate the First Amendment because it re-
sulted from decisions made by ISPs, not state actors.”195  Relying on 
the analogous analysis of the reaction of cable intermediaries in Play-
191 In the URL http://www.whitehouse.gov/government/brown-bio.html, for in-
stance, the “domain name” is “whitehouse.gov.” Blocking access to that “domain 
name” would block access to every site that shares the domain name. 
 192 The Center for Democracy & Technology court explained: 
[T]he URL alone is not sufficient for the user’s computer to locate the web 
site.  A user’s computer must first determine the numeric Internet Protocol 
Address or IP address of the desired web site.  Every device, or computer, us-
ing the Internet must have a unique IP address. . . . When a user seeks to ac-
cess a particular URL, the user’s computer initiates a look up through a series 
of global databases known as the domain name system (“DNS”) to determine 
the IP Address of the Web Server that can provide the desired web pages. . . . 
Although a specific URL refers only to one specific web site, many different 
web sites (each with different domain names and URLs) are hosted on the 
same physical Web Server, and all the web sites on a server share the same IP 
Address. 
337 F. Supp. 2d at 617-18. 
193 Id. at 655. 
194 Id. at 660 (“In the one instance when an ISP, WorldCom, did not respond to 
Informal Notices, defendant carried out its ‘thinly veiled threat’ and obtained a court 
order against WorldCom and subsequently issued a press release describing the legal 
proceeding.”). 
195 Id. at 651. 
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boy Entertainment Group, and the McCarthy-era learning of Bantam 
Books, the court concluded that the predictable reactions of the ISPs 
to the shadow of prosecution could not be disavowed by the state any 
more than McCarthy-era red hunters could disavow the impact of 
their “pitiless publicity” on the lives of their victims.196
Turning to the justifications for the statute, the court observed 
that the blocking requirements could be easily circumvented by so-
phisticated users relying on proxy web servers or anonymizers, and 
that the Attorney General failed to provide evidence either that the 
blocking orders would impede child abuse, or that the state had ex-
hausted the routes of direct investigation of the “entities that produce, 
publish, and distribute the child pornography.”197  The court went on 
to observe that the statutory blocking orders had the same overbroad 
effect of prior restraints.  Statutory designations required blocking not 
on the basis of the current content of the URLs, but on the basis that 
they had once linked to web pages with problematic content, and hav-
ing implemented the blocks, ISPs had no incentive to review the con-
tent. 
Just as the content of a newspaper changes without changing the title of the 
publication, the content identified by a URL can change without the URL it-
self changing.  In fact, it is possible that the owner or publisher of material on 
a web site identified by a URL can change without the URL changing.  Plain-
tiffs demonstrated this by purchasing the http://www.littleangels.tv/tr URL 
and converting the alleged child pornography web site into a web site dedi-
cated to a description of this case. . . . Moreover, other than the instances in 
which complaints were made about blocked innocent content, ISPs have con-
tinued to maintain their blocking action.
198
The trial court held the statute unconstitutional, rejecting the 
state’s claim that the possibility that ISPs could contest overbroad or-
ders in criminal prosecutions would save the statute, since “[a]n ISP 
has little incentive to challenge the suppression of a web site with 
which it has no business relationship.”199
196 Id. at 650-52.  Judge Edwards in American Library Ass’n v. FCC recently voiced 
similar conclusions with more asperity:  “Intervenor [Motion Picture Association of 
America] . . . argues that any injury suffered by the Libraries following the FCC’s im-
plementation of the broadcast flag regulations will be ‘due solely to the independ-
ent . . . decisions of third parties not before this Court.’ . . . This is a specious argu-
ment.”  406 F.3d 689, 697 (D.C. Cir. 2005)(citations omitted). 
197 Ctr. for Democracy & Tech., 337 F. Supp. 2d at 655. 
198 Id. at 657-58 (citations omitted). 
199 Id. at 658.  Pennsylvania declined to appeal the determination in Center for Democ-
racy & Technology.  We may see more discussion of these issues in the litigation around 
the Utah statute that sought to invoke a similar approach to block material that is “harm-
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Similar problems attend governmental efforts to interfere with 
Internet communications by exerting pressure against other weak 
links in the chain of Internet communications.  Professors Mann and 
Belzley have recently advanced proposals to exert leverage against 
websites by targeting payment intermediaries, and these proposals 
raise substantial concerns of collateral impact.200  On one hand, there 
can be no First Amendment objection to a prohibition on payment 
for contraband pirated movies or child pornography.  On the other 
hand, an enterprise that distributes legal content should not be sub-
ject to a commercial death sentence on the ground that it once vio-
lated the law.201  This is particularly so if the death sentence is handed 
down by executive fiat rather than judicial determination; an agree-
ment with a payment intermediary to prevent payment to “wrongdo-
ers” constitutes at least as effective a prior restraint as the issuance of a 
list of “immoral” books.  Just as the former cannot be issued without 
the “First Amendment due process” required by Freedman v. Maryland, 
the latter must be hedged with similar safeguards.202 So too, the 
emerging tactic of law enforcement officials in targeting ISPs with 
“requests” that they take down websites that officials find problematic 
ful to minors.”  See Stipulated Order, The King’s English v. Shurtleff, No. 2:05CV00485 DB 
(D. Utah Aug. 25, 2006), available at http://www.cdt.org/speech/20060829utah.pdf; 
Complaint at 3, The King’s English, No. 2:05CV00485 DB (D. Utah June 9, 2005), avail-
able at http://www.cdt.org/speech/utahwebblock/20050609hb260complaint.pdf. 
200 Mann & Belzley, supra note 8, at 271-72, 289-90, 307 (expressing enthusiasm for 
the use of “hot lists” to prohibit payment intermediaries from doing business with en-
terprises that engage in activities the state seeks to suppress; giving accounts of efforts 
of the New York Attorney General to prevent payment intermediaries from handling 
gambling sites); cf. Mann, supra note 8, at 716 (“[C]onsumers should not lose the pro-
tections they have under conventional systems . . . . [despite] [t]he need to allow ex-
perimentation . . . .”). 
201 See Vance v. Universal Amusement Co., 445 U.S. 308 (1980) (per curiam) (find-
ing unconstitutional a statute that authorized courts to issue orders prohibiting the 
future exhibition of film by a theater that had shown an obscene film in the past); 
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 722-23 (1931) (striking down a statute that allowed 
the court to prohibit future publication by periodicals that had published unprotected 
libel in the past). 
 The Court in Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 551 (1993), approved the for-
feiture of stock imposed on a dealer of obscene publications, but did not interfere in 
future activities, distinguishing Near and Vance on the ground that “[Alexander] is per-
fectly free to open an adult bookstore or otherwise engage in the production and dis-
tribution of erotic materials; he just cannot finance these enterprises with assets de-
rived from his prior racketeering offenses.”  See also Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 
U.S. 697, 705-06 n.2 (1986) (distinguishing the closure order sought here, which “has 
nothing to do with any expressive conduct at all,” from a prior restraint under Near). 
202 See, e.g., Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 71 (1963) (finding uncon-
stitutional the “complete suppression of . . . listed publications” by informal notice). 
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raises, in modern form, the threats to free expression implicit in any 
mechanism of prior restraint.203
b.  “Less Intrusive Alternatives” 
Even if they are not unconstitutionally overbroad, efforts to re-
cruit intermediaries as proxy censors should generally be viewed as 
“more intrusive” for First Amendment purposes than efforts to regu-
late speakers or listeners directly.  Just as First Amendment doctrine 
treats the availability of sanctions against conduct as a basis for invali-
dating prohibition of speech enabling such conduct,204 and the possi-
bility of subsequent prosecution as a reason to avoid prior restraint,205 
proxy censorship should be permissible only as a last resort. 
203 Zieper v. Metzinger, 392 F. Supp. 2d 516 (S.D.N.Y. 2005), represents a paradig-
matic case of improper government action to leverage the weakness of intermediaries.  
When law enforcement officers were unsuccessful in their efforts to persuade a website 
owner to take down a wholly protected imaginary video documentary of preparations 
for a military coup targeted at the Times Square celebration of the millennium, federal 
agents approached the intermediaries who hosted the website, informing the host 
“that they wanted the video blocked because they were concerned that it could be ‘in-
citing a riot,’” and that “‘[w]e’ve contacted your upstream provider, GTE.  And if you 
don’t pull the site down, they will.’”  Id. at 523, 531.  When the web host took down the 
website, the author of the website sued the federal agents.  The trial court found a vio-
lation of the First Amendment had been made out for summary judgment purposes, 
but granted immunity to the FBI agents on the ground that they had been advised by 
their attorneys of the propriety of their actions under the FBI’s “good corporate citi-
zenship” program.  Id. at 538.  The conclusion of the district court that the FBI’s ac-
tions are constitutionally dubious seems well grounded; the conclusion that they may 
be privileged by “qualified immunity” seems to ignore the heritage of Bantam Books and 
the learning of the McCarthy era that “subtle interferences” no less than direct prose-
cutions are subject to First Amendment scrutiny.  See, e.g., discussion of Joint Anti-
Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123 (1951), supra note 102. 
204 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234, 245 (2002) (“‘Among free 
men, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to prevent crime are education and pun-
ishment for violations of the law, not abridgement of the rights of free speech.’” (quot-
ing Kingsley Int’l Pictures Corp. v. Regents of Univ. of N.Y., 360 U.S. 684, 689 (1959) 
(quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 378 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring)))); 
Riley v. Nat’l Fed’n of the Blind of N.C., Inc., 487 U.S. 781, 800 (1988) (striking down 
a broad prophylactic disclosure requirement that infringed on First Amendment pro-
tections against compelled speech where “the State may vigorously enforce its anti-
fraud laws to prohibit professional fundraisers from obtaining money on false pre-
tenses or by making false statements”); Schneider v. New Jersey (Town of Irvington), 
308 U.S. 147, 162 (1939) (“There are obvious methods of preventing littering.  
Amongst these is the punishment of those who actually throw papers on the streets.”). 
205 See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975) (“[A] free 
society prefers to punish the few who abuse rights of speech after they break the law 
than to throttle them and all others beforehand.”). 
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Theories of the First Amendment converge on this conclusion.  
Protection of autonomy is a clear part of the constitutional grounding 
of free expression; the Court regularly proclaims that the “heart of the 
First Amendment” is the ideal that “each person should decide for 
himself or herself the ideas and beliefs deserving of expression, con-
sideration, and adherence.”206  Vesting authority over expression or 
receipt of messages with parties other than the speaker or hearer in-
creases the intrusiveness of government regulation, for it moves that 
decision away from the parties whose autonomy is centrally at issue. 
On a second front, the system of free expression serves the politi-
cal goal of minimizing the risk that government will “excis[e] certain 
ideas or viewpoints from the public dialogue.”207  Sanctions exerted 
against those who are least likely to resist risk such excision more than 
authority exerted over those whose commitment to speech is more 
robust.  And sanctions directed at intermediaries in a fashion that 
prevents them from alerting the end users,208 or sanctions that impose 
criminal penalties (which are intrinsically impossible to capitalize into 
user fees), should be regarded as more intrusive still. 
Nor should efforts to recruit the discretion of intermediaries into 
suppressing publicly disfavored speech find shelter under doctrines 
protecting the discretion of publishers and broadcasters.  The Court 
has observed “that editors—newspaper or broadcast—can and do 
abuse this power is beyond doubt,” but “[c]alculated risks of abuse are 
206 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186, 220 (2003) (quoting Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. 
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 641 (1994)).  A law that prohibits reading without official con-
sent, like a law that prohibits speaking without consent, “constitutes a dramatic depar-
ture from our national heritage and constitutional tradition.”  Watchtower Bible & 
Tract Soc’y of N.Y., Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 166 (2002). 
207 Turner Broad. Sys., 512 U.S. at 642; see also Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (noting that serious constitutional problems arise 
where governmental funding is “calculated to drive certain ideas or viewpoints from 
the marketplace” (quotation marks and citation omitted)); Forsyth County v. National-
ist Movement, 505 U.S. 123, 130 (1992) (rejecting content-based discrimination be-
cause of threat of deforming public dialogue); Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of 
the N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991) (same). 
208 See, e.g., Doe v. Gonzales (Doe I), 386 F. Supp. 2d 66, 70 (D. Conn 2005) (strik-
ing down the application of an order which prohibited disclosing that a person was 
being investigated by the FBI); Doe v. Ashcroft (Doe II), 334 F. Supp. 2d 471, 501-03 
(S.D.N.Y. 2004) (observing that the order “coerces the reasonable recipient into im-
mediate compliance” by prohibiting disclosure of “the issuance of the [order] to ‘any 
person’”).  Doe I was vacated and remanded, and Doe II dismissed as moot, by Doe v. 
Gonzales, 449 F.3d 415, (2d Cir. 2006). 
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taken in order to preserve higher values.”209  Those higher values in-
here in institutions that can check government abuse, not institutions 
that undertake censorship at government behest. 
In recent cases, the Court has tended to view efforts to suppress 
speech as constitutionally suspect where the government forgoes 
mechanisms allowing listener choice and instead imposes direct pro-
hibitions on speech.210  The Court is on solid ground in seeing 
mechanisms that locate decisions with the end user as less intrusive, 
and this insight is of particular import for regulation of intermediar-
ies.  Empowering users to filter is less intrusive than imposing obliga-
tions on intermediaries.  A majority of the Court seemed to grasp this 
fact in American Library Ass’n:  the likely overblocking by the mandated 
filters was seen as impermissible by the dissent, and Justice Kennedy’s 
concurrence was premised on the proposition that end users could 
costlessly avoid the overblocking.211
D.  Safe Harbors and Clear Boundaries:  The Danger  
of Liability Without Fault or Falsity 
1.  The Doctrinal Heritage 
The McCarthy era warped the political culture of the United 
States by raising the risks of political action.212  Those who voiced con-
troversial sentiments could find themselves subject to prosecution or 
discharge, or pinned by the “spotlight of pitiless publicity.”213  But un-
209 Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 673-74 (1998) (quoting 
CBS, Inc., v. Democratic Nat’l Comm., 412 U.S. 117, 124-25 (1973)). 
210 See, e.g., Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 667 (2004) (upholding an injunction 
against a statute prohibiting dissemination of images “harmful to minors” where the 
adoption of user-based filters was a less intrusive alternative); United States v. Playboy 
Entm’t Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (requiring the less restrictive alternative 
of allowing subscribers to request blocking of particular programs); Reno v. ACLU, 
521 U.S. 844, 877 (1997) (considering “user-based software” an effective method to al-
low “parents [to] prevent their children from accessing sexually explicit and other ma-
terial which parents may believe is inappropriate”). 
211 United States v. Am. Library Ass’n, 539 U.S. 194, 215 (2003) (Kennedy, J., con-
curring) (arguing that adult users’ access was not shown to be “burdened in any sig-
nificant degree”); see also discussion supra notes 176-187 (evaluating the Court’s “con-
cern with the potential collateral damage wrought by regulation of internet 
intermediaries” in American Library Ass’n). 
212 See, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 607 (1967) (citing scholarly 
findings that “the stifling effect on the academic mind from curtailing freedom of as-
sociation in such manner is manifest”). 
213 See supra note 89. 
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demonstrative association was dangerous as well.  Connection with 
targets of government suspicion could precipitate intrusive investiga-
tion, and aid to the objects of prosecution could risk both civil and 
criminal sanctions.  One of the pathologies of the McCarthy era, like 
the echoes of the McCarthyite techniques in the effort to suppress the 
civil rights movement in the South, was precisely the impact of such 
prospects on citizens not deeply committed to dissent.  As the Court 
recognized, members of a group potentiate and enable each others’ 
advocacy:  “Effective advocacy of both public and private points of 
view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group 
association.”214  Conversely, as McCarthyite techniques induced the 
less-committed members of the polity to turn away, controversial ad-
vocates were left without shelter or resources, and each member of 
civil society examined her cohorts to assure that associates brought no 
danger of persecution. 
In response to this experience, a cluster of First Amendment doc-
trines evolved to bar legal mechanisms particularly likely to deter the 
less committed from political speech and association.  These doctrinal 
structures established safe harbors in which unheroic citizens could 
still feel free to participate in discourse, to associate, and to facilitate 
the discourse of others. 
a.  First Amendment Skepticism of Strict and Vicarious Liability 
The earliest initiative came in Wieman v. Updegraff, where the 
Court invalidated a state statute requiring that public employees dis-
avow being “affiliated directly or indirectly” with any organization 
listed as subversive by the United States Attorney General.215  The stat-
ute was held unconstitutional because “the fact of association alone 
determines disloyalty and disqualification” regardless of “whether as-
sociation existed innocently or knowingly”; the prospect of sanction-
214 NAACP v. Alabama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958); see also id. at 460-
61 (“[S]tate action which may have the effect of curtailing the freedom to associate is 
subject to the closest scrutiny.”); Bhd. of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 1, 6 
(1964) (recognizing “[t]he right of members to consult with each other in a fraternal 
organization”); Gibson v. Fla. Legislative Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 544 
(1963) (“‘[F]reedom to engage in association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas 
is an inseparable aspect of the “liberty” assured by the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which embraces freedom of speech.’” (quoting NAACP v. Ala-
bama ex rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. at 460)); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437-38 (1963) 
(striking down prohibition of “cooperative activity that would make advocacy of litiga-
tion meaningful”). 
215 344 U.S. 183, 186 (1952) (quotation marks omitted). 
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ing innocent association threatened unacceptably “to stifle the flow of 
democratic expression and controversy at one of its chief sources.”216
As the tide of McCarthyism receded, the Court responded more 
fully to the chilling effect of guilt by association, erecting a margin of 
safety for those who engage in political organization.  In Scales v. 
United States, the Court interpreted the prohibition of membership in 
the Communist Party in light of constitutional mandates by limiting it 
to “only ‘active’ members having also a guilty knowledge and in-
tent.”217  The Court acknowledged a concern that “the mere existence 
of such an enactment tends to inhibit the exercise of constitutionally 
protected rights, in that it engenders an unhealthy fear that one may 
find himself unwittingly embroiled in criminal liability,” but stated 
that the intent requirement met the concern:  “The clause does not 
make criminal all association with an organization which has been 
shown to engage in illegal advocacy.  There must be clear proof that a 
defendant ‘specifically intend[s] to accomplish [the aims of the or-
ganization] by resort to violence.’”218
Subsequent cases viewed Scales as the foundation of a constitu-
tional principle establishing a safe harbor for political association not 
specifically intended to accomplish unlawful ends.219  A solid line of 
216 Id. at 191; see also Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 248 (1957) (striking 
down a contempt citation for refusal to answer political questions, where “as in Wie-
man, the program for the rooting out of subversion is drawn without regard to the 
presence or absence of guilty knowledge in those affected”). 
 Wieman, like several of the other cases in this line, was nominally a due process 
case, but as Henry Monaghan noted a generation ago, issues of substance and proce-
dure intertwine with particular tenacity in the area of free expression.  Henry P. 
Monaghan, First Amendment “Due Process,” 83 HARV. L. REV. 518, 518 (1970) (“[C]ourts 
have lately come to realize that procedural guarantees play an equally large role in 
protecting freedom of speech; indeed, they ‘assume an importance fully as great as the 
validity of the substantive rule of law to be applied.’” (quoting Speiser v. Randall, 357 
U.S. 513, 520 (1958))). 
217 367 U.S. 203, 228 (1961). 
218 Id. at 229 (quoting Noto v. United States, 367 U.S. 290, 299-300 (1961)); see also 
Noto, 367 U.S. at 299-300 (requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt “for otherwise 
there is a danger that one in sympathy with the legitimate aims of such an organiza-
tion, but not specifically intending to accomplish them by resort to violence, might be 
punished for his adherence to lawful and constitutionally protected purposes”). 
219 See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 186 (1972) (“The government has the 
burden of establishing a knowing affiliation with an organization possessing unlawful 
aims and goals, and a specific intent to further those illegal aims.”); Keyishian v. Bd. of 
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 608 (1967) (“[L]egislation which sanctions membership unac-
companied by specific intent to further the unlawful goals of the organization . . . vio-
lates constitutional limitations.”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 265 (1967) (in-
validating a statute forbidding members of the Communist Party from working in 
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precedents established the proposition that “[t]he First Amend-
ment . . . restricts the ability of the State to impose liability on an indi-
vidual solely because of his association with another.”220  It is only 
knowing and intentional alignment with illicit undertakings that can 
constitute the predicate for liability, and the intent must be affirma-
tively established by appropriate evidence.  Citizens have no obligation 
to monitor, censor, or inform on their associates. 
The threat posed by strict liability was not limited to problems of 
association.  Just as strict liability for “subversive” association threat-
ened to turn citizens into overzealous monitors of each others’ patri-
otism, criminal or civil liability without fault for the communications 
of others risked generating a problematic corps of proxy censors.  
Constitutional skepticism of liability without fault thus took root as a 
broader First Amendment doctrine. 
In Smith v. California, the Court reviewed a Los Angeles ordinance 
that imposed strict criminal liability on booksellers who possessed “ob-
scene or indecent” books or writings.221  The Court acknowledged the 
legitimacy of strict liability for possession of contraband in other cir-
cumstances, but nonetheless observed that there are “legal devices 
and doctrines in most applications consistent with the Constitution, 
which cannot be applied in settings where they have the collateral ef-
fect of inhibiting the freedom of expression.”222  The Smith Court 
noted the bookseller’s likely “timidity in the face of his absolute 
criminal liability”223 and held the ordinance’s punishment of booksell-
ers without knowledge or fault to be unconstitutionally likely to en-
courage them to act as proxy censors: 
[I]f the bookseller is criminally liable without knowledge of the contents, 
and the ordinance fulfills its purpose, he will tend to restrict the books 
defense facilities, finding that “guilt by association alone, without [establishing] that an 
individual’s association poses the threat feared by the Government” is impermissible); 
Elfbrandt v. Russell, 384 U.S. 11, 16 (1966) (striking an oath binding state employees 
from becoming members of the Communist Party, since “proscription of mere know-
ing membership, without any showing of ‘specific intent,’ would run afoul of the Con-
stitution”); Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500, 510 (1964) (invalidating the statu-
tory denial of passports to members of Communist Party, because “‘[i]ndiscriminate 
classification of innocent with knowing activity must fall as an assertion of arbitrary 
power’” (quoting Wieman, 344 U.S. at 191)). 
220 NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 918-19 (1982) (reversing a 
grant of damages because there lacked a showing of conscious affiliation with unlawful 
activity). 
221 361 U.S. 147, 148 (1959). 
222 Id. at 150-51. 
223 Id. at 154. 
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he sells to those he has inspected; and thus the State will have imposed a 
restriction upon the distribution of constitutionally protected as well as 
obscene literature.
224
In the last half century, Smith has regularly served as the basis for 
decisions rejecting the imposition of liability without fault on inter-
mediaries who facilitate the transmission of erotic materials from 
speaker to listener.225  These decisions are congruent with the protec-
tions for publishers against liability for defamation without fault,226 
and the greater protection provided to critics of public figures and 
public officials by New York Times Co. v. Sullivan and its progeny.227
b.  Transmission of Truth and Constitutional Privilege 
In the last generation the Court has developed, as well, a second 
safe harbor based not on the mental state of the speaker but on the 
content of the speech:  regardless of other doctrinal analysis, “[a]s a 
general matter, ‘state action to punish the publication of truthful in-
formation seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.’”228  To pierce 
224 Id. at 153. 
225 See, e.g., United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 78 (1994) (inter-
preting a child pornography statute in light of Smith to require knowledge of the age of 
the individuals pictured); New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 765 (1982) (“As with ob-
scenity laws, criminal responsibility [for child pornography] may not be imposed with-
out some element of scienter on the part of the defendant.”); Manual Enters., Inc. v. 
Day, 370 U.S. 478, 492 (1962) (rejecting “the power of the Post Office to bar a maga-
zine from the mails, if exercised without proof of the publisher’s knowledge of the 
character of the advertisements included in the magazine”); cf. Ginsberg v. New York, 
390 U.S. 629, 644 (1968) (approving an obscenity statute where “‘[i]t is not innocent 
but calculated purveyance of filth which is exorcized’” (quoting People v. Finkelstein, 
174 N.E.2d 470, 471 (1961))). 
226 See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 497 U.S. 1, 20 (1990) (“[A] statement 
of opinion relating to matters of public concern which does not contain a provably 
false factual connotation will receive full constitutional protection.”); Time, Inc. v. 
Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 463 (1976) (noting the distinction between “journalistic negli-
gence” and defamation) (quotation marks omitted); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 
U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (forbidding states from imposing defamation liability without 
fault). 
227 N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 279-80 (1964) (requiring deliberate 
falsehood or reckless disregard); Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50 (1988) 
(adopting the same standard for intentional infliction of emotional distress); Time, 
Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 390 (1967) (applying the same standard to “false light” pri-
vacy actions). 
228 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (citations omitted); see also Fla. 
Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524, 541 (1989) (“[W]here a newspaper publishes truthful in-
formation which it has lawfully obtained, punishment may lawfully be imposed, if at all, 
only when narrowly tailored to a state interest of the highest order . . . .”); Smith v. 
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the privilege, plaintiffs or prosecutors generally bear the burden of 
demonstrating falsity.229  Even where the reputation of private figures 
is at issue, in defamation actions: 
[P]lacement by state law of the burden of proving truth upon media de-
fendants who publish speech of public concern deters such speech be-
cause of the fear that liability will unjustifiably result.  Because such a 
“chilling” effect would be antithetical to the First Amendment’s protec-
tion of true speech on matters of public concern, we believe that a pri-
vate-figure plaintiff must bear the burden of showing that the speech at 
issue is false before recovering damages for defamation from a media de-
fendant.  To do otherwise could only result in a deterrence of speech 
which the Constitution makes free.
230
The analysis applies with particular force to media that act as in-
termediaries for the information provided by others; constitutional 
privilege limits the ability of the state to co-opt intermediaries into the 
role of censoring true information they transmit.  In Bartnicki v. Vop-
per, the Court reviewed an effort to impose liability on a radio com-
mentator who broadcast portions of an illegally intercepted cell 
phone conversation among union leaders discussing the need to 
“blow off [the] front porches” of public officials negotiating with the 
union.231 Notwithstanding a statute that imposed liability on any per-
son who disclosed information they “‘kn[ew] or ha[d] reason to 
know’”232 was the result of illegal interception, the Court held that the 
commentator was constitutionally immune from suit for compensa-
tory, statutory, or punitive damages.  The statute was said to be “a con-
tent-neutral law of general applicability,” but was still “a regulation of 
pure speech.”233  Invoking the general presumption against sanction-
ing publication of truthful information, the Court held that the act of 
Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 103 (1979) (reversing a conviction for publishing 
the name of a defendant in a juvenile proceeding); Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Vir-
ginia, 435 U.S. 829, 829 (1978) (reversing a conviction for the publication of an article 
about a pending confidential inquiry by the Virginia Judicial Inquiry and Review Com-
mission); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (reversing the award of 
damages for invasion of privacy against a publisher of the name of a rape victim dis-
closed in court records); N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) 
(per curiam) (refusing to enjoin the publication of purloined Pentagon Papers). 
229 The Court regularly phrases the privilege as one that can be overcome by over-
riding public necessity, but equally regularly finds the necessity absent. 
230 Phila. Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 777 (1986) (citation and quota-
tion marks omitted). 
231 532 U.S. 514, 519 (2001). 
232 Id. at 520 (citation omitted). 
233 Id. at 526. 
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publishing the information provided by the anonymous interceptor 
was constitutionally privileged, declaring that “[t]he normal method 
of deterring unlawful conduct is to impose an appropriate punish-
ment on the person who engages in it.”234
2.  Fault, Falsity, and the Problem of Proxy Censorship  
of the Internet 
The presumptions against liability without fault and in favor of a 
privilege for truthful communications provide useful starting points to 
analyze a series of proposed and actual efforts by government to co-
opt Internet intermediaries as proxy censors.  Three areas of current 
practice raise these issues in particularly pressing fashion:  the contro-
versy around vicarious liability for copyright violation, efforts to enlist 
intermediaries in the “War on Terror,” and the role of collaborative 
authorship in weaving the World Wide Web.  In each, there is reason 
to believe that draconian threats of liability would as effectively “tend 
to restrict the public’s access to [communications] which the State 
could not constitutionally suppress directly”235 when deployed against 
Internet intermediaries as when deployed against fellow travelers, 
hard copy publishers, and booksellers.  In considering contemporary 
efforts to bring legal pressure to bear on vulnerable “points of con-
234 Id. at 529; see also id. at 535 (“[A] stranger’s illegal conduct does not suffice to 
remove the First Amendment shield from speech about a matter of public concern.”).  
But cf. id. at 533 (leaving open “disclosures of . . . information of purely private con-
cern”); id. at 535-36 (Breyer, J., concurring) (emphasizing the narrowness of the hold-
ing, the “unusual public concern” of the speech at issue, and the necessity of balancing 
“speech-restricting and speech-enhancing consequences”). 
 The Court did not directly distinguish Cohen v. Cowles Media Co., 501 U.S. 663 
(1991), but presumably such a distinction could rest either on the proposition that the 
regulation in Bartnicki was “a regulation of pure speech,” Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 526, or 
that, unlike the promissory estoppel approved in Cowles Media, the “State itself defined 
the content of publications that would trigger liability” and the challenged statute im-
posed more than the “incidental, and constitutionally insignificant, consequence of 
applying to the press a generally applicable law that requires those who make certain 
kinds of promises to keep them,” Cowles Media, 501 U.S. at 670, 672.  Cf. Doe v. GTE 
Corp., 347 F.3d 655, 659 (7th Cir. 2003) (rejecting the web hosting company’s liability 
under a wiretap statue for the sale on a site it hosted of tapes obtained in violation of 
the federal wiretap statute, explaining that “[j]ust as the telephone company is not li-
able as an aider and abettor for tapes or narcotics sold by phone, and the Postal Ser-
vice is not liable for tapes sold (and delivered) by mail, so a web host cannot be classi-
fied as an aider and abettor of criminal activities conducted through access to the 
Internet”). 
235 Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 154 (1959). 
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trol” on the Internet, therefore, we would do well to remember the 
safe harbors crafted in response to the McCarthy era. 
a.  Vicarious Liability for Copyright Violation 
Although controversies raged a decade ago regarding the scope of 
liability of Internet intermediaries for defamation, section 230 of the 
Communications Decency Act (CDA)236 has largely suppressed efforts 
to use defamation law as a lever to impel Internet intermediaries to 
act as proxy censors of allegedly libelous content.237  Likewise, al-
though the DMCA erects a system that can be manipulated to induce 
intermediaries to censor targeted works,238 in form, at least, it provides 
protection against liability of many Internet intermediaries for un-
knowing contribution to copyright violations, and limits incentives for 
236 47 U.S.C. § 230 (2000). 
237 Numerous cases hold that various “information computer service[s]” qualify for 
immunity from defamation actions because they do not function as “information con-
tent provider[s]” within the meaning of the CDA.  See, e.g., Carafano v. Metros-
plash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 1124 (9th Cir. 2003) (user-created content on an 
online dating site); Batzel v. Smith, 333 F.3d 1018, 1031-31 (9th Cir. 2003) (posting of 
a received email message); Green v. Am. Online, Inc., 318 F.3d 465, 471 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(chat room messages); Ben Ezra, Weinstein & Co. v. Am. Online, Inc., 206 F.3d 980, 
986 (10th Cir. 2000) (online posting of stock information); Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 
129 F.3d 327, 327 (4th Cir. 1997) (online message-board postings); Optinrealbig.com, 
LLC v. Ironport Sys., 323 F. Supp. 2d 1037, 1046-47 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (online spam 
complaint business).  But cf. Hy Cite Corp. v. Badbusinessbureau.com, 418 F. Supp. 2d 
1142, 1148 (D. Ariz. 2005) (noting that immunity is not available to defendants who 
provide the allegedly wrongful content themselves); MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbu-
reau.com, L.L.C., No. 3:02-CV-2727-G, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6678, at *36 (N.D. Tex. 
Apr. 19, 2004) (refusing to extend immunity to a business that posted customer com-
plaints that were disparaging to outside companies); Barrett v. Rosenthal, 9 Cal. Rptr. 
3d 142, 152 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004), review granted, 87 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2004) (suggesting 
that distributor liability survived 47 U.S.C. § 230).  See also infra note 274, noting cases 
recognizing immunity from statutory liability. 
238 A number of authors highlight the possibilities for manipulation.  See, e.g.,  
Sonia K. Katyal, Privacy vs. Piracy, 7 YALE J.L. & TECH. 222, 281-89 (2004) (noting the 
efforts of the Recording Industry Association of America to compel an ISP to block 
privately stored content); Katyal, supra note 52, at 330-31 (noting the takedown and 
subpoena provisions that copyright owners may use as leverage against ISPs to effect 
the removal of infringing, third party material); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Pri-
vate Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 653, 661-62 (2005) (citing examples of erroneous and 
potentially abusive takedown notices); see also Online Policy Group v. Diebold, Inc., 
337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2004) (detailing the misuse of DMCA notice to 
suppress information). 
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intermediaries to take initiatives to censor material passing through 
their facilities.239
Still, efforts have proceeded apace to use threats of liability to 
enlist Internet intermediaries as proxy censors.  The strategy has been 
most prominent in the attempts by content providers to impose vi-
carious copyright liability, which would not be barred by section 230, 
on intermediaries who provide novel mechanisms that can be used to 
facilitate the transfer of information over the Internet. 
These attempts took place against the background of the rule in 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,240 which, as has been 
noted previously, considered the secondary copyright liability of 
manufacturers of videocassette recorders who opened up the oppor-
tunity for viewers to record and “time shift” programs broadcast on 
television.  The Sony Court refused to impose the obligation on manu-
facturers to act as proxy censors.  Rather, the Court held that liability 
was inappropriate since the equipment had “substantial non-
infringing uses”:  among others, public television stations waived copy-
right entitlements and encouraged viewers to time shift their broad-
casts.  Vicarious liability would “frustrate the interests of broadcasters 
in reaching the portion of their audience that is available only 
through time-shifting.”241
With the explosion of Internet use, content providers adopted the 
position that innovators who forged network mechanisms that could 
be used to share music should be liable for copyright violations that 
took place over their networks, notwithstanding the fact that some 
sharing was entirely legitimate.  The first—and most notorious—case 
involved Napster, whose business model touted the possibility of pro-
viding an end run around the copyright laws.  In A&M Records, Inc. v. 
239 17 U.S.C. § 512(a)(2) (2000) (providing protection for “automatic” transmis-
sion of material); id. § 512(c) (providing the “storage” safe harbor); id. § 512(d) (pro-
viding the “information tools” safe harbor). 
 Section 512(i), however, also requires that intermediaries “accommodate[] . . . 
standard technical measures” used by copyright holders to protect their interests, and 
that they adopt and “reasonably implement” a policy of “termination in appropriate 
circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s system or 
network who are repeat infringers.”  At least one court has held that configuration of a 
system that makes identification of repeat infringers impossible precludes recognition 
of the DMCA safe harbor.  In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 252 F. Supp. 2d 634, 659 
(N.D. Ill. 2002) (“Adopting a repeat infringer policy and then purposely eviscerating 
any hope that such a policy could ever be carried out is not an ‘implementation’ as re-
quired by [section] 512(i).”). 
240 464 U.S. 917 (1984). 
241 Id. at 446. 
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Napster, Inc., the Ninth Circuit imposed a duty on Napster to exercise 
control over its proprietary peer-to-peer network to censor its system 
users; the court distinguished Sony because the ongoing central index-
ing function gave Napster, unlike Sony, “actual, specific knowledge of 
direct infringement” by users of its system.242  The Napster court re-
versed, as overbroad, the lower court’s requirement that Napster en-
sure “that no ‘copying, downloading, uploading, transmitting, or dis-
tributing’ of plaintiffs’ works occur on the system,” but observed that 
“Napster . . . bears the burden of policing the system within the limits 
of the system.”243
When a new set of technologists began to configure peer-to-peer 
systems whose “limits” avoided either the knowledge or central control 
that grounded liability for Napster, the recording industry again in-
voked theories of secondary copyright liability.  In the Aimster litiga-
tion, reviewing one of these second generation decentralized and 
anonymous peer-to-peer file sharing systems, the district court issued 
an injunction requiring “measures to ensure that the Aimster System 
and Service prevents any and all copying, downloading, distributing, 
uploading, linking to, or transmitting of Plaintiffs’ Copyrighted 
Works.”244  The Seventh Circuit affirmed.  Judge Richard Posner 
commented that “[t]he fact that copyrighted materials might some-
times be shared between users of such a system . . . would not make 
the firm a contributory infringer.”245  However, the plaintiffs had dem-
onstrated that widespread, infringing file sharing had been facilitated 
by the network and was apparently encouraged by the defendants, and 
the defendants had adduced “no evidence whatsoever . . . that Aimster 
is actually used for any of the stated non-infringing purposes.”246  
Moreover, the “ostrich-like refusal to discover the extent to which its 
system was being used to infringe copyright,” combined with the de-
liberate design of a system that made knowledge impossible, was tan-
tamount to guilty knowledge, and therefore sufficient to impose liabil-
ity for contribution to copyright infringement.247  In dictum, Judge 
242 239 F.3d 1004, 1020 (9th Cir. 2001); cf.  Ellison v. Robertson, 357 F.3d 1072, 
1077 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding that a jury could conclude that “AOL had reason to 
know of potentially infringing activity occurring within its USENET network”). 
243 Napster, 239 F.3d at 1027. 
244 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., No. 01-6-8933, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 21453, at *2 
(N.D. Ill. Oct. 30, 2002). 
245 In re Aimster Copyright Litig., 334 F.3d 643, 647 (7th Cir. 2003) (noting that 
otherwise AOL could be liable for its Instant Message service). 
246 Id. at 653 (quotation marks omitted). 
247 Id. at 655. 
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
2006] CENSORSHIP BY PROXY 89 
 
Posner went further, suggesting that the Sony safe harbor for “substan-
tial noninfringing uses” would be unavailable whenever censorship 
mechanisms would not be “disproportionately costly” to install.248
The Supreme Court denied certiorari in Aimster, but turned to the 
issue in MGM Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 249 a case involving two other 
peer-to-peer networks that billed themselves as successors to Napster 
and whose architecture, like that of Aimster, precluded centralized 
knowledge and control by the operators.  Relying on Judge Posner’s 
opinion in Aimster, the entertainment industry asked the Court to 
overturn the holding in Sony and impose vicarious liability for distrib-
uting software that facilitated copyright violations where the software 
was used “principally for infringement” and the infringing use “can be 
readily blocked.”250  Other amici advanced the proposition that just as 
vicarious liability is imposed elsewhere in the law upon landlords, bar-
tenders, and the voluntary bailors of motor vehicles to encourage 
them to control other actors, vicarious liability should be imposed on 
the operators of systems that facilitate copyright violation in order to 
“give manufacturers . . . incentive to deter infringement”251 where it 
would be technically possible to interpose software to block infringing 
uses.  Nothing in these lines of reasoning, in principle, limited the po-
tential of indirect liability to software distributors; the obligation to 
“readily block” might be equally applicable to ISPs, search engines, or 
other Internet intermediaries. 
One group of three Justices was attracted to the position of the 
entertainment industry,252 while another faction of three Justices 
sought to retain the Sony safe harbor untouched.253  The entire Court, 
however, joined in an opinion by Justice Souter that pretermitted the 
248 Id. at 647, 653. 
249 125 S. Ct. 2764 (2005). 
250 Brief of Petitioner at 32-33, Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480). 
 251 Brief of Amici Curiae Kenneth J. Arrow et al. in Support of Petitioners at 3-4, 
Grokster, 125 S. Ct. 2764 (No. 04-480).   These amici further reasoned: 
Bars sometimes are held liable when bartenders serve alcoholic beverages to 
patrons who later harm others while driving drunk.  A motor vehicle owner 
can be held to account if a driver to whom he loans his car ends up causing an 
accident.  Landlords are sometimes deemed responsible if they take inade-
quate precautions against criminal activity that in turn harms tenants.   
Id. 
 
252 Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2783 (Ginsburg, J., concurring, joined by Rehnquist, C.J., 
and Kennedy, J.). 
253 Id. at 2787 (Breyer, J., concurring, joined by Stevens and O’Connor, JJ.). 
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exact scope of the defense of “substantial noninfringing uses” and the 
duty to prevent copyright violations.  The Court read Sony as address-
ing only the degree to which “contributory” copyright liability could 
be based on the distribution of a product.254  Such “contributory” li-
ability is premised on an intent to induce a copyright violation, and 
the Court read Sony to preclude “imputing culpable intent as a matter 
of law from the characteristics or uses of a distributed product,” but to 
permit liability for third party copyright violations based on “evidence 
of intent if there is such evidence . . . as shown by clear expression or 
other affirmative steps taken to foster infringement, [making the dis-
tributor] liable for the resulting acts of infringement by third par-
ties.”255  The opinion cautioned, however, that “mere knowledge of in-
fringing potential or of actual infringing uses would not be enough 
here to subject a distributor to liability.”256  Reviewing the evidence of 
the defendants’ practices, the Court found that the defendants each 
“clearly voiced the objective that recipients use [their free software] to 
download copyrighted works, and each took active steps to encourage 
infringement.”257
Some commentators have viewed this focus on purpose as a mis-
step, avoiding as it does judicial evaluation of competing economic 
and technological effects.258  However, the lessons of the McCarthy era 
support the limitation of intermediary liability to cases of purposeful 
inducement.  Like the presumption against vicarious liability for 
communicative torts and the protection against sanctions for innocent 
association, a requirement of a showing of purposeful inducement 
erects a safe harbor for those who innocently facilitate the speech of 
others, and stems their inclination to engage in prophylactic censor-
ship. 
When one recalls the fragility of intermediary commitment to free 
speech, and the dangers of censorship by proxy, the argument that 
Internet intermediaries should be subjected to vicarious liability on 
the ground that tavernkeepers have similar liability rings more than a 
254 Id. at 2776 (majority opinion) (“One infringes contributorily by intentionally 
inducing or encouraging direct infringement . . . and infringes vicariously by profiting 
from direct infringement while declining to exercise a right to stop or limit it.”) (cita-
tions omitted). 
255 Id. at 2779-80. 
256 Id. at 2780. 
257 Id. at 2772. 
258 See, e.g., Tim Wu, The Copyright Paradox, 2005 SUP. CT. REV. 229, 230 (arguing 
that the Court failed to examine the “welfarist” perspective, which calls for “a disci-
plined focus on questions of industry economics and consumer, or user, welfare”). 
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little hollow.  The easiest response to the threat of vicarious liability is 
to remove the risk by avoiding the activities that bring the threat of 
suit.  If a bartender sells a bit less booze to a sober customer, society 
suffers relatively little.  On the other hand, if Internet intermediaries 
erect technological barriers that filter out legitimate communication, 
they have imposed exactly the censorship the government is constitu-
tionally prohibited from sanctioning directly.259  The Court is properly 
wary of mandating a control mechanism that can be so easily diverted 
to censorial purposes.260
b.  Material Support, the “War on Terror,” and the Internet 
A second set of issues regarding vicarious liability of Internet in-
termediaries arises out of efforts to disrupt “terrorist networks” and 
their supporters.  Current regulations require financial intermediaries 
to deny services to individuals alleged to associate with terrorist net-
works, and require nonprofit organizations to assure that they neither 
employ nor make funds available to organizations on terrorism watch 
lists.261  Internet intermediaries present obvious targets for a similar 
259 The issue arises not only from the temptation of peer-to-peer networks to in-
stall overzealous filters to block transmission within their network, but also from the 
inclination of other networks to block access to peer-to-peer mechanisms out of a fear 
of associating with copyright infringers. 
260 In this dimension, Grokster’s result is less than ideal.  The opinion emphasizes 
that “in the absence of other evidence of intent, a court would be unable to find con-
tributory infringement liability merely based on a failure to take affirmative steps to 
prevent infringement.” Grokster, 125 S. Ct. at 2781 n.12 (2005).  At one level it estab-
lishes a safe harbor for devices (and services) capable of substantial noninfringing 
uses, but, as Wu points out, other parts of the opinion suggest that a “dual use tech-
nology” reduces its likelihood of being classified as an illegal inducement by adopting 
a design that facilitates proxy censorship.  Wu, supra note 258, at 247.  If courts adopt 
something like a per se rule that filtering devices immunize against secondary liability, 
the experience with safe harbor provisions of the DMCA suggests that companies may 
view filtering as effectively mandatory.  See, e.g., Ed Oswald, BitTorrent, Hollywood Reach 
Piracy Deal, BETA NEWS, Nov. 22, 2005, http://www.betanews.com/article/ 
BitTorrent_Hollywood_Reach_Piracy_Deal/1132701192 (reporting that the creator of 
a popular file-storing software company agreed to preclude his website from locating 
allegedly pirated films). 
261 See DAY, BERRY, & HOWARD FOUND., INC., HANDBOOK ON COUNTER-TERRORISM 
MEASURES:  WHAT U.S. NONPROFITS AND GRANTMAKERS NEED TO KNOW (2004),  
available at http://www.cof.org/files/Documents/Publications/2004/CounterTerrorismHandbook.pdf 
(discussing specific provisions of Executive Order 13224, the USA PATRIOT Act, and 
the U.S. Tax Code that make U.S. nonprofits and grant makers responsible for ensur-
ing that their funding or activities do not assist terrorist networks); see also Defendants’ 
Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment at 1, ACLU v. Office 
of Personnel Mgmt., No. 1:04cv01958 EGS (D.D.C. Feb. 7, 2005), available at http:// 
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effort by the U.S. government to enlist a corps of strategically placed 
collaborators into the “War on Terror.” 
The most likely tool of recruitment currently at hand resides in 
the “material support” statutes, enhanced after the attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, which impose criminal liability upon anyone who “know-
ingly provides material support or resources” to an organization offi-
cially designated as a “foreign terrorist organization.”262 “Material 
support,” in turn, is defined to include “any property, tangible or in-
tangible, or service, including . . . training, expert advice or assis-
tance . . . communications equipment, [or] facilities.”263
At the extreme, it is possible to imagine a prosecution for failing 
to filter and block an IP packet directed from or to a website affiliated 
with a proscribed organization, on the theory that transmitting the 
packet “provides” a “service,” “communications equipment,” or a “fa-
cility.”  University of California administrators, indeed, expressed con-
cern about liability for providing a hyperlink on a hosted website to 
the website of a proscribed organization, on the theory that the link 
constitutes “communications equipment” or “facilities.”264  Federal 
prosecutors have not, to my knowledge, gone this far, although the 
full extent of covert interaction between federal antiterrorist opera-
tives and communications providers is as yet unrevealed.265  However, 
www.ombwatch.org/npa/CFCMtnDismiss.pdf (stating that in 2004 private organiza-
tions wishing to receive contributions through the Combined Federal Campaign were 
required to certify that “they did not knowingly employ individuals or contribute funds 
to organizations found on [certain] terrorist-related lists” (quotation marks omitted)); 
Press Release, ACLU, ACLU and Diverse Coalition of National Non-Profits Win Major 
Victory in Challenge to Misguided CFC Government Watch List and Contribution Poli-
cies (Nov. 9, 2005), http://www.aclu.org/natsec/emergpowers/21264prs20051109.html 
(referring to the Office of Personnel Management’s final regulation releasing private 
organizations from the requirement to check terrorist watch lists). 
262 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339B(a)(1) (2006). 
263 Id. § 2339A(b)(1). 
264 See Declan McCullagh, University Backs Down on Link Ban, CNET NEWS.COM, 
Oct. 8, 2002, http://news.com.com/2100-1023-961297.html, (reporting that a year af-
ter the attacks of September 11, the administration of the University of California at 
San Diego decided to forbid a student website from linking to the website of the Revo-
lutionary Armed Forces of Colombia for fear that this might be construed as “provid-
ing ‘material support,’” but relented after protests). 
265 See, e.g., Eric Lichtblau & James Risen, Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials 
Report, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 24, 2005, at A1 (reporting that telecommunications companies 
“have been storing information on calling patterns and giving it to the federal gov-
ernment to aid in tracking possible terrorists”); Shane Harris & Tim Naftali, Tinker, 
Tailor, Miner, Spy:  Why the NSA’s Snooping is Unprecedented in Scale and Scope, SLATE, Jan. 
3, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2133564 (describing the cooperation between pri-
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courts have speculated that under the “material support” statutes “a 
cab driver could be guilty for giving a [foreign terrorist organization] 
member a ride to the UN,” while a host could be liable for “loaning 
the member a cell phone for use during the stay, or allowing the 
member to use the fax machine or laptop computer in preparing [a] 
petition.”266
Federal prosecutors have done more than speculate.  They have 
advanced the theory that making a telephone call to a foreign terrorist 
provides “material support” in “providing” the “facilities” of the 
caller’s telephone.267  Moreover, the Justice Department undertook an 
unsuccessful seven-week-long trial under the “material support” stat-
utes to prosecute a graduate student in computer science who main-
tained websites for Islamic charities, which, along with calls for peace 
and dialogue and other religious topics, permitted the posting of ji-
hadist propaganda and links to Hamas websites.  The government’s 
theory was that the defendant had provided “expert advice or assis-
tance” to foreign terrorist organizations.268
If unrestrained by First Amendment doctrine, the “material sup-
port” statutes, or other similar criminal prohibitions that might be 
adopted, will threaten to recruit a federally conscripted corps of cen-
sors.  Webmasters, site owners, or technicians could find themselves 
the subjects of criminal prosecution for facilitating the transmission of 
any message originating with federally proscribed organizations.  A 
risk-averse Internet intermediary would not need to descend into 
paranoia to conclude that the most prudent course would be to proac-
tively censor messages or links that might prove problematic, and to 
vate telecommunications companies and federal authorities in providing access to vast 
amounts of communications data to the NSA). 
266 United States v. Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1337-38 & n.31 (M.D. Fla. 
2004); see also United States v. Al-Arian, 329 F. Supp. 2d 1294, 1300 (M.D. Fla. 2004) 
(discussing how “criminal liability and punishment for conduct are intertwined with 
the criminal conduct of others”). 
267 United States v. Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d 348, 358 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) (noting that 
the government argued that “mere use of one’s telephone” and “using the conference 
call feature on a person’s phone” constituted material support). 
268 Richard B. Schmitt, Acquittal in Internet Terrorism Case Is a Defeat for Patriot Act 
L.A. TIMES, June 11, 2004, at A20 (quotation marks omitted); see also Schmitt, supra 
note 46, at A25 (“The government argues that the [student’s] services were rendered 
as part of a plot to raise money and recruit foot soldiers for terrorist missions . . . .”); 
Fick, Trial Pits Free Speech vs. Terror, supra note 46, at A5 (“[Prosecutors] allege [that the 
student] knew his actions would bring in donations and recruits for groups associated 
with terrorist organizations . . . .”). 
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respond to official “requests” with alacrity.  Here again, the legacy of 
the McCarthy era can provide guidance. 
Just as the Court imposed a requirement of knowing alignment 
with illicit purposes before allowing red hunters and race baiters to 
disrupt networks of political support and participation in the after-
math of the McCarthy era, First Amendment doctrine should be read 
at a minimum to provide similar protection to those who innocently 
associate with illicit actors or provide links in the chain of communica-
tion to them over the Internet.  Some statutes and common law doc-
trines deployed in the “War on Terror” already incorporate these lim-
its.269  However, where positive law lacks such limits, the doctrines 
rooted in the memory of the McCarthy era counsel that protection 
must be provided for intermediaries who facilitate public discourse.270
269 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 842(p)(2) (2000) (prohibiting the “distribution of infor-
mation relative to [weapons]” with the intent or knowledge that such information will 
be used “in furtherance of an activity that constitutes a Federal crime of violence”); id. 
§ 2339A (prohibiting the provision of “material support or resources” with the intent 
or knowledge that they are to be used illicitly); Boim v. Quranic Literacy Inst., 291 F.3d 
1000, 1028 (7th Cir. 2002) (discussing the definition of civil aiding and abetting liabil-
ity under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2333). 
270 For cases requiring that “material support” statutes such as 18 U.S.C.A. § 2339 
be read to include a specific intent requirement, see Al-Arian, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 1337 
(concluding that “material support” statutes should not be interpreted to capture 
those who unknowingly support a foreign terrorist organization without the intent to 
encourage unlawful activity); United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 296 (S.D.N.Y. 
2004) (same); cf. Humanitarian Law Project v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 352 F.3d 382, 400 
(9th Cir. 2003); Humanitarian Law Project v. Gonzales, 380 F. Supp. 2d 1134, 1144 
(C.D. Cal. 2005); Humanitarian Law Project v. Ashcroft, 309 F. Supp. 2d 1185, 1200 
(C.D. Cal. 2004); Sattar, 272 F. Supp. 2d at 358. 
 A number of courts have rejected First Amendment limits on the ground that the 
McCarthy-era cases protect only “association” rather than “action.”  See, e.g., United 
States v. Hammoud, 381 F.3d 316, 329 (4th Cir. 2004), vacated, 543 U.S. 1097 (asserting 
that § 2339B does not suppress free expression, that “Hammoud is free to advocate in 
favor of Hezbollah or its political objectives,” and that only material conduct is crimi-
nalized); Humanitarian Law Project, 352 F.3d at 385 (affirming the previous decisions 
that § 2339B “did not violate the First Amendment by allegedly imposing guilt by asso-
ciation and restricting symbolic speech”); United States v. Marzook, 383 F. Supp. 2d 
1056, 1062 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (“There is no constitutional right to provide . . . the re-
sources with which the terrorists can purchase weapons and explosives.”). 
 Given the Court’s recognition of “association” as a form of “cooperative activity” 
that facilitates “effective advocacy,” see supra note 214, this distinction seems to ignore 
the functions of the protection of association in the aftermath of the McCarthy era.  A 
more responsive distinction could be rooted in recognition of a difference between 
donation of funds or weapons and the facilitation of a “medium for the communica-
tion of ideas,” Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 501 (1952), that constitutes 
the recognized material precondition to public dialogue.  See, e.g., Robert Post, Encryp-
tion Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 713, 719 (2000) (“Pub-
KREIMER PENNUMBRA.DOC 11/21/2006 6:52:58 PM 
2006] CENSORSHIP BY PROXY 95 
 
c.  Safe Harbors Beyond Intent:  Privilege for Weaving the Internet 
Publication on the Internet is increasingly a collaborative enter-
prise.  The capacity to provide hyperlinks to other websites allows a 
burgeoning variety of communicators from blogs to mainstream me-
dia to build on the work of others.  Links increase exponentially both 
the information conveyed by the sites’ own content, and the exposure 
sites provide for the thought of others.  Search engines weave webs of 
links custom tailored to the requests of individual users, and con-
versely provide access to websites to audiences worldwide.  Yet every 
link carries with it a connection with the entire web of data to which 
the link leads, and it is all too easy to envision a legal environment 
that obligates intermediaries to cull that web for risky connections, 
precipitating proxy censorship.  When an Internet intermediary con-
fronts an aggressive prosecutor or private plaintiff, intent require-
ments may prove flimsy shields.  As Justice Frankfurter observed dur-
ing the McCarthy era, “[i]n times of political passion, dishonest or 
vindictive motives are readily attributed . . . and as readily believed.”271  
The pitfalls of relying on a fact finder’s construction of motivation are 
no less in the twenty-first century.272
In traditional media, as we have previously observed, at least for 
intermediaries who are engaged in public discourse, the Court has es-
tablished a safe harbor for transmission of truthful information.  A 
newspaper cannot be sanctioned, without extraordinary justification, 
for publishing information of public importance though it was ille-
gally obtained and disruptive of foreign policy or individual privacy.273  
lishing software in print is covered by the First Amendment because it forms part of 
public discourse and debate.”); Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 
STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1254 (1995) (arguing that communication must “embody a certain 
kind of relationship between speaker and audience” before it implicates the First 
Amendment); cf. Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534-35 (2001) (holding that the 
First Amendment protection of open debate on matters of public importance can, in 
some instances, outweigh privacy concerns); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 
U.S. 886, 913-15 (1982) (holding that the nonviolent, political aspects of a boycott 
serve the interests of self-government). 
271 Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 378 (1951). 
272 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 542 U.S. 656, 670-71 (2004) (“Where a prosecution is a 
likely possibility, yet only an affirmative defense is available, speakers may self-censor 
rather than risk the perils of trial.”). 
273 Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528 (discussing New York Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 
713, 714 (1971) (per curiam), which “upheld the right of the press to publish informa-
tion of great public concern obtained from documents stolen by a third party”); see also 
supra notes 230-237 (discussing the effects of another party’s illegal conduct on First 
Amendment protection). 
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The same principle would presumably stand in the way of government 
officials who seek to punish a newspaper that published the URL of an 
Al Qaeda website, even if it could be proven that the newspaper har-
bored jihadist sympathies.  The question is whether a different result 
should be obtained where an Internet intermediary provides links or 
directions to content that the government seeks to suppress. 
The issue has been most directly addressed in the context of intel-
lectual property disputes, in part because intellectual property actions 
are among the few legal liabilities that can pierce the effectively abso-
lute immunity provided to most Internet intermediaries by section 230 
of the Communications Decency Act (CDA).274  The most aggressive 
and dubious imposition arose in the Universal Studios litigation sur-
rounding the copyright decryption program DeCSS, where the trial 
court granted, and the Second Circuit upheld, an injunction barring 
the owners of the periodical website 2600.com from posting links to 
other websites that made the program available.275  Where the links 
were posted for “the purpose of disseminating” the decryption pro-
gram, both courts held, they constituted prohibited “trafficking” in 
“circumvention technologies” barred by the DMCA.276
The trial court in Universal Studios acknowledged that: 
Anything that would impose strict liability on a web site operator for the 
entire contents of any web site to which the operator linked . . . would 
raise grave constitutional concerns, as web site operators would be inhib-
ited from linking for fear of exposure to liability.  And it is equally clear 
that . . . some web site operators confronted with claims that they have 
posted circumvention technology falling within the statute may be more 
inclined to remove the allegedly offending link rather than test the issue 
in court.  Moreover, web sites often contain a great variety of things, and 
274 See supra note 239 (noting the provisions of the DMCA).  The CDA exempts 
federal criminal laws, laws pertaining to intellectual property, and the Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act of 1986.  47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1), (2), (4) (2000).  Courts have 
read the protection against liability for content provided by others to preempt virtually 
every other cause of action.  E.g., Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119, 
1122 (9th Cir. 2003) (invasion of privacy; negligence); Corbis Corp. v. Amazon.com, 
Inc., 351 F. Supp. 2d 1090, 1118-19 (W.D. Wash. 2004) (Consumer Protection Act, 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.86.010-920 (West 1999), and tortious interference with 
business relationships); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommate.com, 
LLC, No. CV 03-09386 PA(RZX), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27987, at *8-9 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 
30, 2004) (Federal Fair Housing Act, 42 U.S.C. § 3604(c) (2000)); Noah v. AOL Time 
Warner Inc., 261 F. Supp. 2d 532, 540-41 (E.D. Va. 2003) (Title II of Civil Rights Act of 
1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (2000)). 
275 Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 434-35 (2d Cir. 2001), aff’g 
Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294 (S.D.N.Y. 2000). 
276 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2), (b)(1) (2000). 
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a ban on linking to a site that contains DeCSS amidst other content 
threatens to restrict communication of this information to an excessive 
degree.
277
 
The trial court believed, however, that a limitation of liability to ac-
tions with a sufficient degree of culpability would immunize activity 
“except in cases in which the conduct in question has little or no re-
deeming constitutional value.”278  It therefore required clear and con-
vincing evidence that the website owner “create[d] or maintain[ed] 
the link” to a website containing contraband technology “for the pur-
pose of disseminating” it as a prerequisite to prohibition.279
The Second Circuit held that the trial court’s test met First 
Amendment objections: 
If [contraband] materials are posted on one web site and other sites post 
hyperlinks to the first site, the materials are available for instantaneous 
worldwide distribution before any preventive measures can be effectively 
taken.  This reality obliges courts considering First Amendment claims in 
the context of the pending case to choose between two unattractive al-
ternatives:  either tolerate some impairment of communication in order 
to permit Congress to prohibit decryption that may lawfully be pre-
vented, or tolerate some decryption in order to avoid some impairment 
of communication. . . . [T]he District Court’s injunction[] is consistent 
with the limitations of the First Amendment . . . .280
Notwithstanding their initial concern with free expression, the 
Universal Studios courts were seduced by the novelty of the Internet 
into forgetting the lessons of the McCarthy era.  The lacunae are both 
practical and theoretical.  First, as a practical matter, a bulwark that 
rests entirely on motivation risks erosion under determined assault.  
Courts faced with the task of discerning the intent of intermediaries 
may err, particularly where the scales of representation are less than 
evenly balanced.  In the shadow of such errors, the possibility that in-
termediaries will be required to defend their intent in posting each 
link to websites that may harbor controversial content is likely to im-
pel intermediaries to censorial excess.  Second, as a matter of law, nei-
ther court gave adequate weight to the proposition that “[a]s a gen-
277 Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d at 340 (citations omitted). 
278 Id. 
279 Id. at 341.  The actual prohibition was embodied in an injunction, which ar-
guably imposes less censorial pressure than the threat of a damage action, since the 
judge administering the injunction is in a position to police inequitable bullying by the 
plaintiff. 
280 Corley, 273 F.3d at 457-58 (declining to determine whether the standard was 
constitutionally compelled). 
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eral matter, ‘state action to punish the publication of truthful infor-
mation seldom can satisfy constitutional standards.’”281  That proposi-
tion was emphatically reaffirmed in Bartnicki, a case handed down af-
ter briefing in the Second Circuit, and it reflects the insight that 
intermediaries are all too easily converted into proxy censors.  Even 
ill-motivated speech has the capacity to contribute substantially to 
public debate,282 and the fact that free public discourse risks the dis-
semination of “decryption that may lawfully be prevented” is usually 
not grounds for censorship.  A doctrine that seeks to induce interme-
diaries to suppress true information on the basis of motivation alone is 
in substantial tension with the recognition of the need for a safe har-
bor for truth. 
A somewhat more promising approach has looked to the degree 
of connection between the referring websites and the linked websites.  
Thus, in Batesville Services, Inc. v. Funeral Depot, Inc., the court observed: 
[H]yperlinks are essential to the operation of the Internet for a host of legiti-
mate purposes.  The host of a website who establishes a link to another site 
that may be interesting to the host’s website visitors does not undertake any 
general duty to police whether the linked sites contain any material infringing 
the copyrights of others.”
283
   
The court left the door open to liability where the defendant had “ex-
tensive involvement” in the copyright infringement on the linked 
website:  where the defendant “actively secured control of the con-
tents of the [linked] website and modified the website to use it for its 
own purposes.”284  A website owner who effectively adopts the illegal 
conduct of another as her own has less claim to immunity as a pro-
vider of information to the public.  Similar analyses in other intellec-
281 Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001) (quoting Smith v. Daily Mail 
Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 102 (1979)). 
282 See Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 54-56 (1988) (holding that politi-
cal cartoons are protected speech, despite their “caustic nature”); see, e.g., Nissan Mo-
tor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1007 (9th Cir. 2004) (holding, in a 
trademark case, that “to enjoin Nissan Computer from providing visitors to nissan.com 
a link to sites with disparaging or negative commentary about Nissan Motor is . . . in-
consistent with the First Amendment”); Ford Motor Co. v. 2600 Enters., 177 F. Supp. 
2d 661, 662-64 (E.D. Mich. 2001) (“When an Internet user enters [fuckgeneralmo-
tors.com] into a web browser, he is automatically linked to the official website of Plain-
tiff Ford Motor Company (‘Ford’), which is located at ‘ford.com’. . . .  Trademark law 
does not permit Plaintiff to enjoin persons from linking to its homepage simply be-
cause it does not like the domain name or other content of the linking webpage.”). 
283 No. 1:02-CV-01011-DFH-TAB, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24336, at *33 (S.D. Ind. 
Nov. 10, 2004). 
284 Id. at *34-35. 
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tual property cases recognize the importance of allowing intermediar-
ies to provide accurate conduits to unaffiliated websites without taking 
on liability for those linkages.285
A final approach arises in litigation surrounding search engines 
that facilitate access to both legally distributed and illegally infringing 
content.  The leading cases seem to take the position that “‘the fair 
use doctrine encompasses all claims of First Amendment in the copy-
right field.’”286  If the “fair use” of the search engine user is at issue, 
285 See, e.g., Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc., 416 F. Supp. 2d 828, 840 (C.D. Cal. 2006) 
(holding that a website only infringes a copyright where content is hosted on its own 
server, reasoning that “[t]o adopt the incorporation test [finding copyright infringe-
ment where a website provides online links to other websites] would cause a tremen-
dous chilling effect on the core functionality of the web—its capacity to link, a vital fea-
ture of the internet that makes it accessible, creative, and valuable”); id. at 842 
(reviewing cases holding that hyperlinking does not constitute copyright infringe-
ment); id. at 856 (holding that Google was not secondarily liable because its search 
functions did not “materially contribute” to copyright infringement by websites that 
displayed infringing content, notwithstanding some commercial links); Comcast of Ill. 
X, LLC v. Hightech Elecs., Inc., No. 03 C 3231, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14619, at *8-9 
(E.D. Ill. July 28, 2004) (“Defendants correctly point out that under Comcast’s theory 
of increased internet traffic all major search engines such as Yahoo and Google could 
be named as defendants as well.”); Bernstein v. JC Penney, Inc., No. 98-2958 R(Ex), 
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19048, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 29, 1998) (granting defendant’s 
motion to dismiss); cf. Parker v. Google, Inc., 422 F. Supp. 2d 492, 497, 499 (E.D. Pa. 
2006) (finding that Google’s linking and caching did “not include the necessary voli-
tional element to constitute direct copyright infringement,” and did not bear a suffi-
ciently “direct relationship to the infringing acts” to constitute contributory infringe-
ment). 
 Similarly, in Lanham Act litigation, courts have invoked First Amendment con-
cerns in refusing to impose liability on critical websites whose commercial connections 
lie at the end of a chain of hyperlinks.  See, e.g., Bosley Med. Inst., Inc. v. Kremer, 403 
F.3d 672, 678 (9th Cir. 2005) (“This roundabout path to the advertising of others is too 
attenuated to render Kremer’s site commercial.”); Savannah Coll. of Art & Design, Inc. 
v. Houeix, 369 F. Supp. 2d 929, 946 (S.D. Ohio 2004) (“To arrive at the sites contain-
ing commercial content requires a process which is two steps removed from the initial 
decision . . . .”). 
286 Arista Records, Inc. v. MP3Board, Inc., No. 00 Civ. 4660 (SHS), 2002 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 16165, at *37 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 28, 2002) (quoting New Era Publ’ns Int’l v. Henry 
Holt & Co., 873 F.2d 576, 584 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, 
Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1028 (9th Cir. 2001) (“First Amendment concerns in copyright are 
allayed by the presence of the fair use doctrine.”); Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom On-
Line Commc’n. Servs., Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1231, 1258 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“The doctrine 
of fair use already considers First Amendment concerns.”). 
 At least one case has gone further.  See Intellectual Reserve, Inc. v. Utah Light-
house Ministry, Inc., 75 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1295 (D. Utah 1999) (ordering defendants 
to “remove from and not post on defendants’ website, addresses to websites that de-
fendants know, or have reason to know, contain the material alleged to infringe plain-
tiff’s copyright” and rejecting First Amendment objections as inapplicable to copyright 
claims). 
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this approach seems clearly inadequate:  to the extent that search en-
gines must inquire into the use to which customers may put their 
links, it provides little in the way of protection for dissemination of 
truthful information.  On the other hand, if the “fair use” inquiry goes 
to the nature of the service provided by the search engine itself, an in-
vestigation of the “purpose and character of the work” seems like a 
promising avenue of protecting pathways to information in public dis-
course.287
CONCLUSION 
The first wave of legal thinking about the Internet saw millennial 
omens in technology.  The reach of the Internet seemed to exceed 
the grasp of governments, and this structure heralded—or threat-
ened—the end of censorship. 
The new millennium has now dawned, but censorship is still with 
us.  While the Internet makes life more difficult for governments that 
seek to sanction speakers or listeners directly, it has also provided cen-
sors with a tempting array of proxies.  Faced with the challenge of 
controlling the transfer of information on the Internet, governments 
increasingly adopt the strategy of putting pressure on Internet inter-
mediaries to act for them. 
This turn to proxy censors carries with it a series of dangers to the 
system of free expression, for intermediaries are likely to be substan-
tially less robust in their defense of free speech than are speakers and 
listeners.  Claims that the natural workings of the market-–or the 
Internet—will alleviate these threats misunderstand both technology 
and politics. 
Legal tools to address these dangers of the future can be found in 
the struggles of the past.  The threats of proxy censorship mirror the 
challenges of the McCarthy era and the battle for civil rights in the 
287 See, e.g., Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp., 336 F.3d 811, 819 (9th Cir. 2003) (conclud-
ing that the display of “thumbnail” images by a search engine constituted fair use be-
cause of the transformative purpose of  “improving access to information on the inter-
net”); Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1118-19 (D. Nev. 2006) (finding that 
Google’s “caching” of websites which do not opt out is fair use, given, inter alia, the 
value of the caches for Internet navigation); cf. Perfect 10, 416 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (rec-
ognizing that, “given the exponentially increasing amounts of data on the web, search 
engines have become essential sources of vital information for individuals, govern-
ments, non-profits, and businesses who seek to locate information,” but finding on 
balance that the harm to possible commercial use of “thumbnail” images precluded 
fair use). 
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South, when governments sought to avoid First Amendment con-
straints by enlisting civil society structures in crusades to suppress left-
wing ideology and to hold back the civil rights revolution. 
In the 1950s, the Court ultimately recognized the necessity of 
guarding free expression both against “heavy handed frontal attack” 
and against “being stifled by more subtle government interference.”288  
The doctrines born of that recognition require courts to take cogni-
zance of the likelihood of collateral damage from proxy censorship in 
First Amendment calculus, and to eschew legal structures that impose 
liability on intermediaries without fault or falsehood.  These doctrines 
do not answer all of the challenges, but they are indispensable plat-
forms from which to fashion the doctrines necessary to protect free 
expression in our generation. 
288 Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960). 
